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Abstract 
This thesis traces Ibsen's development as a writer of tragedy through lykke. 
contingency and happiness. 
Chapter I explains why notions of chance and happiness are so central to 
tragedy, and shows how the interests of tragedy and ethics converge in these 
concepts. Aristotle's arguments in the Poetics for the secularisation of tragedy are 
examined, along with basic ethical and tragic categories of eudaimonia 
(happiness) and tuche (luck). The case is then made for seeing Norwegian lykke as 
a concept straddling both these notions. This leads to the argument that Ibsen 
performs an analogous secularising gesture on his own tragedies, which explains 
the development from an excessive reliance on external agencies in his historical 
tragedies to the highly sophisticated accounts of lykke in later works. 
Chapter II presents the early historical tragedies from Catilina to Kejser og 
GaiJlceer, dramas written in 'high tragic' mode, dependent on notions of fate and 
other forces hostile to human happiness. 
Chapter ill argues that with Brand, Ibsen turns away from manifestations 
of contingency, and is more concerned with human agency. Here the spiritual 
discipline of the hero, not contingency, is pitted against happiness, and the move 
towards secularisation is discernible. 
Chapters IV, V and VI focus on Ibsen's realist tragedies Et Dukkehjem, 
Gengangere and Rosmersholm, secularised tragedies par excellence. Through their 
explorations of happiness, they participate in philosophical debates such as the 
affirmation of the ordinary life and utilitarianism. 
The last two chapters examine Bygmester Solness and John Gabriel 
Borkman, in which Ibsen returns to an analysis of notions of extra-human 
agencies and chance as determiners of happiness, not as a return to the 
cosmologies of his historical tragedies, but as a part of the dramatization of the 
hero's search for truth. 
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Hvorfor blir man staende ved Sokrates? 
Hvorfor gar man ikke et lidet skritt videre 
og hdger Diogenes eller - om jeg ter sige -
mig, da vi dog ferer eder tillykken? Thi er 
ikke lykken formalet for al visdomsl~re? -
Kejser Julian 
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1.1 Introduction 
Chapter I 
Introduction 
Julian the Apostate defines lykke (happiness) as the end of all 
philosophical enquiry.! This is one of his less controversial statements, because 
as Simon Blackburn explains, 
All ethical theories accord some importance to human 
happiness. They differ first in their conception of what 
that happiness consists in, secondly in views of how an 
agent's own personal happiness is aligned with, or traded 
against, the general happiness, and thirdly in whether it is 
necessary to acknowledge any other end for human 
action.2 
This thesis sets out to explore lykke and kindred concepts in the tragedies 
of Henrik Ibsen. It does not do so in order to distil a discrete philosophy from 
these dramas, nor to crystallise any neat definition of 'lbsenian tragedy,' but 
rather to locate lykke at the tragic core of these works. Norwegian lykke 
(happiness, luck, success) will be considered alongside Greek eudaimonia 
(happiness) and tuche (chance) within a specifically Aristotelian framework. 
The main point of entry is Aristotle's canonical anatomy of tragedy 
contained in the Poetics3 supported by his views on eudaimania as expounded in 
the Nichomachean and the Eudemian Ethics.4 By establishing an affinity between 
lykke and eudaimania, it will be possible both to evaluate the extent to which 
Ibsen's tragedies are Aristotelian and to delimit the conceptual spine which 
supports these plays and what Miguel de Unamuno would term their "tragic 
sense of life".5 
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The evolution of lykke is traced from Catilina (1850) to John Gabriel 
Borkman (1896), with the emphasis on the post-Brand dramas. The early 
historical works are of interest not because they uniformly indicate the levels of 
subtlety Ibsen was to reach in later works, but because they evidence a writer 
who was vexed by the lykke question from the very beginning of his dramatic 
output, and who would never be free from its reach. These plays also enable us 
to appreciate the continual refinements in Ibsen's thinking on lykke, both in the 
sense of 'happiness' and 'chance'. It is these refinements that so enlarge his 
tragic vision. 
Ibsen once remarked, "Man taler her i Landet om min Filosofi. Jeg har 
ingen Filosofi" .6 This is one of the few pronouncements of Ibsen's which should 
be accepted without qualification. However, this does not mean that Ibsen's 
dramatic works have no philosophical content Tvertimot. They constantly bring 
to the fore problems that are as old and enduring as philosophy itself -
happiness being the prime example, "Thi er ikke lykken formalet for al 
visdomsl(Ere?" 
I will argue that the basic structure of Ibsen's exploration of lykke is 
Aristotelian, but I also argue that his treatment of the problem undergoes 
several important modifications and is nuanced at times more obviously by 
other thinkers, most notably the ideas of Kant, Kierkegaard and the Utilitarians. 
Although I make extensive reference to Aristotle and other philosophers 
I am not undertaking a study in influence; nor do I consider it essential to my 
argument to establish whether Ibsen owned or read these works at any given 
time in his career. (The burden of the evidence suggests that he did not read 
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them, not the primary texts anyway. He is likely to have encountered them in 
the countless newspapers and journals he devoured so eagerly.) The point is 
that Ibsen's drama engages issues of enormous and inexhaustible philosophical 
importance, issues which at once 'belong' both to discrete thinkers and to any 
mind vexed by the problem of existence. 
1.2.1 Ibsen Criticism 
This section serves to situate this thesis in the precise context of Ibsen 
research; the next section will situate its method in a broader literary-critical 
framework. In his brief historical survey of Ibsen criticism written in 1994, Errol 
Durbach divides the secondary literature into distinct phases: 1) Marxism, 
Propaganda and Shaw7; 2) Modernist-Symbolist criticisms; 3) Freudian 
criticism9; 4) Textual Criticism, focussing on Ibsen the theatre-poetlO; 5) 
Performance criticismll and finally 5) 'Supertextual Criticism'. 
By christening this last critical tendency , Supertextual' , Durbach is 
clearly winking in the direction of Brian Johnston's 1989 Text and Supertext in 
Ibsen's Drama.12 Durbach defines Supertextual interpreters as "critics who 
conjoin text to .. supertext' and insist upon intellectual process and philosophical 
idea as the deep structure of the drama - a Weltanschauung experienced in the 
dialectical tensions within reality and tested upon the plane of universal 
reason."13 He also cites an important article by Rolf Fjelde, Richard Hornby's 
book and his own work as belonging to this sub-category .14 
This thesis identifies itself completely with this Supertextual school. 
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The Supertextual school has its pedigree in earlier philosophical 
approaches to Ibsen. One of the earliest of these was Josef Faaland's study 
published in 1943 and entitled Henrik Ibsen og Antikken15, which was a detailed 
reading of the presence of Classical mythology, philosophy and drama in Ibsen. 
It signalled a departure from morally interested readings, (which I will turn to 
presently), highlighting the great classical heritage in Ibsen's oeuvre. In 
England, also in the 1940's, Brian Downs drew together all the philosophical 
ideas he identified behind Ibsen's dramatic works in Ibsen: The Intellectual 
Background (1946).16 
After 1975, the philosophical approach underwent a renaissance with the 
publication of Brian Johnston's three Hegelian interpretations of Ibsen, which 
although too totalising a reading, had an energising effect in their irresistible 
assertion of Ibsen's intellectual range, generally undervalued by Anglo-Saxon 
critics.17 In 1981 Richard Hornby published his Kierkegaardian appraisal of 
Ibsen's so-called social plays in Patterns in Ibsen's Middle Plays, and in 1982 Errol 
Durbach's landmark work Ibsen the Romantic placed Ibsen in the context of a 
more pluralistic philosophical encounter with the history of ideas. 18 Durbach is 
one critic who always reads Ibsen with one eye on the tragic. 
1996 saw the publication of Theoharis C. Theoharis's Ibsen's Drama: Right 
Action and Tragic Joy, a work interpreting three plays by Ibsen as the site of 
collision between Aristotelian humanism and Nietzschean will to power. 19 This 
book, like Johnston's The Ibsen Cycle, represents a watershed in Ibsen 
scholarship for its insistence on the intellectual weight of Ibsen's drama, but is 
flawed in the same respect; perhaps too evangelical, its absolute positions force 
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the author into some unfortunate comers. In Norway, Egil Wyller in Henrik 
Ibsen: et enhetssyn (1999) recalls earlier Christian interpretations,20 while Tom 
Eide's Ibsens Dialogkunst, a book-length study of Ndr vi dede vdgner (2001), offers 
a much more measured and open approach. 21 
Some of the earliest Ibsen research in Scandinavia was carried out by 
theologians with overtly ethical, if not moralistic concerns. This research was 
documented by Hjalmar Brenel whose thorough Christian reading of Ibsen, 
Etiska Motiv i Henrik Ibsens dramatiska diktning, was published in 1941. Brenel 
traces the theological reception of Ibsen's work from the 1890' s to the 1930' s. 
Interpretations were often polemical (Olaf Holm, Kristus eller Ibsen?, 
1893; A. Schack, Om udviklingsgangen i Henrik Ibsens Digtning, 1896). These 
critics find Ibsen's view of life devoid of any clear umoralske 
Grundanskuelse" . 22 Two further researchers, Heinrich Weinel in his Ibsen. 
BjOrnSon. Nietzsche. Individualismus und Christentum (1908) and J. C. A. Fetter in 
his Henrik Ibsen (1917) focus on Ibsen's early dramas, and both conclude that 
Kejser og Galila?er represents Ibsen's own apostasy. Alles oder Nichts!, written by 
Emil Felden in 1911, approaches Ibsen's dramas from a very different 
perspective, evaluating them as potential sermon material.23 
Brenel himself insists that Ibsen's dramatic output opens a number of 
theological questions, and his aim is to establish the distance between Ibsen's 
presentation of the human and a Christian concept of man. In evaluating 
Ibsen's view of the human, he concludes that Ibsen uhar i huvudsak samma 
strukturella grundsyn pd miinniskan, niir hon iir utan gudsrelatian, som niir han 
skildras i medveten motsiittning till Gudsbestiimmelse" .24 
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The first critic to insist on the predominance of the ethical over the 
Christian/moral and the social dimensions in Ibsen's work was Daniel 
Haakonsen. Unfortunately Haakonsen restricted his observations to one, albeit 
ground breaking, article, "Ethical Implications in Ibsen's Drama". What 
Haakonsen responds to in this discussion is the non-normative approach to 
moral questioning in Ibsen's dramas. It is the moral questions Ibsen asks over 
and over again, most commonly articulated as a conflict between loyalty to an 
ideal and loyalty to another human being, which for Haakonsen make him 
unequivocally a writer of tragedy.25 
1.2.2 Ibsen the Tragedian 
Beyond a rather restricted battery of scattered articles, albeit in some 
cases highly provocative and illuminating, the subject of Ibsen as a writer of 
tragedies has received lamentably scant attention.26 Theoharis's Right Action is 
the most substantial recent treatment, but since it deals with only three works 
(Ghosts, Rosmersholm and The Master Builder) and gives uneven attention to 
them) has obvious problems. Thomas F. Van Laan is currently drawing 
together years of deep engagement with Ibsen as a writer of tragedy in a book-
length study which embraces his entire dramatic output. 
Van Laan's basic premise is that Ibsen must be seen "as essentially a 
dramatist in the Aristotelian mode". He correctly identifies an Aristotelian 
tragic patterning underlying his tragic composition: "the pattern in which the 
protagonist, beginning in a state of good fortune, initiates an action by acting in 
error (hamartia) and then experiences reversal, recognition, and, finally, 
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catastrophe" .27 My reading of Ibsen is tangential to Van Laan's, as I too assume 
a basically Aristotelian framework. 
Atle Kittang's Ibsens Heroisme considers aspects of heroism. Although his 
focus is on the narrower theme of self-transcendence rather than the tragic per 
se, his arguments do address several aspects of the problem.28 
At the moment there is a definite need for a sustained discussion of 
Ibsen and tragedy, for the subject badly lacks focus. This thesis hopes to 
contribute a sustained discussion within clearly defined parameters. 
If the critical response to the issue of tragedy has been patchy, the lykke 
problem has been woefully neglected. No book-length study has been 
attempted, and the number of articles which have concerned themselves with 
the issue is indecently modest. Edvard Beyer's 1946 survey "Livsgleden som 
problem i Henrik Ibsen's Diktning" was a highly promising beginning but 
unfortunately failed to inspire further studies.29 Michael Goldman's Ibsen: The 
Dramaturgy of Fear devotes a chapter to "Lykke and Tro", which he sees as 
intimately connected. 30 
1.3.1 Ethical Criticism 
The present study can be said to represent a sub-section of Supertextual 
criticism which can be defined as ethical criticism. With the term I ethical 
criticism', I allude to the secondary literature which tries to evince ethical 
problems as central to Ibsen's drama. I do not include the moralistic reactions, 
mostly contained in early theatre notices denouncing his work as rebarbative.31 
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I will link this to the broader field of what is known as 'ethical criticism' 
as an orientation within critical practice, but first I will introduce a useful 
distinction set up by Denis Donoghue between 'epi-reading' and 'graphi-
reading' .32 
Epi-reading is "predicated on the desire to hear [ ... ] the absent person". 
Epi-readings regard language as an unproblematic transparent mode, a 
window onto" the shared realm of intention and reference". It is a nostalgia for 
presence, for the human. Graphi-reading, on the other hand, privileges the 
written word over any assumed world that may exist behind it, suspicious of 
any attempt to invoke an author or voice inside the text. Deconstruction and its 
variants are graphi-readings.33 Obviously it is difficult to see how graphi-
reading can accommodate an ethical reading within the broad sweep of its 
dehumanising gestures.34 
'Ethical' is an ambiguous and not always well-chosen term; for some, 
like J. Hillis Miller, it points to the act of reading as an ethical act (and thus 
could be recast as an ethics of criticism). Those who identify the act of reading 
as an ethical act speak from within a deep-seated humanism, a humanism 
which they seek to insulate against the dehumanising ravages of non-ethical 
deconstructive theories and critical practice: Literature is an essential, human 
practice of ethical utility. As Tobin Siebers puts it, "living and choosing in the 
human world are the only true subjects of literature [ ... ]. The finally human is 
literature".35 Literary texts are valued for what they can tell us about ourselves 
and for their insights into how we can live. This critical stance takes an 
averredly didactic view of literature, at least as old as Aristotle. Its detractors 
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fault it for its lack of a clear theoretical and methodological base and for its 
nostalgia for presence. 
For others, ethical criticism denotes a critical strategy which seeks to 
locate the ethical centre of a text and to analyse the ethical issues raised by it. A 
key advocate of contemporary ethical criticism today is the classicist and 
philosopher Martha C. Nussbaum. Nussbaum came to literary criticism with an 
already finely developed neo-Aristotelian ethical theory. She eschews any rigid 
distinction between ethical philosophy and literature, as for her, ethical 
questioning is the central activity of both - they are complementary activities. 
She assesses literature's potential within an ethically more coherent society, 
foreseeing: 
a future in which our talk about literature will return 
increasingly, to a concern with the practical- to the ethical 
and social questions that give literature its high 
importance in our lives [ ... J a future in pursuit of the 
question 'how should one live?'36 
Nussbaum has generalised her position on tragedy and philosophy into 
a theory of literary interpretation, and of ethical readings of literature. She has 
extended this practice to the novel, particularly the novels of Henry James. Her 
critics have faulted her neo-Aristotelianism for not allowing for the aesthetic 
distinction between literary and philosophical texts and for refusing to confront 
the problem of language. Finally, they argue that her critical practice cannot 
extend itself beyond a limited range of texts. 
There can be no question that an ethical reading will not always be the 
appropriate response to all texts: Imagist poetry immediately suggests itself in 
this context as a particularly unyielding literary mode. However, I do not 
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intend to enter this debate, or consider the effectiveness of Nussbaum's 
interpretative strategies beyond her work on Attic tragedy and philosophy, for 
tragedy is my present concern, and it seems to me that the ethical is so deeply 
ingrained in the tragic as to be constitutive of it. 
1.3.2 Tragedy and Philosophy 
The question of the continuity or rather the discontinuity between 
tragedy and philosophy has its roots in Plato's famous stance against the poets 
in the Republic (607d).37 Prior to Plato there was no strict conceptual 
delimitation of the literary and the philosophical, certainly not as we know it 
today. As Nussbaum explains: 
For them there were human lives and problems, and 
various genres in both prose and poetry in which one 
could reflect about those problems. Indeed, epic and 
tragic poets were widely assumed to be the central ethical 
thinkers and teachers of Greece; nobody thought of their 
work as less serious, less aimed at truth, than the 
speculative prose treatises of historians and 
philosophers.38 
Plato's desire to banish the poets from the republic arose not from an 
inherent distaste for poetry and tragedy, but rested partly on his objection to 
tragedy's appeal to the emotions. He considered the emotions to fall outside the 
range of rational ethical enquiry. It also rested on the fact that tragedy had a 
clearly didactic function during Plato's time, and in his view, it was teaching 
the wrong lessons: for Plato and all who embraced the Socratic belief in the 
self-sufficiency and invulnerability of the good man, the concept of the tragic 
reversal, the peripeteia, through which the good man could come to grief, was at 
best morally suspect, at worst, abhorrent. Platonic ethics posits a world in 
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which the virtuous man would not come to grief, and it was seen as the task of 
the poets to reflect this.39 And tragedy, with its unrelenting re-enactment of 
reversals insists that they are profoundly important Moreover, tragedy 
conveys a consciousness that there is a sphere that is greater than rational self-
sufficiency, a sphere of uncontrolled events, and it demonstrates time and time 
again that this sphere can be decisive in the story of a life. 
Bernard Williams sees immense potential in tragic texts as valid areas of 
philosophical enquiry by situating them within the terms of the debate over 
contingency and rational self-sufficiency: 
A deeper sense of exposure to fortune is expressed [ ... ] 
above all in tragedy. There the repeated references to the 
insecurity of happiness get their force from the fact that 
the characters are displayed as having responsibilities, or 
pride, or obsessions, or needs, on a scale which lays them 
open to disaster in corresponding measure, and that they 
encounter those disasters in full consciousness.40 
Nussbaum concurs with Williams in this but would take it further. She argues 
that recourse to tragic texts can complement the study of philosophical texts but 
she cautions against merely plundering tragic texts to exemplify philosophical 
arguments. She urges that they be read whole and not abstracted from their 
poetic complexity because IItragedy does not display the dilemmas of its 
characters as pre-articulated; it shows them searching for the morally salient; 
and it forces us, as interpreters to be similarly active. Interpreting a tragedy is a 
messier, less determinate, more mysterious matter than assessing a 
philosophical example" .41 
Williams and Nussbaum both argue persuasively for the relevance of 
literary texts to philosophical enquiry; the opposite, the argument for the 
17 
applicability of philosophical texts to literary enquiry depends on a parallel 
conception of complementarity. Indeed, as Laurence S. Lockridge points out in 
his study of the ethics of Romanticism, the "ancient quarrel between poets and 
philosophers is played out in the very enterprise of a philosophical reading of 
literary texts" .42 I would argue, moreover, that these divisions are both 
unhelpful and unnecessary as all texts born of creative thinking interpret 
experience and can thus enter legitimate dialogue with one another. This thesis 
will demonstrate that the application of philosophical contexts, concepts and 
terminology to Ibsen's dramatic texts can provide a grammar which makes us 
more articulate on certain crucial aspects of his works, aspects which would 
otherwise remain elusive. It is perhaps this segregation of academic activity 
which has led to the dearth of interest in lykke hitherto. 
1.4.1 Lykke 
Before turning to an examination of the Greek concepts to be considered, 
it is necessary to introduce lykke. The etymology given for lykke in the Ordbog 
over det Danske Sprog (1932) shows that lykke comes from the Old Norse via the 
Old Middle German (ge)lucke, and refers simply to the "maade, hvorpaa no get 
lukker sig, falder ud". The English 'luck' clearly derives from this, but the verb 
'happen' is closer to the original sense.43 
The dictionary gives cross-references to Held for its primary definition, 
followed by sense: 
2) som udtr. for (en magt, der bestemmer) begivenheders 
ell. tildragelsers af menneskenes indgriben uafh~ngige 
udviklingsgang og de derved fremkaldte tilskikkelser; (en 
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for menneskenes vilkaar raadende) skcebne; (en 
menneskene tildelt) livsskcebne; (beskikket) lode 
The multiple glosses provided for lykke as denoting a realm beyond 
individual control (fate; circumstances and personifications of these notions, 
including Lykke as the translated name of the goddess Fortuna) suggest that 
lykke in the sense of 'happiness' accrued to the word later, as a logical 
consequence of a benign fate: "indbegreb af oms~ndigheder ell. forhold, der 
udg0r ell. er betingelsen for ens velfcerd, gunstige skcebne .... " Intimately 
related to this is affect of such favourable circumstances set out here: 
til stand ell. forhold som fremkalder en s~rk, dyb glcede 
over ell. en trygg f0lelse af visse (paa de som de 
vcesentlige f0lte omraader) gode ell. fuldkomne vilkaar 
ell. forhold, visse indre (aandelige) rigdomme, sjcelelig 
harmoni olgn Lyksalighed.44 
Although consulting the dictionary m this manner may seem like 
laborious spade work, it is crucial, for it establishes the range and force of a 
deceptively every-day word, something Ibsen was extremely alert to. But of 
more interest than this early twentieth century multi-volume dictionary is 
Molbech's Danish dictionary, the standard reference work at the time Ibsen 
was writing.4s Molbech defines Lykke thus: 
Held, heldig Tilskikkelse eller Skjebne; heldig Forening af 
saadane Tilfcelde og Oms~ndigheder, der ei staar i var 
Magt, og hvorved det attraaede Gode, det, vi holder for 
0nskeligt opnaaes eller det Onde afvcerges. (Italics mine.) 
The semantic field of lykke is thus very wide, bounded by chance and 
even full-blown divinities on the one hand and 'happiness' on the other. But it 
is clear from the dictionaries cited that the sense of 'happiness' is secondary to 
the sense of contingency. Lykke nevertheless remains a thorny translation 
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problem, for where Ibsen can be deliberately ambiguous, the English translator 
has to declare his hand: 'happiness' or 'contingency', for the chance at the root 
of the English word 'happiness' is no longer audible. 
1.4.2 Aristotle: tuche, eudaimonia, and hamartia 
Tuche, eudaimonia and hamartia all have very vexed interpretative 
histories, and are thus notoriously resistant to translation. It is now almost 
established practice to leave them untranslated. In this section I will begin by 
introducing tuche and its cognates and eudaimonia and then discuss the role they 
play in Aristotelian tragic theory, before going on to introduce hamartia in the 
context of the tragic plot. 
Tuche is often thought to convey the sense of random, unmotivated 
events. However, on closer inspection, it emerges that the matter is not quite so 
simple. As Nussbaum explains, tuche "does not imply randomness or absence 
of causal connections. Its basic meaning is 'what just happens'; it is the element 
of human existence that humans do not control".46 This simple formulation 
belies the fact that tuche ranges over senses as diverse as: chance, a general 
sense of fortune (good or bad), success, unforeseen occurrences and fate, and 
later evolved into Tuche personified as a supernatural agency with the power to 
alter the course of a person's life.47 
Liddell and Scott show that tuche derived from the verb W'f'XilVro, which 
in Homer meant simply 'hitting a target'. Later it acquired the sense of 'meeting 
by chance', and 'befalling' .48 What is immediately striking in the context of the 
Danish dictionaries consulted above is the near-equivalence of lykke and tuche: 
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they share a sense of something" der ei i vor Magt staar"; or of fate and fortune 
(personified or not), and of unforeseeable outcomes. 
The Danish sense of happiness-lykke is clearly grounded in a sense of 
'going well', of being fortunate. But even in this the Greek is not too remote: 
tuche is the stem of the eutuchia, literally, 'good luck, success, prosperity', 
coming close to what we think of as 'happiness' and is, moreover, the modern 
Greek word for 'happiness'. Lykke also supports the meaning of eutuchia, 
though unmodified by affixation. 
The standard translation for eudaimonia used to be 'happiness', but this 
was problematic as the ethical range of eudaimonia was both more distinct and 
more porous than the English 'happiness'. John Cooper agrees that the pursuit 
of a transparent English translation is chimerical, and suggests 'human 
flourishing' as a more appropriate rendering.49 Cooper explains that 
The traditional English rendering, 'happiness', derives 
from the mediaeval Latin translation, felicitas. But it is not 
a good choice, since 'happiness' tends to be taken as 
referring exclusively to a subjective psychological state, 
and indeed one that is often temporary and recurrent. 
Hence much that Aristotle says about eudaimonia 
manifestly fails to hold true of happiness as ordinarily 
understood.50 
Examples of the mis-fit between happiness and eudaimonia include Aristotle's 
insistence on eudaimonia covering a whole life, rather than merely capturing a 
moment in that life. It is therefore more readily applicable to the old rather than 
the young, and can also be stretched to accommodate the sense of fulfilling 
potential. 
In the Nichomachean Ethics, eudaimonia plays a dominant role as the 
supreme good. Aristotle defines it as the perfect exercise of virtue in which 
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virtues and vices are aligned with pleasure and pain. Plato sought to extract a 
commitment from the tragedians to affirm this balance (Republic 363e ff), but in 
the Poetics Aristotle resists this enjoinder, seeing in tragedy the potential for a 
dislocation within the attempt to balance virtue and good fortune, which makes 
the attainment of perfect eudaimonia so elusive: Plato sought to eliminate this 
dislocation from the ethical life. 
Although eudaimonia pervades the Ethics, it barely features in the Poetics 
beyond the assertion of the ethical importance of the genre of tragedy in 
Chapter VI: 
Happiness (eudaimonia) and unhappiness (kakodaimonia) 
both consist in activity, and the goal [of life] is a certain 
kind of activity, not a state; and while it is in their 
characters that people are of a certain sort, it is through 
their actions that they achieve or fail to achieve happiness 
(eudaimonia). (SOa 17-20) 
Below is Ledsaak's Norwegian translation of the same passage: 
For tragedien er efterlingning, ikke av mennesker, men av 
handling og liv, og lykke (eudaimonia) og ulykke 
(kakodaimonia), for ogsa lykke og ulykke er handling, og 
malet er en handling, ikke en egenskap. I kraft av 
karakterene er menneskene slik og slik, men i kraft av 
handlingene er menneskene lykkelige (eudaimonia) eller det 
motsatte.51 
This is a restatement of the ends of life from the Nichomachean Ethics cited above 
and it is thus clear that Aristotle is positioning tragedy within the scope of 
ethics. As Amelie Oksenberg Rorty points out, "accepting Aristotle's Poetics 
entails accepting a good deal of his psychology and ethics toO".52 
The Poetics does, however, make repeated reference to a related concept, 
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eutuchia 'good fortune' (and 'dus-tuchia', 'bad fortune'), which seem to range 
over the areas of experience which have chance tuche at their root. But eutuchia 
is not synonymous with eudaimonia. While eudaimonia is intimately related to 
virtue, eutuchia is not an ethical category. It describes what Aristotle refers to as 
'external goods'. Aristotle enumerates good birth, wealth, status, friends, 
physical beauty, power and honour as external goods and argues that they fall 
outside the ambit of moral control of the individual. They stand in a 
subordinate yet critical relationship to eudaimonia: "Nevertheless, it seems clear 
that happiness needs the addition of external goods ... for it is difficult if not 
impossible to do fine deeds without any resources".53 This is not to say that 
they cannot be affected by character and nature, and they are connected in 
some tragedies with the gods.54 Stephen Halliwell concludes that" Aristotle's 
theory does not commit tragedy to the dramatisation of the crude and 
disconnected vicissitudes of life, even though it locates the genre's essential 
material in the transformations of fortune which affect those external goods 
that are the secondary conditions of happiness".55 External goods, as Aristotle 
makes perfectly plain in the Nichomachean Ethics, do fall under chance. 
Halliwell explains that "the accentuation on the eutuchia-dustuchia 
dichotomy in the treatise" means that Aristotle's theory" commits tragedy not 
directly to an engagement with the ethical centre of happiness, but with the 
external conditions or circumstances in which the quest for happiness takes 
place." He observes further, that there is no necessary entailment between 
virtue and happiness in tragedy (hence Plato's objection).56 So, on the one hand, 
Aristotle seems to resist the Platonic insistence upon the entailment of 
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happiness and virtue, yet, on the other he seems to be equally resistant to 
unmotivated action as propulsive of a change in fortune.57 
We will now turn to the elements of tragic plotting, and consider them in 
relation to concepts of contingency, and attend to hamartia. 
1.4.3 The Tragic Plot 
In Chapter VII of the Poetics, Aristotle presents his model for the most 
effective kind of tragic plot He insists that the tragic action range between the 
poles of good and bad fortune (eutuchiaj dustuchia) and that the sequence of 
events is so plotted as to admit of a transformation of fortune (metabole): "[ ... ] 
not to good fortune [eutuchia] from bad [dustuchia], but on the contrary from 
good to bad." 
Halliwell stresses the centrality of these concepts to the work as a whole, 
with the scope for reversal of fortune being a cardinal requirement But another 
cardinal requirement is conformity to the laws of probability and necessity. The 
reversal cannot be occasioned by the random events, the haphazard or the 
unmotivated but must be organised "strictly in accordance with the laws of 
probability and necessity" (1451a13f). 
Chapter IX repeats this desideratum: Aristotle cautions that even when 
surprising events occur, they must have at least the air of design about them 
since they are less effective when they occur by themselves or by chance (tuche). 
He then insists that reversal (peripeteia) and recognition (anagnorisis) arise as a 
necessary or probable result of the preceding action. 58 
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Indeed, the standard of the necessary and the probable pervades this 
text, and chance is not allowed to impinge on the integrity of the causally-
intelligible complex plot59 
This may, prima jacie, seem counter-intuitive: is tragedy not the genre par 
excellence which lays bare the vicissitudes of fortune and chance, concepts 
tangential to and often signifying a specifically divine causation? Is it not 
tragedy that demonstrates how significant these forces can be in the story of a 
life, of which the accident at the crossroads would be emblematic? 50 how can 
we resolve this apparent tension? 
Halliwell has argued that this intelligibility requirement reveals how 
" Aristotle's whole theory of the genre requires and presupposes the exclusion 
of chance from the dramatic action".60 He explains that in its place Aristotle 
positions an unspecified, undefined hamartia, human error or fallibility (or as 
the Nichomachean Ethics puts it, simply a 'going wrong') at the heart of the tragic 
lusis.61 
1.4.4 Hamartia and the 5ecularisation of Tragedy 
Almost as much critical ink has been spilled trying to produce a 
definitive analysis of hamartia as has been on tragedy. Halliwell cautions 
against attempts to eke out a theory of hamartia: "It is [ ... ] somewhere in the 
space between guilt and vulnerability to arbitrary misfortune that hamartia 
ought to be located [ ... ] it is not, as much scholarship has presupposed, a 
discrete, technical term". 62 He prefers to read hamartia as 'error': "not all errors 
are crimes or sins, but any crime or sin can be called error." Aristotle leaves it 
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deliberately vague in this work, referring to tina hamartia - "some kind of 
hamartia." This caveat concerning over-theorising the notion is well-founded. 
Not only is tina hamartia doggedly indeterminate in itself, but it also makes 
ambiguous alliances. Aristotle does not allow it to espouse 'villainy'; yet he 
explicitly locates hamartia in the character of the hero. The issue is further 
deepened a few lines further down, when Aristotle expresses his preference for 
the family tragedy, and shifts in and out of active and passive structures. 
To sum up - metabole is occasioned not by chance, but according to the 
laws of probability and necessity. It is not the result of villainy, but it is the 
outcome of some kind of error in the hero's character. Heroes are drawn from a 
few families, for example Oedipus and Orestes and "others who have done or 
suffered something terrible" [1453a22]: 'suffered' - passive; 'done' - active. 
Therefore, with his emphasis on hamartia, Aristotle is able to resolve the 
contradiction between tragic vulnerability and human culpability: the hero is 
now actively implicated in his own reversal of fortune, thus straddling the gap 
between a flies-to-wanton-boys interpretation of the operations of the tragic 
and full-blown moral guilt. "Contrary to the practice of the major tragedians 
themselves, this fallibility is to be dramatised and made intelligible within a 
purely human framework of ethical intention and action." 63 
The elimination of the unknowable and the supernatural from tragedy 
requires the secularisation of the genre. This goes some way to placating the 
Platonic camp, because outrageous fortunes befalling the hero are not merely 
arbitrary strokes of fate, but embrace the morally salient. However, Aristotle 
only goes so far. He is not willing to sacrifice tragedy to moralistic 
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rationalisation, because there is still an important sphere of human life which 
makes human flourishing vulnerable to contingency. 
1.4.5 Ibsen and the Secularisation of Tragedy 
Familiarity with Aristotle's dual agenda in the Poetics, to restore tragedy 
to philosophy through secularising it by removing the arbitrary and the 
unknowable from its core, and at the same time seeking to locate its dramatic 
interest in transformations of fortune, is central for an appreciation of Ibsen as a 
developing writer of tragedies. This thesis will show how Ibsen effects a similar 
operation of secularisation on his own tragic works, starting out with dramas 
replete with appeals to extra-human agencies, deities, fate (named or abstract) 
and contingency-Iykke, only to return to them in the later plays. Timothy Schiff 
is one of few critics who underlines the extent to which Ibsen's dramas 
presuppose a supernatural dimension.64 
While it seems an almost natural reflex to accept the presence of the 
divine and the extra human in Greek tragedy, in the case of Ibsen, a great 
number of commentators talk very happily about him without the least 
reference to external agencies. Robert Parker, discussing the emergence of the 
divine in Sophocles, observes, "Struggle against it though one may, it is hard in 
the end to talk about Sophocles without talking about his gods".65 Parker 
develops a scheme through which it is possible to trace the emergence of the 
divine in Sophocles. As I will demonstrate, this scheme can be applied with 
very little modification to Ibsen's tragedies too. I have adapted it here to take in 
the ways that the huge range of extra-human agencies in Ibsen emerge, and do 
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not resIDct it, as Parker does, to a SIDct notion of the divine. Its application 
shows just how pervasive these elements are in Ibsen. 
In Parker's scheme, first level representation involves the physical 
appearance of gods on stage. We get something approaching this in the Voice at 
the end of Brand. The second level is through divination, oracle and signs - e.g 
the comets in Kongsemnerne; Maximos in Kejser og Galila?er; Gerd in Brand. This 
level cannot function, clearly, without the presence of characters who are 
temperamentally disposed to accepting the authority of oracles. Kejser og 
Galila?er is full of such characters. There is another form of divination which 
Parker calls ubackward-facing divination" which detects past causes of present 
ills (this is effectively what Fru Alving is effecting through her image of 
gengangere. Characters themselves can also make explicit reference to the 
involvement of gods, other supernatural agencies and chance in human affairs, 
for example, Gulian on Fortuna; 0rnulf in Ha?Tma?ndene pd Helgeland on the 
norns; Skule on God in Kongsemnerne; Solness on God and his helpers and 
servants). lll-omened dreams and visions often play an important role, as they 
do in the case of Catilina and Julian. Furthermore, the recurrent idea of the 
familial curse re-emerges in Ibsen in various casts such as inherited sin. There 
is yet another level which I would like to add which complements this list, and 
that is that of 'intermediary characters' who are neither fully human nor fully 
divine or supernatural. These include Furia, Gerd, Maximos, Brendel, the ghost 
in Catilina, and Solness's army of helpers and servants, as well as 
Rottejomfruen in Lille E yolf. 
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Ibsen's tragic oeuvre falls into three more or less distinct phases. The 
first phase consists of dramas which were very much an attempt to write 
tragedy in the mode of 'high tragedy', and thus his first tragedy, Catilina is 
replete with appeals to unknowable forces, especially fate. However, these 
forces are gradually absorbed into a more sophisticated questioning of 
contingency-lykke, and an increasing engagement with the terms of happiness-
lykke, devoid of any divinity or semi-divinity, forces which, after Kejser og 
Galila?er are disabled by naturalism. 
By the time Ibsen starts writing in the naturalistic-realist mode, the idea 
of fate has been subsumed into a deterministic philosophy and appeals to 
extrinsic forces are mainly for rhetorical effect, where they occur at all. 
However, during his last phase of dramatic production, from Bygmester 
Solness on, there is a discernible return to the realm of the supernatural and a 
re-focus on contingency. This is not the result of dramaturgic nostalgia. Rather 
it is a questioning of the capacity of the rational individual to function 
independently of the categories that he has fought so hard to subdue: 
contingency, fate and divinity. 
This thesis traces the most important developments of happiness and 
contingency over these three phases. 
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Chapter IT 
Early Historical Tragedy and der g6ttliche Gegensatz 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I will show how the secularising gesture of the Poetics 
finds a parallel gesture within Ibsen's own tragic corpus, and establish an 
affinity between Aristotelian theory and Ibsenian practice in this respect. It 
will then be possible to see how Ibsen's response to these problems cleared the 
way for the development of modern tragedy. I will present four early plays: 
Catilina; Fru Inger til 0strdt; Ha?r11lJ!1ldene pd Helgeland; Kongsemnerne and Kejser 
og Galila?er. 
These early dramas are the result of experimentation with historical 
and national-historical tragedy and do not presage the level of subtlety to 
which Ibsen was to take the problems of luck and happiness in his later works. 
Nevertheless, when uncoiled from this perspective, these plays are especially 
illuminating in that they show that Ibsen gradually abandoned traditional 
representations of contingency and happiness (especially that of fate) to evolve 
the complex moral matrix which was sustaining of his tragic vision. 
By tracing the role and the definition of what Friedrich Hebbel referred 
to as der gottliche Gegensatz, I the divine antagonist', to denote" a power, a force, 
an influence, something to be reckoned with that is supra-individual,"1 we can 
appreciate the extent to which Ibsen was dependent both conceptually and 
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dramaturgically on notions of the supernatural and contingency in the early 
stages of his dramatic career. 
In an important yet rarely cited article Timothy Schiff comments that 
Although the concept of an active Providence is not a 
new one to Ibsen criticism, it is a relatively neglected one 
[ ... ] little attention is now paid to the fact that virtually 
half of Ibsen's ceuvre assumes the existence of a 
supernatural realm with supernatural powers that may 
intervene in human affairs.2 
But what is more arresting is that even in these fate-laden works, there 
is an embryonic engagement with aspects of lykke, which will come to replace 
these personifications. 
2.2 Catilina 
Ibsen bases his first tragedy, Catilina, on the career of the eponymous 
Roman rebel. Brian Johnston defines this playas "historical fate-tragedy', as it 
presents a hero whose pursuit of his perceived calling to raise Rome out of 
decadence to its former glory is derailed by personal ambition, and falls foul 
of fate. But like the majority of critics, Johnston does not identify the seeds of 
the dramatic power of Ibsen's subsequent work in it 
The drama seems at once conventional and fumbling as 
it attempts, with painfully inadequate artistry, to fulfil 
the terms of the German fate-tragedy and of the 
Romantic, i.e. Byronic, drama (in the manner of 
Manfred) of the lonely, blasted hero bringing himself to 
destruction.3 
Although Ibsen was justified in providing a religious and mythological 
context, he over-indulges the notion of external agency; the countless appeals 
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to unspecified "h0ie Guder" seem to have been included only for rhetorical 
effect and the twenty-one occurrences of Ska?bne (fate) are wearying as they do 
not accrue nuance or refinement through repetition as key concepts in the later 
plays do. Here we have what Thomas Van Laan criticises for being a if clumsy 
attempt to signify an agency for the tragic action".4 Indeed, an examination of 
Ska?bne in the play reveals a schematic function. It is interesting that although 
Ibsen names a recognisable deity, Nemesis, to represent vengeance he resists 
substituting the idea of fate, Ska?bne, for Fortuna, who is not invoked by name 
until Kejser og GalilCEer.5 
For Catilina Ska?bne is the force that directs his goals as well as being the 
force that inhibits and frustrates the realization of these very goals. Catilina 
opens the Ibsen canon with the words "Jeg maa! Jeg maa! Sa byder mig en 
Stemme i Sjcelens Dyb" (HU 1.1.43). This voice is later identified explicitly as 
Ska?bne: "Jeg maa! Jeg maa! Min Skcebne driver mig!" (2.71). Frequent 
reference is made to "hva Skcebnen viI" (2.73), "om Skcebnen har det saa 
bestemt" (3.90), "hva Skcebnen har besluttet" (3.95). Fate is "umild" (2.77), 
twice referred to as "fiendtligsindet" (1.57; 2.88) and is seen in unequivocally 
dark terms in alliance with baleful spirits: 1/ - Hvad Skcebnen viI, hvad 
M0rkets Aander bestemmer, see vi lyde maa - " (2.73). 
Furia is directly associated with, if not an actual personification of 
Nemesis. Hesiod accounts for Nemesis as one of the children of Night, and 
representative of retribution.6 When it is revealed that Catilina and the man 
who violated Furia's sister (a crime which Catilina ironically has sworn to 
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avenge) are one and the same, she gives thanks to the deity for making it 
possible for her to avenge the rape which led to her sister's suicide: "[ ... ] 
Tullias Forferer / Ha, saa har Nemesis jo hert min Ben" (1.54). Furia herself 
clearly evokes the Furies, the Greek Erinyes (originally the angry, vengeful 
soul of a murdered manr. Catilina describes Furia as "vildt som en 
H~vngudindes Flammeblikk" (1.56). After her escape from death, he 
comments "Man siger jo, at Furierne stiger / fra Underverdnen frem for at / 
forfelge den Dedelige" (2.83). As the action progresses, the identification of 
Furia and Nemesis becomes so close that the distinction between the two is 
ultimately blurred. 
In Act IT Furia persuades Catilina that after her near-death experience 
in the dungeon, with her thirst for revenge abated, her ambition now is to join 
forces with him in a quest for power. He identifies a demonic power in her: 
"Du smiler f~1t; - ha, saadan har jeg t:cEnkt / mig Nemesis - ". Furia replies 
that she is nothing more than an image of his own soul, and of the realm of 
darkness that they both inhabit. Catilina accepts this image and embraces it: 
"Skjenne Nemesis! / min Genius, Du Billed af min Sj~l!" (2.74), and joins 
hands with Furia in a symbolic pact with darkness. 
Furia/Nemesis thus receives further definition as Catilina's 'Genius' or 
daimon in its Greek form. The daimon, according to Plato is the spirit that 
comes into existence at the same time as a man and accompanies him 
throughout his life. The daimon: 
[ ... ] comes near to standing for the idea of Fate; in 
particular it emphasizes what is external to a man's will, 
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what he does in passion or infatuation; indeed the 
adjective daimonios is regularly used of what is 
incomprehensible or blameworthy. [ ... ] It is more often a 
theos who disperses favors, and (the) daimon who, if not 
neutral, exerts a baleful influence. 8 
Nemesis and Furia set up the light/dark, good/evil opposition with 
Aurelia around which the action is organised, reaching its culmination at the 
end of the play in Catilina's words to the dying Aurelia: "Nei, Aurelia! Du 
svcever mod den lyse Evighed, - / Nemesis mig f0rer imod M0rket ned" 
(3.113). By this stage, Furia has become so abstracted as to lose dramatic force, 
and thus Catilina's words make the play too schematic. 
Nevertheless, it is only through the Furia/Nemesis identification that 
the notion of fate assumes any contours at all. But what is interesting about 
Ibsen's treatment of these I divine' forces, Hebbel's gottliche Gegensatz, is that 
fate, which traditionally represents that which is external to a man's will, has 
been narrowed down to a perhaps over-determined sense of evil and 
Nemesis, with excessive insistence on the identification with Furia. This not 
only deprives Catilina's psychomachy of any real tension and power but also 
takes the focus away from his perceived political calling to the retribution for 
the crime against Tullia and his involvement with Furia. Nemesis, executive 
power of revenge, centres the interest on crime and retribution, which is, 
unlike the workings of fate, transparent to the perpetrator. 
Chester Clayton Long's analysis of the role of Nemesis in O'Neill's 
drama divides the functions of Nemesis into four distinct areas, explaining 
that "Nemesis is the personification of an idea, the idea of justice. [ ... ] It may 
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also contain within itself significance in relation to distributive, retributive, 
divine and tragic justice."9 Retributive justice refers to the eye for an eye 
version of justice; distributive justice points to a more social conception; divine 
justice to violations of divine law and tragic justice to the potential for good 
and evil in the hero. However, Furia so unequivocally represents the first kind 
of justice, and the fact that Catilina joins forces with her, automatically 
deprives the narrative of his calling of vitality. 
The representation of fate and the unknowable in this play is thus 
heavily reductive. Named Fate is two-dimensional, and the element of 
retribution is so dominant as to entail an a priori foreclosure of happiness. 
Happiness stands in antithetical relation to fate, and is figured by Aurelia, and 
notions of good and light and innocence: 
[ ... ] har Du forglemt vort lille Landsted, hvor 
min Vugge stod, og hvor vi siden glade 
og lykkelige i en salig Ro 
har levet mange muntre Sommerdage. 
[ ... ] Dit flygte vi og vie ind vort Liv 
tillandlig Rolighed, til stille GlCEde. (1.60 - italics mine) 
Here Aurelia is trying to persuade Catilina to abandon the corrupt world of 
Rome and his pursuit of power for a life of peaceful seclusion in the 
countryside of Gaul. He is briefly tempted by this bucolic idyll in which he, 
free of power and passion, would exchange sword for spade, but 
Furia/Nemesis pits her strength against Aurelia's benign influence and leads 
him back into the tragedy with her taunting contempt for the obscurity he 
seems ready to embrace in defiance of his fate. 
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Schiffs discussion of providence in these early plays emphasizes the 
providentially blessed and guided individuals who carry these dramas. His 
analysis recalls that of Hebbel's analysis of the gottliche Gegensatz. These 
characters are chosen by a highly selective force, be it the gods, Fate, a 
'verdensvilje' or God Himself, and are guided in their fulfilment of that 
calling. 
Catilina is rather an exception to this, for it is difficult to define any 
calling beyond his personal ambition, and the only sense the play gives of his 
having been singled out for a special calling is muted by the retribution 
theme, and the source of the 'voice' guiding him is left vague. 
In Ibsen's next experiment in tragedy, Fru Inger til 0strdt, an active 
providence is unambiguously at work.Io 
2.3 Fru Inger til 0strdt 
Fru Inger til 0strdt was published in 1854, four years after Catilina, and 
IS a more finely nuanced work, one which, moreover, responded to the 
contemporary appetite for national subjects. Van Laan argues that by now 
"Ibsen had acquired a more sophisticated sense of what 'writing tragedy' 
might mean in actual practice."11 Ibsen himself referred to the work as "et 
historisk Drama eller, om man viI, en Tragedie," (HU 11.113-14) showing that 
he saw little difference between the two. 
This is in large part due to the overt influence of the theatrical 
handbook Ibsen read while abroad in 1852, namely Hettner's Das moderne 
Drama. In this work, Hettner, offering advice to budding dramatists on 
composing tragic drama, denounces fate-drama and Scribean constructs. He 
emphasised the rich resources available to the dramatist in history, but 
cautions that the choice of subject should be relevant to contemporary 
audiences. Hettner also recommends that the dramatist, even when drawing 
characters and events from history, must present them in a psychologically 
coherent manner, within a plot which adheres to the rules of necessity. 
There are far fewer references to fate in this play than in Catilina. 
Nevertheless, there are similarities in its function and its importance for the 
heroes of the respective plays, and, as we shall see, the plot relies heavily on 
chance, so much so that Asbjern Aarseth has defined the playas "pre-
eminently a study in the effects of chance encounters in an action which lacks 
any rigorous structure."12 
Both Catilina and Fru Inger respond to their calling, but in the case of 
Fru Inger the audience or reader does not question the validity of the source of 
the calling - God. Both are tempted to abandon their calling in favour of more 
earthly versions of happiness. 
Fru Inger is set in 1528, when Norway's fortunes were at a low. Henrik 
JCEger describes the early part of the sixteenth century as "the midnight hour 
of the four hundred year night" of Danish subjugation.13 Fru Inger has spent 
the thirty years since she made a pledge to fight for Norway's freedom 
deferring her response to her calling, which she both acknowledges and 
resists: "Hvor SCElsomt, hvor sCElsomt! SkjCEbnen har dannet mig til Kvinde og 
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har dog Ices set en Mandsdaad paa mine Skuldre. Mit Folks Velf~rd er lagt i 
mine H~nder" (HU IT.1.145). Her conception of Skjcebne appears to cover an 
aspect of her Christian faith in which God appoints people to distinct tasks: 
"Jeg f"lte Herrens Kraft i mit Bryst" (1.145) is how she experiences the 
revelation of her calling. 
But torn between her political calling to lead her people and her private 
identity as a woman, she fails to act. She resents this "Mandsdaad" she has 
been burdened with and cannot let go of her female self, a self that falls in 
love and has children, because being true to this self deflects from an adequate 
response to her duty to safeguard the fate of her country. She feels excluded 
from female experience: "[ ... ] K vindens s~dvanlige Lod var jo ikke min" 
(4.198). Steen Sture, the Swede with whom she had fallen passionately in love 
in the past, had opened up the area of the erotic in her, and this encounter 
resulted in a child: " han var min Kj~rligheds Barn, det Eneste, der Mindede 
mig om den Tid, da jeg var Kvinde i Aand og Sandhed" (4.200). 
Her attachment to her femininity through her son and her neglect of her 
daughters (fruits of another, passionless union) whose happiness she willingly 
sacrifices, causes her to swerve from her calling. The political implications of 
this are dire for Norway, and those who once looked to her for leadership 
have lost faith. Like Catilina, Fru Inger refers to her calling as a curse, and 
laments the isolation of being chosen by God, a condition which brings with it 
a loss of essential freedom and conflicts with personal happiness: 
Den, der er kaaret til at v~re Himlens V~rkt0i, t0r Intet 
eie, der er hende kj~rt; ikke Mage eller Barn, ikke 
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Fr~nder eller Hjem, og deri, seer I, - deri ligger 
Forbandelsen ved at v~re kaaret til en beremmelig 
Daad. (4.198) 
The fate/happiness conflict is infinitely more nuanced in Fru Inger than 
in Catilina, for the competing claims of the two are more keenly felt In the 
former play, happiness, represented by Aurelia was too idealised, schematic 
and passionless. For Catilina it never represented much more than withdrawal 
and escape, whereas for Fru Inger a vivid nostalgia for happiness colours her 
entire experience. The question of personal happiness is much more richly 
embedded in this play and has ramifications for all levels of action, and is 
mirrored in the fate of her daughter. 
When Eline, definable by her dogged determination to avenge her 
sister's disgrace and death, falls in love with Niels Lykke, the man responsible 
for her sister's undoing, her project is suddenly and utterly derailed, and the 
only mode she can live in is that of love. The irony of this situation recalls the 
Tullia-Furia-Catilina connection, but there is no hint in the former play of the 
possibility of transformation. There Nemesis is intractable. Eline is the polar 
opposite of Furia; even after her mother has revealed Lykke's true identity to 
her as the man she has sworn vengeance on, there is no going back for her. Fro 
Inger then questions the wisdom of her decision to deprive Eline of her 
illusion: 
Hvorfor kunde jeg ikke tiet med Hemmeligheden? 
Havde hun Intet vidst, saa var hun bleven lykkelig - paa 
en Maade. - Men det er min Skja?bne, det staar skrevet 
deroppe, at jeg skal bryde den ene grenne Green efter 
den anden, inntil Stammen staar bladles tilbage! (5:219 -
italics mine) 
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Fro Inger's consideration of Eline's happiness here is Ibsen's earliest 
presentation of the concept of livsl8gnen so central to Vildanden. It prefigures 
the central dilemma of that later work: is happiness based on ignorance any 
the less valid, and what is the moral position of those who arrogate the right 
to dispel the deluded happiness of others, often leaving corpses in the wake of 
truth? This problematic is only presented, not explored, in this play. But what 
remains is the image of a fate directly hostile to life and inimical to happiness. 
Whoever is driven by this fate will inevitably incur some collateral damage. 
Fro Inger feels an acute sense of guilt over neglecting her calling, and 
senses that her misery is God's punishment. When Niels Lykke tells her that 
he knows of the whereabouts of her illegitimate son and how close he is to the 
throne, he plants the idea of Kongemoder in her mind, an idea which comes to 
dominate her thoughts and rule her action. She sees her salvation in this idea, 
for in it she can combine the personal and the political: secure a future for 
Norway and be a mother to her precious son at the same time. But this 
putative harmonizing of SkjCl?bne and Lykke is elusive. Fru Inger is in bad faith 
because ambition is at the heart of this vision, not only ambition for status but 
a desire to circumvent, if not directly compete with God: "Ha, ha! Hvem 
seirer, Gud eller jeg?" (5.227). 
Nevertheless, Fru Inger's real undoing does belong unequivocally to an 
area beyond her control. She has her son killed in the mistaken belief that he is 
Sture's legitimate son, in a genuine attempt to protect him. Kongemoder turned 
Kongemorder: giving life and taking life. This is a case of tragic irony and tragic 
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error in the most classical sense, the truest kind of peripeteia, accompanied by 
the most basic kind of anagnorisis, by which Fru Inger is made aware of the 
identity of her son by the old device of the ring he wore round his neck. 
Poetics Chapter XI is followed almost to the letter by Ibsen in this scene: 
Reversal of the Situation (peripeteia) is a change by which 
the action veers round to the opposite, subject always to our 
rule of probability and necessity. [ ... ] The recognition 
(anagnorisis) which is most intimately connected with the 
plot and action is [ ... ] the recognition of persons [ ... ] 
Moreover, it is upon such situations that the issues of 
good and bad fortune will depend. (Poet. XI 1452a22-
1452b2) 
Van Laan argues that because peripeteia almost coincides with 
anagnorisis here it should not have been left to the end of Act V, just prior to 
the final curtain. Ibsen fails Fru Inger in deferring recognition and not giving 
her any room to process it; Francis Fergusson's charge that the ending of 
Ghosts is "brutally truncated" is perhaps more applicable to Fru Inger. 14 
Although in many ways an advance on Catilina, Fru Inger is ultimately 
unsuccessful, both for the reason of the mishandling of tragic recognition, and 
on account of the overburdened plot. This somewhat creaky plot is in 
violation of Aristotle's demand for the exclusion of chance from the plot, and 
as a result, the tragic loses focus.15 The events leading up to the murder of 
Niels are brought about by such painful contortions of coincidence that they 
strain the credibility of even the most suspended disbelief. This is totally 
counter to the spirit of Aristotelian sequentiality, and probably the influence 
of Scribean plotting. Ibsen still had a long way to go before he separated out 
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the idea of chance as a dramaturgic tool and chance as an abstract concept 
belonging to the extended family of divine antagonists. 
However, it is a further sign of Ibsen's increasing subtlety that he is 
moving away from personification and standard tropes to a deeper 
appreciation of the tonalities of fate and happiness. Indeed, in the revised 
edition of Fru Inger of 1874, Ibsen reduces the presence of fate even more, by 
removing it from Fro Inger's Act I speech and replacing it with "Gud Herren" 
(1.256). This serves to emphasize the fact that Inger's calling is God-given and 
that she rebels against God directly in not responding to her calling. It also 
underscores God's active agency in the final act. This does not mean however, 
that Ibsen wants to replace the idea of fate with the idea of God. Although 
Skjd!bne is also discarded from her Act V speech, reference is made to the stars 
instead, which retains a pagan sense of fate rather than overwriting it with a 
purely Christian cosmology. Eline in the revised version makes no mentions of 
fate, but Niels Lykke retains his references to it.16 
Despite its technical shortcomings, Fru Inger shows a marked 
development from Catilina, and this owes something to the sharpening of the 
concept of supra-individual agency (God) and the establishment of a clear 
sense of the source of the heroine's calling. That she resists her calling, ignores 
the signs and ultimately falls foul of historical necessity, makes her an 
infinitely more complex character than Catilina. 
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2.4 Ha?rmamdene pd Helgeland 
Ha?rmcendene pd Helgeland (1858) is a further drama in the national 
historical mode. It signals a definite development from Fru Inger as its tragic 
focus is clearer and its plot less creaky, though it is still by no means 
determined by Aristotelian necessity. 
Ibsen himself considered the play to be a tragedy. In his preface to the 
revised edition of Gildet paa Solhaug Ibsen explains that whereas he had 
deliberately reduced Gildet paa Solhaug from tragedy to drama, Hcermcendene 
paa Helgeland was definitely to be a tragedy. Some of the ideas he had for 
Hcermcendene ended up in Gildet paa Solhaug: 
De to kvindeskikkelser, plejes0strene Hj0rdis og Dagny i 
den pat:Enkte tragedie blev til s0strene Margit og Signe i 
den fuldf0rte lyriske drama. [ ... ] Slcegtsligheden er 
umiskendelig. Tragediens den gang kun 10st planlagte 
helt, den vidt berejste og ved fremmede kongehoffer vel 
modtagne h0vding, vikingen Sigurd, omformede sig til 
riddersmanden og sangeren Gudmund Alfs0n [ ... ]. Hans 
stilling mellem de to s0stre blev cendret ... ; men begge 
s0strenes stilling lige over for ham forblev vcesentlig den 
samme, som i den oprindelig pat:Enkte og senere 
fuldf0rte tragedie. (HU ill.33-4) 
The dramatic focus of Hcermcendene is a conflict of values and instead of 
centring the problem so squarely on how to respond to one's calling, it 
emerges from the conflicts produced by two incompatible value systems and 
honour codes: Hj0rdis's pagan and Sigurd's Christian, and the 
incommensurability of two kinds of love, philia and eros. 
If Fru Inger can be seen as a first, tentative attempt to demobilise the 
battalion of supra-individual agencies (and the revisions to the second edition 
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seem to bear this interpretation out), HCEr~dene, although more deeply 
embedded in myth, shows a growing commitment to this approach. Ibsen can 
be seen to be experimenting further with the idea of fate; he largely abandons 
Skjc£bne in this play - there are only two occurrences, at 3.77 and 4.93, 
compared to the twenty-one in Catilina. But Ibsen still retains a notion of an 
area of life that is outside the control of the individual, expressed 
predominantly through the mythological personification of the Noms: Urd, 
Verdande, and Skuld - Clotho, Lachesis and Atropos's Nordic cousins.17 
In common with the Greek Moirai the Noms are the manifestations of 
spinners and weavers, and are baleful figures. They also share a property with 
the daimon who, we recall was present at a child's birth and intimately 
connected with the apportioning of man's lot; it was believed that all children 
were assigned a Nom at birth. 18 Ibsen builds up a fairly involved mythology, 
consistent with the historical setting, but there is a detectable development in 
this play. The range of lykke in its designation of happiness is extended, and, 
for the first time, Ibsen experiments with its bivalence and capacity for 
pointing to the area beyond individual control. 
The sense of lykke as fate is established in Act I. 0rnulf, Hj0rdis's 
reluctant foster-father, has come from Iceland to Helgeland to extract 
compensation from Sigurd and Gunnar respectively for the abduction of his 
daughter Dagny and his foster-daughter Hj0rdis. A peaceful settlement seems 
possible but Hj0rdis denounces this as cowardly: "Lykken rader for livet. Lad 
times hvad der viI; men heller viI jeg falde, end frelses ved fejgt forlig" (HU 
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N.1.39 - italics mine). This statement articulates a sense of ineluctable destiny 
on the one hand, but also a belief in an area of self-determination within that 
destiny. In other words, Hj0rdis believes that fate cannot be circumvented but 
the question of haw one gauges one's response to it does lie within the control 
of the individual, and this also entails the freedom to assert selfhood in the 
choice of death, which Hj0rdis exemplifies in her suicide. 
Sigurd evokes a similar area of freedom when he attempts to persuade 
0rnulf of his undying love for his blood-brother Gunnar: "Bade i strid og i 
fredsomme kar har vi fristet lykken tilhobe; og han er mig krerest af alle 
mCEnd" (1.42-3 - italics mine). 0rnulf, however, feels the slight he has suffered 
too great to allow for a peaceful, however generous settlement He decides he 
has no choice but to fight Gunnar, whatever the outcome: "Nej, siger jeg! Selv 
rna jeg fremme min ret; lad sa lykken rade" (1.43 - italics mine). Here he is 
echoing Hj0rdis's sentiment in reverse: she argues that fate will decide and 
then one can act appropriately; 0rnulf demands appropriate action and then 
fate will decide. 
Happiness IS suggested as the quality residing in personal 
relationships. Sigurd tells 0rnulf that if he leads an attack against Gunnar, he 
will never be happy again. Hjerdis and Sigurd both see their emotional lives 
as wasted; he because he put Gunnar's happiness above his own in 
relinquishing Hjerdis, and she because she was deprived of the man she 
loved. Sigurd on the other hand lives under the sign of graceful 
disappointment He is loyal to the choice he made for Gunnar, but recognises 
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the violence he has done himself and Hjerdis, and ultimately Gunnar and 
Dagny too. 
Act IT directly wrestles with the question of happiness. Dagny is unable 
to understand how Hjerdis can be dissatisfied with life as she lives so well, 
and moreover has a child. But Hjerdis is no Fru Inger. She does not hanker 
after domestic bliss - uKvindens sCEdvanlige Lod". Even when she comes face 
to face with death she still rejects the life of obscure wedlock, even with the 
man she loved: ulngen magt kan CEndre vor skCEbne nu! 0, ja - det er ogsa 
bedre sa, end om du havde fCEstet mig hemede i livet; end om jeg havde 
siddet pa din gard for at VCEve lin og uld og fede dig afkom, - fy! fy!" (4.93). 
Hjerdis thirsts for action, freedom and passion, and tells Dagny that 
captivity is captivity no matter how luxurious the material conditions. She also 
laments her son's lack of manliness. The only physical passion she has ever 
felt was her first night with Sigurd disguised as Gunnar. Act II ends in a dual 
crisis when Gunnar kills 0rnulfs son Thorolf in the belief that 0mulf has 
gone south to kill Egil, when the opposite is the case, and Dagny reveals the 
truth to Hjerdis of the identity of the man who killed the bear with the 
strength of twenty men to win her. Hjerdis resolves that either she or Sigurd 
will die as a result of this deception. 
In Act ITI, the sphere of life beyond individual control is clearly marked 
as the territory governed by the Noms. Gunnar and Hjerdis are in Gunnar's 
hall, and Hjerdis is attending to a bowstring. There are obvious parallels 
between Hjerdis and the power of the Noms, which reminds us of Furia, 
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whose identity is suspended somewhere between the human and the chthonic. 
Gunnar explains that she has a special power and could make him do 
anything. But when he fails to untie the knot in her bow, she refers to an even 
higher power: "Nornenes spind er kunstigere" (3.70). Gunnar submits to this 
power: when he sets out his plans to recover his lost honour, honour that he 
sacrificed for prizing her above all things, he comments, "Vgrundeligt er 
nornens rad; Sigurd skulde blevet din husbond" (3.71). Gunnar had interfered 
with the course of fate by fixing the competition for Hj0rdis. But neither he 
nor Hj0rdis is aware of Sigurd's passion for her. 
Sigurd seeks Hj0rdis out with the intention of confessing his love for 
her. She reproaches him for having destroyed her life, for having humiliated 
her and making off with Dagny. He demurs explaining "Mangt v~rk m~gter 
m~nds vilje at fremme; men de store gerninger styres af sk~bnen, - sa er det 
gaet med os to". Here Sigurd is alluding to the fact that his love for Gunnar 
was so intense that it demanded this great sacrifice. The value he had allied 
himself to, the love of his friend, defined his fate. Hj0rdis agrees: "Vel sandt; 
onde nomer rader over verden; men deres magt er ringe, ifald de ikke finder 
hj~lpere i vort eget bryst. Lykken times den, der er s~rk nok til at s~vne i 
strid mod nomen; - det er det jeg nu viI g0re" (3.77-italics mine). 
In this speech Hj0rdis is extending her conception of individual choice 
and self-determination within a pre-ordained scheme, essentially the 
workings of a baleful providence. She also introduces the concept of 
"hjrelpere", something which resides in the hearts of men which can ally 
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themselves with the Noms and assist their workings. This reminds us of the 
daimon, the intermediary entity between character and fate, and also 
prefigures Solness's helpers and servers. Happiness can only come to those 
who resist and fight the Norns. Hj0rdis reiterates this position that happiness 
can only be gained in valiant defiance of fate: "Lykken er vel en stordad vcerd; 
vi er begge fri, nar vi selv viI det, og sa er legen vunden" (3.81 - italics mine). 
Hj0rdis gradually persuades herself of the fact that she and Sigurd were 
destined to be together, and in a sudden inversion of her view that happiness 
can only be won by challenging the Noms, she argues: "Det er nomens rad at 
vi to skal holde sammen; Det kan ej cendres" (3.82). And Hj0rdis is determined 
to prove "nornen voksen" (3.77-78). 
This passage demonstrates the instability of the meanings invested in 
the concept of the Noms. They represent something so protean that they can 
stand for anything from an inscrutable, merciless, intractable fate to a direct 
challenge to men to assert personal happiness in defiance of the misery they 
bring down, to the legislators of a happy and fulfilling life. This gestures 
dimly towards the relationship between Solness and lykke over forty years 
later. 
But Sigurd's ethics and honour code do not permit him to join Hj0rdis 
in her desire to unite their lives. He resists Hj0rdis, and in his determination 
not to desert his integrity, challenges Gunnar to a duel, ostensibly to avenge 
Thorolfs murder. Gunnar appreciates the scale of this second sacrifice: 
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"Sigurd, min bolde broder, nu f0rst forstar jeg dig! Du vover nu livet for min 
hceder, som du fordum voved det for min lykke" (3.85 - italics mine). 
Catilina and Fru Inger had posited the radical incompatibility of calling 
and personal happiness. This notion pervades in Herma?ndene but in the form 
of competing values. But again personal happiness is the victim. Dagny's love 
for Sigurd is so deep that the fact that he is with her is enough, even though 
she realises that with her he has learned to live with "en ringere lykke" (3.75 -
italics mine); and that their plan to withdraw to a peaceful life in Iceland 
(reminiscent of Aurelia's plans for Catilina) in no way constitutes happiness 
for Sigurd. Sigurd's loyalty to Dagny is bred of his unwillingness to humiliate 
her in recognition of her devotion. Gunnar's passion for Hj0rdis is even more 
extreme. At the beginning of Act ill when Hj0rdis tries to persuade Gunnar to 
kill Sigurd, she does so by tempting him with a vision of a marital life defined 
by passion and devotion, the negative image of the indifference she mainly 
feels for him (which even extends to her contempt for the son she bore him). 
Gunnar prefers to live an unhappy lie rather than renounce the woman he 
loves. He sacrifices his honour for love, his version of happiness. Sigurd 
sacrificed love, his happiness, for honour and his blood brother. 
0rnulf provides some of the most powerful moments in the play. At 
first he appears to be a pretext for action and a vehicle for pushing the plot 
forward. However, at the end of the feast, he appears bearing the young Egil 
for whom he has sacrificed six of his own sons. Unbeknownst to 0rnulf, his 
youngest son, who was to sustain him in his loss of his other sons, has also 
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been killed. When he finds out about Thorolfs death, he rails against the 
workings of the N orns. Alone in old age and bereft of his sons, his lykke, 
0rnulf seeks revenge on the supernatural. He derives comfort from his skaldic 
powers, the gift of Brage, the only thing he has that stands inviolate before the 
norns: 
Harmfuld norne hcerged 
hardt mig verdens veje 
listed lykken fra mig 
0dte 0rnulfs eje. 
[ ... ] 
Nidsyg norne n0dig 
ncegted mig sit eje, -
dryssed smertens rigdom 
over 0rnulfs veje 
Vegt er visst mit vcerge 
Fik jeg guders evne 
en da blev min idrcet: 
nornens fcerd at hcevne. 
En da blev min gcerning: 
nornens fald at friste, -
hun, som har mig r0vet 
aU - og du det sidste! (3.88-9 - italics mine) 
What emerges beneath 0rnulf s grief is a tension within his belief in the 
Norns: they are at once intransigent and indomitable forces, and possible 
objects of revenge. 
In this final act Hj0rdis in full armour, dressed as the Valkyrie she 
longs to be to Sigurd, tries to stage a Liebestod. She tells Sigurd how she has 
experienced intimations of death through three sightings of her fylgje, the 
mythological guardian spirit in the form of an animal. P. A. Munch explains 
that the fylgjer were related to the Norns. They were creatures with animal 
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forms, who led or preceded the person they attached themselves to, - it was 
believed that everybody had at least one. There was normally a close fit 
between the animal and the individual, so that brave, strong chieftains would 
have a bear fylgje. Hj0rdis's fylgje naturally takes the form of a wolf.19 She 
resolves to create the conditions for Sigurd and herself to be together in the 
afterlife, to see Sigurd on the throne of heaven with her sitting by his side. But 
the most significant part of her vision is her statement of Sigurd's error: a 
defiance of fate, happiness and ultimately life itself. This speech rewards 
quoting at length, for it sets out Hj0rdis's views on fate, love and 
responsibili ty: 
TIde handled du dengang! Alle go de gaver kan manden 
give til sin fuldtro ven, - alt, kun ikke den kvinde han har 
keer; thi g0r han det, da bryder nomens 10nlige spind og 
to liv forspildes. Det er en usvigelig r0st i mig, som siger 
at jeg blev til, for at mit stcerke sind skulde 10fte og beere 
dig i de tunge tider, og at du f0dtes, for at jeg i en mand 
kunde finde alt det, der tyktes mig stort og ypperligt; thi 
det ved jeg, Sigurd, - havde vi to holdt sammen, da var 
du bleven navnkundigere og jeg lykkeligere end alle 
andre! (4.93) 
Sigurd insists on the ineluctability of his choice; a life devoid of 
happiness and love. Hj0rdis conjures up a stampede of dead warriors to come 
and take them off to glory, but Sigurd resists. She is so consumed by her 
vision that she fails to notice this resistance, deriving comfort from the fact 
that their new life will be even more glorious than an earthly life together, 
which would probably have subjected her to domesticity and childbearing. 
The news of her home, husband and child burning cannot bring her back to 
the here and now. "Ingen magt kan eendre vor skeebne nu!", she declares, 
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rejecting a changing world in which the approaching White God of the 
Christians is enfeebling the spiritual vitality of the old gods. But this fate is 
exclusively hers. There is no Liebestod. 
Sigurd does admit to the magnitude and destructive nature of his 
betrayal of love. But he is a Christian and refuses to ride with the old order, 
and instead embraces the White God. Thereafter 0mulf, Dagny and Gunnar, 
having survived the fire, make peace, Gunnar believing that Hjerdis killed 
Sigurd out of love for him. 
This last short act undercuts the tragedy with Sigurd's I sting in the tail' 
confession of conversion to Christianity. The ending weakens the play 
considerably, as it is unmotivated, and contrary to the spirit of probability and 
necessity. Sigurd's conduct stems from a code of honour which is not 
obviously Christian, and, moreover, he subscribes just as much to the fatalism 
of the old order as Hjerdis, Gunnar and 0rnulf. It is difficult to argue the case 
for this playas successful tragedy, but it certainly shows a refinement in 
Ibsen's conception of happiness and fate. One important nineteenth-century 
Ibsen critic concludes that Sigurd's death at Hjerdis's hands in this "is the 
result of his heroic renunciation of her; and he thus becomes a kind of 
anticipation of the tragedy of sacrifice which reaches its sublimest note in 
Brand".20 
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2.5 Kongsemnerne 
The next work to be considered is another drama to derive its material 
from Norwegian history. Kongsemnerne (1863) is widely held to be Ibsen's first 
really great work. It is based on the thirteenth-century political and civil 
upheavals that scarred the country on its path to nationhood. However, 
despite its success in creating a mediaeval atmosphere and its historical 
plausibility, the true power of the work lies in its the psychological portraiture 
of the Machiavellian Biskop Nikolas and its hero, Skule Jarl. The progress of 
the man who would be king's misguided ambition to occupy the throne is 
traced minutely over a course of twenty years 
As Bj0rn Hemmer points out, this play is unique in the corpus in that 
its hero is neither following a great calling, nor defying his calling, nor 
sacrificing incommensurable goods in the name of his calling.21 
Skule, despite his talents and intelligence, has no real calling. He is 
driven by a deep-seated worldly ambition and a debilitating lust for power. 
His spiritual activity ranges between two poles, that of the demonic Biskop 
Nikolas, who lives to confound the nation in a permanent state of strife and 
warfare through his principle of perpetuum mobile, and Hakon Hakonss0n with 
his unassailable sense of purpose and faith in his great kongstanke: "Norge var 
et rige; det skal blive et folk" (HU V.3.89, 4.101). Utterly lacking a calling of his 
own, Skule resorts to stealing his rival's inspiration. As Hemmer points out, 
"Skule er blitt nektet retten bade til det som star for ham som livets lykke og 
til en stor kongstanke" . 
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Perhaps because this play is set in post-conversion Norway, and much 
of the action is centred around churches, shrines and the great Nidaros 
cathedral, itself the Christian centre of Norway, Ibsen was at liberty to 
dispense with the mythologizing of spheres beyond human of previous plays. 
Gone are the fates, furies and Noms; even ska?bne in the abstract has 
disappeared from the set. The "Norges SkjiEbne" of Fru Inger has been replaced 
with "landets lykke" and "Norges lykke" in this work (3.79,3.81). 
Once again Ibsen focuses on an earthly anonymous lykke available 
through love: erotic (Ingebj0rg); uxorial (Margrethe and Ragnhild); maternal 
(Inga and Margrethe); paternal (Hakon and Skule) and filial (Margrethe and 
Peter). No other levels of relationship are explored; there are no reliable 
political alliances or friendships asserted of the kind represented by Sigurd 
and Gunnar. Skule derives great spiritual strength from the lykke of love 
during the agony of his anagnorisis: "Jeg s0gte efter lykken ude i det fremmede, 
og agtede aldrig pa, at jeg havde et hjem, hvor jeg kunde fundet den. Jeg jog 
efter kcErlighed gennem synd og br0de, og vidste aldrig, at jeg ejede den i 
kraft af Guds og menneskenes lov" (5.143). 
But for the preceding four acts it is clear that Skule is denied happiness 
and Hakon is not. Ibsen's statement in his preface to the second edition of 
Catilina can hardly be applied to Hakon: "[ ... ] modsigelsen mellem evne og 
higen, mellem vilje og m ulighed, menneskehetens og individets tragedie og 
komedie pa engang" (1.123). Hakon has the great kongstanke, and, it seems, the 
purpose of mind and ability to see it to fruition. These factors automatically 
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debar Hakon from the tragic role; he IS far too settled a character to 
accommodate tragic conflict. 
The greatest development in the lykke nexus is the highlighting of the 
concept as straddling success and happiness. This occurs mainly in Act IT in 
the confessional scene between Skule and the amoral Bishop. Nikolas has just 
asked Sku Ie for his definition of the 'greatest' man. Skule replies that the 
greatest man is the most courageous. The Bishop's reply rewards quoting at 
length: 
Sa siger hevdingen. En prest vilde sige, det er den mest 
troende, - en vismand, at det er den kyndigste. Men det 
er ingen af dem, jarl. Den lykkeligste mand er den st0rste 
mand. De lykkeligste er det; som g0r de st0rste gerninger, 
han, hvem tidens krav kommer over ligesom i brynde, 
avler tanker, dem han ikke selv fatter, og som peger for 
ham pa den vej, han ikke selv ved hvor b~r hen, men 
som han dog gar og rna ga, til han h0rer folket skrige i 
gl~de, og han ser sig om, med spilte 0jne og undrer sig 
og sk0nner, at han har gjort et storv~rk [ ... ] det er det 
som Romerne kaldte ingenium. (2.47-8) 
Skule develops a portrait of Hakon, the man of destiny, whom lykke -
fortune smiles on, detailing his easy victories and how his path to the throne 
was always eased by circumstances. This conception of the lykkeligste is 
consistent with the notion of 'constitutive luck'. Constitutive luck refers to the 
capacities and talents one is born with, such as intelligence and beauty.22 He 
asks Nikolas if "Hakon skulde v~re skabt af et andet stof end jeg? V~re af de 
lykkelige?"23 Nikolas develops this idea further by arguing that Hakon has the 
right because he is blessed by fortune: "Han har retten, fordi han er den 
lykkelige, - den sterste lykken er den, at have retten" (3.49 - italics mine). This 
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argument has an inescapable circularity, but it does point to an uneven 
distribution. Aristotle himself was undecided over the question of whether the 
eudaimon man was aided and supported by good fortune. Of course his 
rationalist ethics resisted the notion, but an identifiable equivocation persists 
in his thinking. 24 Moreover, the entire text of Kongsemnerne emphasises 
Hakon's connection with the divine and the supernatural, and Skule is only 
expressing a commonly held view when he asks: 
F0jer ikke alting sig til det bedste, nar det geelder ham? 
Selve bonden meerker det; han siger, at trceerne beer 
togange frugt, og fuglene ruger eeg togange hver 
sommer, mens Hakon er konge. [ ... ] Det er som blodet 
og asken g0dsler, der Hakon farer frem i heerferd; det er 
som Herren deekker over med gr0de, hvad Hakon 
tramper ned; det er som de hellige magter skynder sig at 
slette ud hver skyld efter ham. Og hvor let gik han ikke 
til at blive konge! (5.49) 
Everything that has gone well for Hakon has gone badly for Skule, 
even on the personal level. He sacrificed the woman he loved to make a 
marriage that would provide him with sons, but he got only daughters. 
Hakon on the other hand married Skule's daughter Margarethe, not out of 
love but out of political expediency, yet Skule is sure that he will come to love 
her, and that she will inevitably produce a male heir. 
The bishop returns to the question of the authority vested in Hakon and 
urges Skule to resist this uneven distribution: 
Og I, I viI lade jer jage fredl0s fra lykken aU jeders liv 
igjennem! Er I da blind? Ser I ikke, at det er en stcerkere 
magt end Birkebejnerflokken, som star bagved Hakon og 
fremmer al hans gerning? Han far hjelpen deroppefra, 
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fra dem, - dem som star eder imod - fra dem som var 
eders avindsmrend fra f0delsen af! (2.50) 
But for Skule, Hakon's unshakable belief in his legitimacy is insurmountable. 
He argues that faith is the greater part of success: "det meste af lykken" (2.53 _ 
italics mine). Skule is haunted by the sense of Hakon's indominatable luck 
even when he has become king of half the country, following an unexpected 
victory over Hakon at Laka. He recalls his pretence of appearing "smilende 
fremad, som om jeg var sa uryggelig viss pa retten og sejren og lykken". The 
taste of victory is bitter and terrifying as he senses its illegitimacy. Ever since 
Hakon uttered the kingly thought, Skule has seen him as the rightful king: 
"Om der glimtede et Guds kald i disse srelsomme ord? Om Gud havde siddet 
inde med tanken til nu, og viI str0 det ud - og har karet Hakon til samand?" 
(4.101). It is faith that he lacks, and faith is unavailable to him, as he has no 
calling of his own. 
The supernatural element of the play is underscored by the appearance 
of the comet at Nidaros which opens Act V. The comet resembles a flaming 
sword to the terrified observers, and they have to interpret its message, in the 
manner of the ancient omen. Skule's followers read it as a sign that a great 
leader is about to die, and are not all agreed that it refers to Hakon, as Skule is 
ill and his followers are suffering from low morale. The comet reappears to 
Skule just prior to his encounter with the ghost of Biskop Nikolas, who has 
visited him to cement his resolve to kill Hakon's heir and establish Peter's 
ascendancy. It is his concern for his son Peter's soul that enables him to resist 
Nikolas, and clear the way to his anagnorisis. 
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Skule's anagnorisis is precipitated by his growing inability to proceed 
without faith. Circumstances conspire to defeat him on a military level, but 
more importantly, he recognises the palpably corrupting effect believing in a 
stolen vision is having on Peter. Peter resorts to stealing from the church and 
preparing to murder Hakon's heir at all costs, even if this means killing him in 
his mother's arms. Peter has become the manifestation of the kind of man that 
the bishop was tempting Skule to become, and his misplaced faith in his father 
has had an invidious, corrupting influence on him. 
Skule's insight, prompted by Peter's excesses, forces him to accept his 
fate. The kingly thought may not have been his, but he recognizes its value 
and as such is willing to die for it, recognising that Norway's future demands 
this sacrifice. He and Peter give themselves up to God: "Gud, jeg er en fattig 
mand, jeg har kun mit liv at give; men tag det, og berg Hakons store 
kong stanke" (5.199). 
In his death there is "the annihilation of tragic conflict".25 Hakon's final 
judgement on Skule is one that we must accept "Skule Bardss0n var Guds 
stedbam pa jorden; det var gaden ved ham" (5.150). Bj0m Hemmmer argues 
that we have no reason not to take this judgement on trust as these are words 
spoken by Skule's arch-enemy. The image of the step-child is a rich one, for 
like many step-children, Skule receives harsh treatment. It also summarises 
Skule's life: 
Den betydning Hakon legger i uttryket, er [ ... ] at Skules 
skjebne var som et stebarns: Han har fatt - for et 
menneskes blikk - en hard og ublid behandling av 
Varherre. Skule er blitt nektet retten bade til det som star 
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for ham som livets lykke og til en stor og kongelig ide. 
Han har vcert tjener for en plan som ikke gjaldt hans 
egen jordiske tilvcerelse.26 
In Kongsemnerne, Ibsen presents a coherent picture of the realm beyond 
human control. In this work, the focus is on the calling, and a fate determined 
by God/historical necessity. Contingency as such does not contribute so much 
to the plot (beyond the unexpected appearance of Skule's illegitimate son), but 
is extrapolated by Skule through comparison with Hakon as a constitutive 
good which derives from being chosen by God. 
Happiness is given clear definition and value. It comes through deep, 
familial attachment and love, and is not, in this play a site of conflict as it will 
be in Brand. By narrowing the focus of super-human agency in this work, 
Ibsen succeeding in developing significantly more powerful characters and 
conflicts than in the other plays we have considered thus far. 
2.6 Kejser og GaliliEer 
Kongsemnerne was followed by only one further history play. After 
Brand and Peer Gynt Ibsen finally completed his monumental world-historical 
two-part, ten-act drama, Kejser og GaliliEer. In this drama the intensity of Brand 
is lost to the grander design, and Julian Apostata, although undoubtedly a 
more significant historical figure than Skule, must look to the duke, not Brand, 
for his dramatic pedigree. Like Skule he unwittingly bolsters that which he 
would tear down (in this case Christianity, an entire moral, social and political 
order, in contrast to Skule's more local, ad hominem struggle). His sense of 
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competition with the Galilean recalls Skule's jealous impotence at the 
unstoppable success of Hakon, and like Skule he is finally corrupted by 
ambition. However, the ending of Kejser Julian is much more equivocal and the 
tragedy much less insistent. It is true that Julian undergoes several peripeteia 
but they are never accompanied by the anagnorisis Aristotle recommended as 
the outcome of reversal. 
The scope of the work is tremendous, not simply for the chronological 
and geographic range of the action, and the impressive ten-act structure, but 
also for the philosophy that it embraces through Julian's pursuit of wisdom. 
Atle Kittang sees the (stronger) first part as "eit la:rdoms - eller 
erkjenningsdrama: eit drama om trangen etter kunnskap og sanning. Saleis har 
det visse likskaper med den sakalla 'lrerdomstragedien' i f0rste del av 
Goethe's Fausr'. Part II, conversely, is a parallel unravelling of the search for 
enlightenment. 27 
Once again, Ibsen was consciously writing in the tragic mode, but in 
this case he was undertaking a radical questioning of the genre, as he 
explained in this letter to William Archer: 
... stykket er ... anlagt i den mest realistiske form; den 
illusion, jeg vilde frembringe, var virkelighedens; jeg 
vilde pa lreseren frembringe det indtryk at det, han 
lreste, var noget virkelig passeret. Skulde jeg ha' brugt 
verset, sa havde jeg derved modarbejdet mig egen 
hensigt og den opgave jeg havde stillet mig. [ ... ] Vi lever 
ikke lrengere i Shakespeares tid, og mellem 
billedhuggeme begynder man allerede at tale om at 
bemale statueme med naturlige fa rver. [ ... ] I det hele 
taget rna den sproglige form rette sig efter den grad af 
idealitet, som er udbredt over fremstillingen. Mit nye 
skuespil er ingen tragedie i den reldre tids betydning; 
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hvad jeg vilde skildre er mennesker og just derfor har jeg 
ikke villet lade dem tale II gudernes tungemal." (XVII 
122-123) 
Julian is a young man living in uncertain times, on the cusp between 
two orders, a passing paganism and emergent Christianity, much like the 
historical moment encapsulated in Act V of HCErmcendene pd Helgeland. Kejsers 
Frafald traces his fortunes and crises as he abandons the stifling and corrupt 
Christianity of the court to restore a vital and joyful paganism to the world. 
In Act I two basic elements familiar from previous works discussed are 
in place: the calling and the notion of being singled out to pursue the calling. 
But what is immediately arresting in view of Ibsen's insistence that this play 
was not to be a tragedy in the old mould, and would be written in prose to 
reinforce the realism of the drama, is the highly charged sense of the 
supernatural. 
Act I is replete with references to such forces. Over the solemn Easter 
vigil in Constantinople and the choir singing of the victory of the Lamb of God 
over evil, can be heard the discordant voices of social and religious division in 
the streets. The imperial procession enters and the atmosphere of suspicion 
and tension is extended. Emperor Konstanzios, though ostensibly a Christian, 
makes immediate and serious reference to the judgement of an oracle, which 
appals the young Julian. 
When his old friend Agathon seeks him out, it is to apprise him of a 
vision. At this point Julian sees his first falling star, and refers to the dream his 
mother had before she gave birth to him, namely that she was giving birth to 
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Achilles. He goes on to explain to Agathon that Constantinople has become a 
dangerous hotbed of sin, and the arrival of the pagan philosopher Libanius is 
seen as an index of the spiritual decay of the imperial city. His arrival was 
predicted by Signs. Julian is horrified by these pagan abominations; only a 
miracle can save them. 
Agathon explains that a vision, a divine revelation, has brought him to 
Constantinople. It is the substance of this revelation which convinces Julian 
that he has been singled out for great things: he has been chosen to wrestle 
with the lions. Julian interprets this as a revelation: "En abenbaring; et bud til 
mig -; jeg skulde vcere under udvcelgelsen" (HUVII 1: 1.53). 
When Konstanzios declares Julian's brother Gallus his successor, it is to 
placate the eleven shades, representing the eleven members of Julian's family 
he has killed. Julian is happy at not having to assume imperial office. 
Declaring himself free, he prepares to leave incognito for Athens, to discover 
the root of wisdom through learning. He tells Konstanzius that he has a divine 
calling to follow: "Gud Herren har rabt pa mig med h0j r0st. Lig Daniel gar 
jeg trygg og glad ind i 10vehulen" (1: 1.60). This image juxtaposed with his 
valedictory image establishes the terms of his subsequent spiritual struggle: 
"God ber, du vingede 10ve, Akilleus felger dig i k0lvandet" (1: 1.63). Daniel 
or Achilles? Prophet or warrior? Julian's sighting of another falling star, on 
which the act closes, point towards his death on the battlefield. 
But Athens leaves Julian similarly disillusioned concerning the 
potential for reaching wisdom through the academy. He refuses to be co-opted 
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by either side. Willing neither to defend Christianity against the corrupt 
centres of power nor to be used to defend rational logic against the mystic 
Maximos, Julian abandons Athens for Ephesus on a spiritual quest that cannot 
be conducted in the terms of either the old beauty of Hellas or the new truth of 
the Galilean. 
Act III makes it clear that the Act I instances of appeals to supernatural 
forces and signs were not merely an exercise in local colour and historical 
flavour. The act opens with Basilios and Gregor arriving in Ephesus 
astonished to find that Julian has been expecting them, when no-one knew of 
their intentions to journey there. Julian explains that he saw them in a vision 
the night before, at the precise moment they were talking about him. Brian 
Johnston has emphasised the importance of this scene: Ibsen evidently wanted 
it to be experienced as a piece of realist theatre by resisting the easier option of 
organising all the supernatural experience of the play into soliloquies. 
Julian has become an ascetic, and much of his time is spent 
contemplating the very signs and mysteries he so despised in Act I. He 
declares himself to be Njordens lykkeligste S0n" (1: 3.88). Julian's version of 
happiness here comes close to the Aristotelian definition of the eudaimon man 
as he who devotes his life to philosophical contemplation.28 (This notion will 
be discussed later in the context of Rosmersholm). However, Julian's method of 
contemplation is becoming increasingly reliant on signs and dreams, and on 
Maximos to interpret them. He tells his friends that he sees no reason to resist 
this method as many signs and portents have been fulfilled. 
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Julian is waiting for Maximos to interpret the great riddle of life for 
him. For Julian, Maximos is the greatest man for he aims to restore our 
likeness to the deity. He believes that through him the pure spirit of Adam can 
be reborn as a new race, generated by him and the pure woman. He will 
journey to the Euphrates and establish the new race, the empire of the spirit. 
The scene immediately following this, when Julian has alienated his 
Christian friends with his blasphemous prophesies, establishes the crucial 
importance of the supernatural elements in the play. Ibsen could very easily 
have reworked the contents of the symposium with the spirits into a narration 
of a dream, but instead he took the risk of staging it within a realist 
framework. And this was a momentous decision as the scene is a turning-
point in the playas it marks the beginning of julian's decline and 
disintegration, even though he experiences it as his moment of glory. 
In an alarming sequence of apparitions, Julian is addressed by 
disembodied voices who suggest themselves as Cain and Judas Iscariot 
ufrigivne under n0dvendigheden" (1: 3.102) - great helpers in denial, both 
delivering enigmatic answers to Julian's questions. The riddles they speak not 
only reflect Julian's preoccupations, but persist throughout Ibsen's tragic 
oeuvre. 
The first voice instructs Julian that he was born to serve the spirit; his 
calling is to establish the empire by way of freedom, that is by way of 
necessity, by the power of willing, willing the necessary. Maximos interprets 
this as a reference to three empires: the one founded on the tree of knowledge; 
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the second on the tree of the cross and the third a synthesis of the two. When 
Cain reveals himself to Julian, Julian interrogates him about his past life 
instead of trying to find the key to his own future. His purpose in life had 
been to sin, and this had simply fallen out by birth - by the fact that he was 
not his brother. He willed what he had to because he was himself. His sin 
produced life and the ground of life is death. The ground of death is the great 
mystery. The second willing slave at the great turning point in history, Judas 
Iscariot, helped the world turn to glory because it was his will and he willed 
what he had to, chosen by the Master. For him the riddle is whether the 
master could foretell when he chose. Maximos fails to call up the third as he is 
not dead yet. He interprets the voice in the light as a clear message to Julian to 
establish the third empire, but Julian resists defiantly, closing the sequence 
with the categorical "Jeg tr0dser oodvendigheden! Jeg vii ikke tjene den! Jeg 
er fri, fri, fri!" (1: 3.102). 
This scene is a clear statement of the major tragic themes that preoccupy 
not only Julian but many subsequent heroes. The messages of the voices 
function in the same way as the oracle functioned in the ancient world and in 
drama, and misinterpretation could be central to tragedy. Maximos is a 
Tiresias figure, somewhere between human and spirit. As strong as the sense 
that a calling is grounded in some higher power or ideal is the close 
association of freedom and necessity on the one hand, and of willing and 
constraint on the other. These function together in an ineluctable circularity 
that is only temporarily ruptured at the moment of death. In Julian's case the 
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ground of his calling suggests not a specific deity or personifiable fate, but the 
wider pull of a romantic conception of history. History is engaged in an 
upward progress, and is as intractable a force as Nemesis, Fate, the Noms and 
God. 
When news arrives that his brother Gallus has died and Konstanzios 
has named Julian Caesar, Julian greets this as fulfilment of the words of the 
voices and an earlier dream of Apollinarius's. When he reads the letter from 
Konstanzios instructing him to marry his sister Helena, Julian reads the union 
with the 'pure woman' into this. Maximos, Basilios and Gregor all advise him 
against establishing Konstanzios's empire - Maximos's unease springs from 
conflicting signs "tegn imod tegn", whereas his Christian friends see Julian as 
unable to resist temptation. 
Act N presents Julian as a military leader whose significant successes 
In combat have been erased from record by his Emperor's revisionist 
propaganda. Julian appears to be a modest and serious ruler. He asks his 
general Florentius what Caesar could need to make him happy, and decrees 
that knowledge of the truth is essential to his happiness. For the remainder of 
the act, truth is under great pressure: Helena is poisoned by the fruit sent by 
the Emperor to congratulate Julian on a successful campaign. In her delirium 
it emerges that she is anything but the 'pure woman' of Julian's vision. The 
despair and impotence he feels at Konstanzios's constant erosion of his power 
and autonomy is transmuted into a radiant confidence in his belief in the 
necessity for assuming the reins of Empire. 
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He ends the act buoyed up by the confidence of his soldiers and his 
faith in lykke: "Veer med mig, du lykke, som har aldrig svigtet mig f0r!" (1: 
4.142 - my italics). Julian is indeed, like Hakon a lykkebarn. Little goes wrong 
for him, even in military campaigns, which are not the natural realm of 
success for the philosopher. Helena, Maximos and Basilios all make reference 
to this. Basilios remarks that Julian has been attended by good fortune to such 
a degree that he has often been mistaken for Christ himself. Basilios's 
evaluation, without necessarily representing a personal position, represents a 
line of thought traceable to at least as far back as Aristotle, who wrestles with 
the question of the role of luck in eudaimonia and whether or not it is abetted by 
divine dispensation.29 
The appeal is to an unspecified fortune, but what is arresting about it in 
the context of the symposium of spirits of the previous act is that it follows a 
declaration that in leading a rebellion against Konstanzios "Jeg b0jer mig for 
det uundgaelige" (1: 4.142). Julian here is effectively withdrawing his 
statement from the end of the previous act when he rejects necessity and 
declares himself free. Now he is embracing the inevitable and investing his 
future in a benign providence. 
When Julian asks Sallust how he could bring himself to break his oath 
to Zeus and Apollo, Sallust replies that his gods are far away. Julian sees this 
as an index of freedom: "Lykkelig du, hvis guder er langt borte" (1: 5.149). 
This communicates a resentment at the extent to which religion controls one's 
life, thought, and action. Unlike the Christian God, the gods of the Pantheon 
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Llhemmer ingen", leaving LIen mand rum omkring sig til at handle. 0, denne 
grceske lykke, at f0le sig fri!" (1: 5.149). Here happiness is delimited as a 
freedom that obtains from a lack of divine control: freedom from God; freedom 
to act 
This freedom seems to extend to a freedom from ethics too. When 
considering the justification for a pre-emptive strike against Konstanzios, 
Julian invokes the authority of Plato to support his stand. But Sallust merely 
questions the right of Julian's enemies to life. Maximos is unable to interpret 
the omens on account of the fact that they have been drowned out by the 
voices from the church singing hymns, in itself an omen. Maximos cautions 
Julian to LlTag din skcebne i egne hcender" and bury the ufurie-piskede 
synder" (1: 5.153). The crisis comes to a head when the body of Helena is 
reported to perform miracles. 
Part I closes with Julian emerging into the light from the catacombs 
having performed a sacrifice to the god Helios. In counterpoint to the choir 
singing the Lord's Prayer, Julian proclaims the Kingdom his. 
In Part I, as Julian gradually distances himself from his Christian faith, 
there is an observable parallel movement towards lykke denoting fortune. His 
intellectual and spiritual transformation is accompanied by a concomitant 
deepening of the notional field of chance and happiness and more worldly 
concerns. 
Part II returns us to Constantinople, and takes us slowly eastward to 
the Tigris, where Julian had envisaged the establishment of a new race. 
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Konstanzios is dead and Julian is Emperor. He has introduced religious 
freedom, but this is a principle very easily eroded. 
Julian's faith in lykke gradually becomes formalised and systematised 
into an asserted belief in an alliance with the old religion. He tells the orator 
Themistius that 
Hvad mig angar, sa drister jeg mig ikke til at bygge mit 
hab pa en gud der hidtil har vcert mig fiendtlig i aIle 
foretagender. Jeg har sikre tegn og varsler for at al den 
fremgang, jeg vant pa Galliens grcenser, den skylder jeg 
hine andre guddomme der begunstiget Alexander pa en 
noget lignende made. Under disse gudommes skcerm og 
skjold slap jeg lykkeligt gennem aIle farer; og navnlig var 
det dem der f0rte mig frem pa min rejse hid med en sa 
vidunderlig hurtighet og lykke at jeg her i gadene har 
hert tilrob som tyder pa at man holder mig for et 
guddommeligt menneske, - (2: 1.172 - my italics) 
Julian now locates his success in the dispensation of the old gods, and 
this entails sacrifices to the goddess Tuche, whom Ibsen Latinised as Fortuna. 
His original apostrophe to lykke in 1: 4.142 has evolved into formalised 
worship. Julian is involved in a project of temple restoration and of reinstating 
ancient ritual largely forgotten by the adherents of the old religion. This 
systematisation of old religious practice provides Julian with an interpretative 
position from which to rationalise his opposition to the imperatives of the 
Galilean. It should be noted that Julian's position has not hitherto been 
consistently pagan - prior to his sacrifice to Helios, his position was more 
atheist than pagan - he yearned for the freedom of the gods who were far 
away. 
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This act witnesses Julian rebuilding the old religion. There are six 
references to Fortuna in this act alone. He explains how he had to consult old 
books to get accurate representations of sacrificial procedures, and even 
expresses a wish to officiate himself. The ceremony proclaims the power of the 
old gods Apollo and Dionysus, restoring them to their former status. Much 
emphasis has been given to the Dionysian and Apollonian elements of Julian's 
religion, but little mention is made of his reliance on and reverence for Tuche, 
Fortuna. He sends up this tribute to her: 
.... 0 Fortuna! Sto jeg vel her uden din bistand! Visselig 
ved jeg at du ikke lcengere selv lader dig til syne, saledes 
som tilfceldet var i den gyldne tidsalder, hvorom hin 
uforlignelige blinde sanger har fortalt oss. Men det ved 
jeg dog - og deri er alle andre visdomsvenner enige med 
mig - at det er dig som har vcesentlig andel i valget av 
den ledsagende and, god eller fordervelig, som skal 
f0lge ethvert menneske pa hans livs-gang. Jeg har ingen 
arsak til at klage over dig, 0 Fortuna! (2: 1.175) 
Julian attributes his smooth rise to the imperial throne to the benign 
ministries of Fortuna, who has guided him through the vagaries of the 
Byzantine power structure, corrupt allies and enemies to the helm of a great 
power. He has been served by a friendly daimon appointed by Fortuna at his 
birth. Here we have Ibsen's clearest statement hitherto of the structure of a 
belief in the realm beyond the human. 
This is the first time that these forces are presented as positive forces. In 
Catilina they were irredeemably dark, and almost coextensive with the forces 
of evil; in Fru Inger, fate again was seen as a powerful force, but if crossed, 
demanded the downfall of the elect In Ha?rmiflldene pa Helgeland fate and the 
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Noms were again irresistible and vengeful, yet an alternative was available. 
Kongsemnerne took the question of fate into a distinctly Christian framework 
while still deliberating the consequences of crossing her or God - the 
distinction is not clear. All the above point to the syncretism discernible in the 
plays. Julian brings us back to the question of whether the lucky man is aided 
by the divine, and at this stage his response is unequivocal. 
Julian's preoccupation with a divinely organised and representative 
lykke shows the beginning of his disintegration and collapse. He feels cradled 
in the company of immortals, which is accompanied by a gradual fading of 
the distinction between the human and the divine in his person. His stated 
end is no longer the search for truth but experienced through the worship of 
Dionysus. He organises a festive procession through the streets, which he 
claims will distinguish the pure from the impure and the true believers from 
the unbelievers and the result will be the release of pure joy. "Liv, liv, liv i 
skenhed" (2: 1.188). 
But the procession is a travesty of these ideals. Julian himself appears 
with wine-leaves in his hair, riding an ass (a visual reference to Jesus) wearing 
the god Dionysus' signature panther skin, surrounded by drunkards dressed 
as fauns and satyrs. 
Var der sk0nhed i dette? - - Hvor var oldingerne med det 
hvide skceg? Hvor var de rene jomfruer med band om 
panden, med s0mmelige lader, tugtige midt i dansens 
glcede? Tvi eder i skeger! - - (han river panterhuden af og 
kaster den tilsiden.) 
Hvor er skenheden bleven af? Kan ikke kejseren 
Byde den sta op igjen, og sa star den op? 
Tvi over denne stinkende utugt- -
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Hvilke ansigter! AIle laster skreg ud af disse forstyrrede 
drag. 
Kroppens og sjcelens bylder. 
Fy, Fy! (Tjenere i palatset) Et bad, Agilo! Stanken kvceler 
mig. (2: 1.193 - italics mine) 
Insight strains towards the surface melancholy of Julian's ubi sunt, yet 
his deepening vanity ensures that his question remains rhetorical. Julian 
cannot revive the old religion, and his refusal to acknowledge this contorts his 
personality into a tyrant of the first order, and retards anagnorisis. 
Julian's reliance on external signs and the supernatural becomes 
excessive. In part this had been an indication of an open and receptive mind, 
closed neither to the arguments in books, philosophical debate, nor the 
supernatural. Now Julian relies only on signs and Fortuna for guidance and 
success. This recalls Aristotle's dictum: "'Where there is more insight and 
reason, there is least luck; and where there is the most luck there is the least 
insight" .30 
The second part of the play moves from local man-to-man 
disagreements in the street to full-scale bloodshed on the battlefield. Julian 
dies at the hands of Agathon, his childhood friend, whom he himself had 
converted to Christianity. His dream of restoring what was noble, beautiful 
and life-affirming about the old religion resulted in personal corruption and 
decadence. The religion he established was, as we have seen, a rickety and 
finally oppressive construct, not a restoration but a re-creation, largely in 
Julian's own image, for the old religion had already passed away. Where 
Julian's religion sought to be open and inclusive, it became hostile and 
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exclusive, where it preached tolerance it practised hatred, leaving its founder 
near-delirious for interpreting the signs. 
But Julian dies unrepentant, having built nothing, in the words of 
Halvard Solness : "'ingenting byggd". His destructive vanity has only served 
to bolster the Galilean. But Ibsen clearly was not seeking to dramatise the fall 
of a vain and failed man. Kejser og Galilceer is also Ibsen's farewell to historical 
tragedy, which in the person of Julian is taken to its limits. The freedom 
indistinguishable from necessity that Julian is fighting is nothing less than 
history itself - Julian's nemesis, and the old gods are no match for the forces of 
history. 
His dying words recalling his earlier beautiful earth speech closes on 
the apostrophe to Helios, borrowing Christ's formation: "'0 sol, sol, hvi bedrog 
du mig!" (2: 5.334). But it is Makrina, the true I pure woman' of the play who 
has the final word, seeing Julian's death in the context of history, which she is 
certain will judge him kindly under the sign of necessity: 
V ildfarende menneskesjcel, - matte d u fare vild, da skal 
det visselig regnes dig til go de pa hin store dag, nar de 
vceldige kommer i skyen for at sige dommen over de 
levende d0de og over de d0de levende. (2: 5.336) 
In Brand, which we now turn to, belief in contingency-Iykke is displaced 
by a discipline of spirit which proves as inimical to happiness-Iykke and 
insight as Julian's reliance on signs and Fortuna. 
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It is inevitable for human nature that 
one should wish for and seek 
happiness - Kant, The Metaphysics of 
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Chapter ill 
Brand: Mellem Lykke og Pligt1 
3. 1 Introduction 
On the fly-leaf of a copy of Brand presented to a little girl on her first 
birthday, Ibsen wrote the following dedication: "Gid dit liv rna f0je sig som 
et digt / om den store forsoning mellem lykke og pligt"(HU XN.463 - my 
italics). This dedication gathers several seminal questions to itself, and the 
mere fact that it was written in 1896 shows that even with the benefit of 
thirty years' hindsight, Ibsen regarded these two elements, happiness and 
duty, to stand as a motto for the play. Furthermore, it implies that tragedy 
lurks in the life that fails to effect this reconciliation. 
This chapter will argue that the range of conflicts and tensions on 
which Brand is predicated is collapsable into the problem of the putative 
harmonising of happiness and duty. It will read Brand as a hero whose 
agonistic struggle takes place between the two poles of lykke and pligt. 
The yoking of happiness and duty as opposed to happiness and 
fortune in this play shows a clear departure from form. This work pays scant 
attention to the question of the gottliche Gegensatz. It could not be otherwise: 
Brand is a man so deeply committed to his calling, a calling which expresses 
itself in a formalism so rigid that it leaves no room for even the weakest 
account of contingency. He brings to mind Aristotle's contrast between luck 
and insight "Where there is most insight and reason, there is the least luck; 
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and where there is the most luck there is the least insight".2 This is a logical 
outcome for Brand's doctrine of the will, the executive power of his inner 
legislature, which leaves nothing to chance, although it constantly takes 
chances. In this play the gottliche Gegensatz is no longer plural and fickle but 
becomes capitalised and singular. He is God.3 Nevertheless, Ibsen has not 
completely cleared the stage of supernatural and external agencies; there is a 
residual tension in this work, which I will consider briefly before discussing 
the lykke-pligt disequilibirium further. 
This is Ibsen's first non-historical attempt at writing tragedy. One 
effect of the contemporary setting is for the supernatural to recede. All 
reference to Brand's calling, all apostrophising to God is absorbed into a 
surface realism: we are observing a religious man, rather than someone 
obviously alien and other. However, the Messiah of All or Nothing is 
flanked by trolls, has visions of the dead and hears voices and heavenly 
choirs. He dies in the company of a mad half-gypsy Cassandra-figure, also 
prone to visions. Nature itself is endowed with a natural supernaturalism. 
The fact that these elements, with the obvious exception of the Voice which 
accompanies the avalanche at the close of the play, are often passed over by 
critics, owes as much to the compelling portrait of the protagonist as it does 
to the fact that this is a dramatic poem, not a realist play. I will return to 
some of these supernatural aspects as they occur. 
One of the important issues the verse dedication confronts rests in its 
implication that a reconciliation between happiness and duty is not only a 
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desirable but also an achievable end: Ibsen wishes a life lived and not a death 
died in such harmony, so it is clear that we are not dealing with a vision of 
perfection deferred to another world, such as the various versions of 
paradise or the Kantian notion of bliss.4 However, the evidence that Ibsen's 
vision could not in fact accommodate such a reconciliation is consistent 
Happiness and duty are notions which in the moral scenography of his stage 
are in perpetual collision, and they do very separate moral work. Aline 
Solness comes to mind as testimony to the radical incompatibility of the two 
values5, and we recall Pastor Manders's admonition to Fro Alving in 
Gengangere: "Det er just den rette opr0rsand at krceve lykken her i livet Hvad 
ret har vi mennesker tillykken? Net vi skal g0re var pligt, frue!" (HU IX.l.77 
- italics mine). The opposition between happiness and duty which these 
characters express is familiar territory in Ibsen, but we can find no 
corresponding reconciliation in these plays or in any other. 
Pastor Manders's formulation not only signals the dissonance 
between the two terms, but seeks to vanish happiness from morality 
altogether. And as the narrative of the Alving family tragedy shows, an 
ethics which gives no account of happiness other than as something outside 
morality, is not one which can be lived by. 
3.1.2 The Failure of the Enlightenment Project 
Before taking this discussion any further, it is necessary to pause to 
consider the contours of the moral space which these characters inhabit, a 
86 
space where happiness and duty provide the moral mabix for their attempts 
to discover how to live. Walter Benjamin warned against trying to develop a 
philosophy of tragedy as "a theory of the moral order of the world, without 
any reference to its historical content, in a system of generalised sentiments" 
with no more than the logical support of a few key concepts to sustain it 6 It 
is my contention that any attempt to define this moral space in these terms 
will arrest the moment in the history of ethics famously termed by Alasdair 
MacIntyre as "the failure of the Enlightenment project" . 
Historically we can locate the moral space in which Brand's tragedy is 
played out as belonging to the Enlightenment Project, the period in the 
history of ethics which according to Alasdair MacIntyre ran from 1630-1850 
and which accorded morality its own cultural space, independent of legal, 
theological and aesthetic constraints.7 It was a period in which "the project 
of an independent, rational justification of morality becomes not merely the 
concern of individual thinkers, but central to Northern European culture".8 
This project can be broadly defined as the overarching impulse to isolate 
morality from both theology and teleology, and to define it independently of 
facts about human nature or any order external to it, and to ground it 
exclusively in rationality. MacIntyre makes the important point that this 
project was not the preserve of professional thinkers, but penetrated the 
Weltanschauung of Northern Europe. And perhaps no other thinker of the 
period had such a profound effect on the structure of common morality as 
Kant did, although how possible, or even how desirable it is to chart the 
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wider influence of his ethical thought independently of Lutheran fideism is 
unclear. If Kant was the moral philosopher par excellence of the 
Enlightenment Project, then no-one in drama better exemplifies its failures 
than Brand. 
3.1.3 Kant The Pure Will and Duty 
At this point it is necessary to rehearse those features of Kant's ethics, 
which, shored up by a pervasive Protestant ideology, discernibly provide 
the terms for the ethical collisions in Brand. While the question of the 
possible influence of Kierkegaard's Enten Eller on this play has been debated 
since the play was published, few have pointed to the more ready 
comparison with Kant. Croce constitutes a rare exception when he writes of 
"Brand, obsessed by the idea of duty, duty for duty's sake, of this ultra-
Kantian duty so pitiless and cruel to the very man who exercises it. .. ".9 
The first chapter of Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals 
(1785) begins with the assertion that "Nothing in the world - indeed nothing 
even beyond the world - can possibly be conceived which could be called 
good without qualification except a good will" .10 One basic distinction 
which this axiom entails is that between actions performed out of respect for 
the moral law, and those motivated either by the pursuit of a specific end, or 
out of inclination. Not only do moral evaluations turn on this motivational 
distinction, but moral worth is sought in the quality of the will informing a 
given action, and not in the outcome of that action: 
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The good will is not good because of what it effects [ ... ] 
it is good [ ... ] in itself. [ ... ] Even, if by some special 
disfavour of destiny or by the niggardly endowment of 
step-motherly nature, this will is entirely lacking in 
power to carry out its intentions, [ ... ] it would still 
shine like a jewel for its own sake ... 11 
In a non-consequentialist scheme such as this, happiness is 
necessarily decentred. Its pursuit is subordinated to the duty to follow the 
moral law. It is seen as unsatisfactory for the purposes of morality in many 
ways: Firstly it is too indeterminate and shifting a concept in which to 
ground morality; secondly, if posited as the end of an action, it would 
automatically define the status of the rule it expressed as holding only 
conditionally and not categorically; finally, as inclination, it compromises the 
moral purity of duty, whereby even the pleasure the agent may derive from 
seeing that his action is productive of human happiness, II still has no 
genuine moral worth [ ... ] for its maxim lacks moral content, namely the 
performance of such actions not from inclination but from duty".12 
3.1.4 Kant: Happiness 
Kant's account of happiness is much more nuanced than generally 
allowed. This is understandable in view of the fact that Kant gave no 
explicit, systematised account of it. The popular understanding of the 
relationship between Kant and happiness can be faulted not for what it says 
about Kant's views on happiness, but for what it does not say. 
Indeed, one could go so far as to say that the popular understanding 
of Kant's position on happiness is broadly representative of Pastor 
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Manders's view of what constitutes moral action. But first, let us consider 
some aspects of the presentation of happiness in Kant.!3 
The most important point about happiness for Kant is that he does 
not reject it - on the contrary, he acknowledges it as a natural end for human 
beings. Secondly, he does not offer a single definition of it, neither does he 
consistently use the same term (Gluckseligkeit). There are two basic senses in 
which he understands happiness: 1) as a "sensible state" and 2) as an 
"intelligible state". Happiness as sensible state covers ideas such as pleasure, 
well-being and the satisfaction of inclinations. He sometimes refers to this 
kind of happiness as "physical happiness" and in his Religion Within the 
Limits of Reason Alone (1793) he states his belief that humans cannot be 
expected to renounce this kind of happiness, because they are sensible 
beings. Sometimes Kant adds a satisfaction requirement it is not enough to 
be happy - you have to know it too. Physical happiness, then, is a 
description of a state of being in the natural world and is clearly a goal that 
can be achieved in this world. But this happiness is separate from morality. 
The second category of happiness, happiness as an intelligible state, 
differs from the happiness as a sensible state in that it is seen as a mental 
state, rather than as a physical state, and it describes a person's conception of 
himself as a moral agent. Alternatively, it can be a deferred state, i.e. 
something which can only take place in another world. Kant's mental state 
versions of happiness describes "moral-" or "self-contentment" 
[Zujriedenheit] and finally "bliss" [Seligkeit]. 
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"Self-contentment" is the satisfaction a person has when he knows he 
has acted virtuously. Kant remarked that happiness is not possible without 
this sense of contentment He did not posit that the two things were 
identical. Self-contentment is distinct from happiness in that it is a negative 
satisfaction, as it does not involve direct participation and gratification as 
sensible happiness does. Self-contentment arises from the satisfaction with 
one's condition "when one is conscious of needing nothing" and having 
conquered inclination. 
Therefore, it is not pure happiness, but an analogue of happiness. It is 
the contentment the agent feels in the knowledge that he has acted 
virtuously in freedom. This is an intellectual contentment, which stands 
apart from sensuous contentment. 
Bliss, the final version of happiness Kant deals with, is again, not 
identifiable with happiness, but an analogue of it It resembles self-
contentment in that involves freedom from inclination, but in the case of the 
former, this freedom is partial, in the case of bliss, it is total. It is not . 
attainable in this world because human beings are by nature too dissatisfied 
to attain it It will occur in the next world, as it is the result of progress away 
from the sensible realm. 
In sum, only the first type of happiness, sensible happiness can be 
accepted as genuine happiness, because only this kind of happiness takes 
place in the sensible world. The other kind is too closely allied to morality or 
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too otherworldly to qualify. This explains why Kant saw the pursuit of 
happiness as a natural, but not a moral end. 
However, this separation of sensible and intelligible happiness, or 
participatory and negative happiness, of physical and moral happiness, did 
not mean that happiness stood outside morality. Kant was very clear on one 
point: Human beings have an indirect duty to be happy, because well-being 
reduces the temptation to err, to commit a theft for example. The other point 
about happiness which Kant emphasised is that it is part of the highest 
good, the happiness that crowns virtue. 
These refinements on the idea of happiness and its analogues will 
enable us to appreciate both Brand's tragic failure and Agnes's 
transformation. 
3.1.5 Kant and Aristotle 
Another point central to Kant's moral philosophy is the emphasis he 
placed on the dignity of the rational agent This dignity consists in the agent's 
freedom and self-determination, in his capacity not only for rule-governed 
behaviour but also his ability to generate the rules which he lives by. In this 
scheme man in his rationality is an end in himself, and his special status in 
nature carries with it a duty to be equal to the dignity of that status by 
obeying the moral law. The agent can test whether a maxim falls within the 
moral law by asking if he can" at the same time will that it should become 
universal law" ; if he can, the maxim will be binding on all rational agents. 14 
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In contrast to this scheme stands Aristotelian virtue ethics which 
recognises moral worth not as a quality of will, but in the degree of success 
with which man performs a certain role (e.g. farmer, soldier) through the 
exercising of a clearly defined set of virtues (e.g. courage, justice), and 
which, as we have seen, posits eudaimonia as the end of human life: 
"Happiness [ ... ] is found to be something perfect and self-sufficient, being 
the end to which our actions are directed.15 Ibsen brings out this contrast 
very clearly with his portrayal of so many community figures in direct 
conflict with Brand, from the humane doctor to the cynical mayor. But with 
the Enlightenment the functional notion of man has vanished into a 
formalist ethics which refuses to derive ethical principles from facts about 
human nature and is absorbed by a modernity which thinks of man first and 
foremost as an individual and not in terms of specific roles.16 
Arguably no other post-Enlightenment drama has produced as many 
'individuals' in this sense as Ibsen's. But these individuals from Brand on are 
not presented as paradigms of rational optimism, but rather show how this 
particular version of anthropocentricism cannot teach them how to live: Peer 
Gynt, Halvard Solness, and John Gabriel Borkman, are all involved in an 
ultimately debilitating struggle to be sovereign in moral authority. They 
attempt to free themselves from the bondage of inherited modes of ethical 
thought, but are finally deconstructed by its concepts. 
The internal inconsistencies of the project of providing a rational 
justification for morality is too vast an area to chart here.17 But what we see 
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on Ibsen's stage is the agony of individuals who are most fully themselves 
when they realise that they cannot ultimately sustain a conception of the 
autotelic self and that the formalism that requires such a self can only issue 
directives and form policies, and is no reliable guide to what to value in life. 
The tragedy is at its keenest when the heroes are forced to confront the 
question of the legitimacy of their personal moralities, which they finally 
begin to acknowledge as having no status beyond that of creations of the 
will. 
It is noteworthy that even as brief a consideration of Kant as this 
opens up several of the conflicts in Brand and affords insight into the 
structure of these conflicts. In the following section we will consider the 
wider dramatic context for understanding the various versions of duty in 
this drama. 
3.1.6. Necessary Identities 
In Shame and Necessity where he analyses the ethical structure behind 
decision-making in Greek tragedy, Bernard Williams takes up arms against a 
sea of Kantians, arguing that the necessity expressed by, for example, 
Oedipus and Ajax in their deontic formulation "I must" do not fit either 
version of the Kantian story, that is they express neither the categorical nor 
the hypothetical if-based imperatives.I8 Williams finds the argument that 
these imperatives radiate from an if pitifully reductive of the heroic 
dimension of the responses of these characters, while the categorical 
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imperative was, of course, outside the moral experience of the post-Homeric 
age. Williams concludes instead that these imperatives radiate from the 
protagonists' acceptance of the heroic code.19 
The heroic code not only animates various key choices made by these 
characters but also grounds the identities of those who chose to live by it 
Shame in the ancient world mediated the hero's relationship to both himself 
and the community in which he lived. Failure to live up to the code 
signalled not only a loss of face in the community but also a rupture in the 
hero's identity. When the hero's identity to a great extent determines the 
choices that he makes, Williams terms it a "necessary identity", an identity 
which is "internal, grounded in the ethos, the projects, the individual nature 
of the agent and the way he conceives the relation of his life to other 
people's" .20 
The heroic is clearly light years away from the bourgeois Protestant 
ethic that will henceforth colour Ibsen's stage world: shame has made way 
for the more private guilt and the concept of divine necessity has been 
replaced by either a rational humanism or melancholic fumblings in a space 
vacated by a deus absconditus. But the modality of the heroes' expression 
remains insistently deontic throughout the canon, which the eponymous 
Catilina opens with a programmatic "Jeg maa! Jeg maa! / Sa byder mig en 
Stemme i Sjcelens Dyb" (HU 1.1.43). It is this same self-addressed injunction 
which ricochets off the walls of Catilina's Rome through Brand's winter 
landscapes into the desolate comfort of Fro Alving's parlour; it is what 
95 
pushes Solness up the steeple to his death, precipitates Hedda Gabler's 
double suicide and forces John Gabriel Borkman into the confrontation with 
the icy hand that is to take his life. And in both cases, the ancient and the 
Ibsenian, a response to this perceived duty can require the death of the 
protagonist. But despite Williams's demonstration that the Kantian story 
cannot number Ajax and his contemporaries among its audience, there are 
compelling reasons for asking whether it can claim Ibsen's heroes. 
An analogous perception emerges in Ibsen's correspondence with 
Brandes concerning Kejser og GaliliEer. Brandes faulted the play for its 
excessive determinism, which he concludes is of a religious nature: 
Ved den mest gennemf0rte Determinisme ses Alt, hvad 
Helten g0r, som Begrebet Ansvar og dermed til en vis 
Grad ogsaa Lidenhed og Storhed. Hedningen Maximos 
og Kristinden Makrina stemmer overens i den Tro, at 
Julian maatte handle, som han har handlet [ ... ]. [ ... ] 
Kun Forsynstroen, ikke Videnskaben kan f0re til en 
Determinisme af denne Natur. Den religi0se 
Forsynstro alene kan pumpe Individet i den Grad leens 
for Selvbestemmelse; den videnskapelige Lovantagelse 
derimod aabner Individualiteten et Spillerum.21 
Ibsen's response to this criticism is instructive: 
meg finder nogen indre modsigelse i Deres dom om 
den i min bog inneholdte n0dvendighedslcere, nar jeg 
sammenholder Deres misbilligelse heraf med Deres 
godkendelse af noget lignende i P. Heyses Kinder der 
Welt. Thi efter min mening kommer det om trent ud pa 
et, enten jeg om en persons karakter siger 'det ligger i 
blodet' eller jeg siger 'han er fri under 
oodvendigheden - '. (30.01.1875, Dresden - HU 
XVII. 160)22 
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It is with Brand that Ibsen makes his first full exploration not only of 
the calling but of the structure of the calling and the authority of its origin: Is 
it the expression of a strict Kantian formalism, or is it simply the 
extraordinary assertion of an ego playing God, as suggested by Solness's 
"Jeg er nu engang slig, som jeg er! Og jeg kan da ikke skabe mig om heller!" 
(HU XII.l.39)? 23 Is there anything external to the agent which gives content 
to this imperative, which we ask of Borkman's "Menneskene sk0nner ikke at 
jeg matte det, fordi jeg var mig selv, - fordi jeg var John Gabriel Borkman, _ 
og ikke nogen anden" (HU XID.3. 97)? As we shall see, part of the struggle 
that these characters are caught up in involves their addressing this very 
question of defining the nature of the ground in virtue of which these 
imperatives obtain their authority, and in Brand, this questioning takes the 
form of death. 
3. 2. Brand: "Helt og Holdent Kallets Mann" 
Brand is Ibsen's clearest dramatic expression of the problems 
produced by the calling. As we have seen, the sense of a calling is active in 
almost all the early historical tragedies, but nowhere is the distinction 
between character and calling so blurred. In contrast to Catilina and Fru 
Inger, Brand does not resist his calling; in contrast to Skule there is no doubt 
that he has a calling; like Hakon his commitment to his calling is absolute, 
but unlike Hakon he undergoes almost intolerable suffering for its sake. He 
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is thus an interesting inversion of the heroic pattern so far established. He is, 
in Edvard Beyer's words, "helt og holdent kallets man".24 
The eponymous Brand, perhaps more than any other of Ibsen's 
creations, lives by imperatives. For this charismatic diocesan curate, the 
sovereignty of his self-made moral code of "intet eller alt" is absolute. As in 
Catilina, the first sequence of Brand establishes a calling. Where Catilina 
speaks of a voice inside him driving him on, Brand immediately identifies 
his duty as a divine injunction, an injunction which defines his relationship 
to life and death. The play opens with Brand leading a peasant and his son 
across the mountains in hazardous conditions to give comfort to the 
peasant's daughter on her death-bed. But the peasant loses heart, and 
decides in the interest of their own safety and of the rest of his family to turn 
back: 
BOND EN. Det evener ingen Mandemagt. 
Kjend; - her er Grunden hul og spr0d -
Stands, Mand! Det gcelder Liv og D0d. 
BRAND. Jeg maa; jeg gaar en Stormands Bud. 
BONDEN. Hvad heder han? 
BRAND. Han heder Gud. (HUV.l.178-179) 
Brand asks the father how much he would be prepared to give to 
ensure that his daughter could die happy (salig). The peasant declares that 
he would give everything, but stops short of his life. This is where the 
principle of intet eller aU first asserts itself, with Brand writing the peasant off 
spiritually. As the first act progresses, this calling receives sharper definition: 
Brand identifies his task as the resurrection of the kindly old God 
emasculated by the state church, and the transformation of this God into the 
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vengeful virile Lord of the Old Testament But Brand's stated end, to see 
God great and very strong, requires a corresponding resurrection in his 
fellow men, and he isolates a triple alliance of the nLettsind", 
"Slappsind" and "Vildsind" (1. 201-2) which must be vanquished in order 
that the ultimate end of human life can be achieved: the demonstration of its 
dignity before God. This end, as we saw above, is clearly inscribable within 
Kantian morality: 
Haand om Hakken, som om Sverdet, 
enes kan med Mandev~rdet; 
et er Maalet, - det at blive 
Tavler, hvorpaa Gud kan skrive. (2. 229) 
Brand goes on to locate human dignity in the quality of the will, and 
for him the will is the only absolute good, prized as something much greater 
than simply being the faculty of ends: 
Ingen bramfuld Storv~rkshandling 
10fter Sl~gten til Forvandling; 
V ~kkelsen af rige Evner 
B0der ej dens Sj~lerevner. 
Det er Viljen, som det gj~lder! 
Viljen frigj0r eller f~lder, 
Viljen, hel, i alt det spredte 
i det tunge som det lette. - (2.228-9) 
The scope of Brand's project is immense for it involves the recreation 
of both God and man. But just as the benign and merciful father figure was 
created in response to the needs of the people in the valley, so is the 
intransigent Jehovah a reflex of Brand's need for something 
uncompromising in which to anchor his own moral code. It is important to 
distinguish Brand's calling from his official position of priest - his success, or 
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not, qua priest, is not for him at issue, and, moreover, despite his assertion at 
the beginning of the play that his duty is a divine injunction, not until the 
end of the play does he make any direct appeals to God, and he even 
confesses to a certain hesitation at calling himself a Christian. His only 
appeals are to the strong, autonomous will; his only yardstick his self-made 
dogma of Allor Nothing. (It should be stressed here, in the context of the 
question whether Brand was a religious play or not, that Brand's doctrine is 
more immediately describable as a doctrine of duty rather than of faith.) 
The insistence on the immutable essence of self, we noted, so 
dominant in later heroes occurs in an interesting variant in Brand. Brand has 
a much more limited sense of self than these characters do as he has made a 
total identification with his calling. The mere fact that he does not thunder 
his own name out in the manner of the later heroes, demonstrates this. The 
mere fact that his name is only spoken by others provides an instant contrast 
with the later plays. Brand does not insist on immutable human essences, he 
is after all, in the business of restoring mankind to dignity - to "skabe nytt 
og helt og rent" (2.216) - and thus necessarily believes in the spiritual 
potential of all for redemption. 
3. 3 Agnes and Ejnar: Sensible Happiness 
The encounter with the peasant ends with the most extreme scene 
shift in Ibsen. Nature shifts gear from avalanche to heady spring, responding 
to the various dramas played out on her. This change is brought about by 
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the arrival of the young lovers, Agnes and Ejnar, two children of happiness. 
The young lovers, the most undiluted presentation of lykke in Ibsen, 
represent the basic ~sensible happiness' that Kant describes. The couple is 
intoxicated by life, love and joy, so much so that they fail to observe the 
precipice directly beneath them. 
The apparent harmony between man and nature is striking here. And 
the imagery used, the butterfly poem, for example, reinforces this sense. 
Ejnar sees himself as the child of a providential God, a God who gave him 
Agnes to wed. Agnes herself is almost a symbolic representation of this kind 
of contentment. She is Ejnar's masterpiece, 1/ et Rosenbluss paa hendes Kind, 
/ et 0jepar som lyste Lykke, / et Smil, som sang i Sjcelen ind - " (1.187). The 
joy they are experiencing is one Ejnar believes will last a lifetime: 
Et Bryllupsliv i Gammen, 
som Dn?)mmen stort, som Sagnet smukt; 
thi vid at denne S0ndagsmorgen, 
skj0nt midt paa Vidden, uden Prest, 
vort Liv blev lyst i Fred for Sorgen 
og viet till en Lykkefest. (1.189) 
Brand berates Ejnar for his representation of God in his paintings as 
an enfeebled old man. He announces that it is this God he is on his way to 
bury, and in his place he will return moral stature both to the old God and 
the new people. This scene functions to establish the concept of basic 
happiness in the play, not as a moment in a life but as a chosen mode of 
living. Agnes and Ejnar live in harmony with each other and nature. They 
represent all aspects of Kantian ~sensible happiness' in that a) their desires 
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are being satisfied b) their well-being is obvious c) they are aware of their 
happiness and very much satisfied with their lives. 
Ibsen does not undermine this portrait. The positive associations are 
too insistent, and even Brand responds to the sound of their song. The light 
and radiance that they bring lifts the fog of the previous scene in which 
Brand insists on the sanctity of duty, but this light is in turn eclipsed by the 
figure of Brand. Brand admonishes Ejnar that if he wants to lead an aesthetic 
life, he must be careful to do so completely and not live a little bit for 
happiness, a little bit for God, and a little bit for painting, like all those who 
acknowledge their duty but only give a very partial response to it 
Lad gaa at du er Glcro.ens Treel,-
men veer det da fra K veld till K veld. 
Veer ikke et idag, igaar, 
og noget andet om et Aar. 
Det, som du er, veer fuldt og helt, 
og ikke stykkevis og delt. (1.191-2) 
Ibsen does not allow the couple's radiance to undermine Brand either. 
While the contrast is powerful, it does not diminish him. Agnes, who is more 
or less silent throughout, feels the sun recede and the cold encroaching. 
After Brand leaves, she feels too tired for games, and the stage directions 
make it clear that she has been profoundly shaken by this encounter. She 
asks Ejnar if he too noticed how Brand "voxte, mens han talte!" (1.198). 
3.4 Ought and Can 
Brand's progress through the landscape and action of the play 
involves a series of trials; trials, however, which he experiences not as his 
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bials but as the bials of others. And the more difficult the situations that 
present themselves, the more intransigent he becomes, and the more he 
elevates the will above human experience. 
At the beginning of the play he had condemned the peasant for 
abandoning the hazardous journey to his dying daughter. In Act IT he 
condemns a mother for not joining him in the boat to reach her husband 
who had killed his youngest child because he could not bear to see him 
starve and then committed suicide. He sees these cases not as failures of 
ability, but of will. In the conviction that man has betrayed his original 
dignity and has fallen into spiritual decadence, Brand becomes more 
Kantian than Kant, rejecting Kant's position that "People do not have duties 
they are not able to carry out", loses sight of the crucial slippage between 
will and ability, a space in which a "disfavour of destiny or [ ... ] the niggardly 
endowment of a stepmotherly nature" often plays a decisive role in 
preventing the agent from achieving the ends legislated by the morallaw.25 
Agnes, now Brand's wife, who is finally killed by "Lovens grumme H0g og 
Falk" (4.272) has to remind him of this basic tenet 
AGNES. 0, men brug ej Str~ngheds Spore. 
BRAND. Gjennem mig en st0rre byder. 
AGNES. En, om hvem du selv har sagt, 
at han Viljen ej forskyder, 
skj0nt den savner Evnens Magt. (4.271) 
Even after Agnes's death, Brand refuses to countenance any distance 
whatsoever between ought and can. In Act I he had criticised the aesthete 
Ejnar for separating life from dogma, but what Brand himself is doing is 
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forcing life into a dogma it cannot ultimately sustain. In Act V, during the 
final allegorical sequence which finds Brand at the top of the mountain, 
abandoned in his sublimer combat by all those of enfeebled will, he gives an 
account of compromised humanity, maintaining u .•. slcegten vorden er et 
Folk, / som har glemt, at Viljens Pligter / ender ej hvor Evnen svigter!" (5. 
353). In Brand's scheme anything can be made possible through a 
monumental exertion of the will; the will is not only autonomous but also 
omnipotent. 
And if we return to the question of identity, we will recall the concept 
of the necessary identity which inhered in the projects of the agent and in his 
perception of how his life relates to other people. Although not an egotist in 
the way later heroes are, Brand has a clear sense of self, and his particular 
version of selfhood, which he equates with wholeness, is no less guiding and 
decisive for the choices he makes than it was for the ancients: util at vcere 
helt sig selv / det er lovlig Rett for Manden, / og jeg krcever ingen anden!" 
(2.218). It is discontinuous with the necessary identities of the ancients in 
that it is not grounded in anything outside itself, either in the community, or 
in anything approximating the heroic code whose exigencies the lives of 
Ajax and others articulated. Brand's morality rejects all external authority; 
his own internal legislature is sovereign: 
Indad; indad! Det er Ordet! 
Did gaar Vejen. Der er Sporet. 
EgetHjert~-deterKloden, 
nyskabt og for Gudsliv moden; 
der skal Viljegribben d0des, 
der den nye Adam f0des. (2. 218) 
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As we have already noted, All or Nothing is Brand's own invention 
which he uses to structure his formalism. James McFarlane comments "one 
commandment is universally applicable, eternally valid. It is a categorical 
imperative without feedback: the inner voice speaks, but with a one-track 
insistence. There is no dialogue within the soul, only endless reaffirmation of 
the sovereignty of the code." 26 
Another basic difference between the 'identities' of the Attic heroes 
and Brand's is that in the case of the former, these identities are to a certain 
extent pre-given not only in that they are code-based but also in that their 
responses are mediated by a sense of what the community expects of them. 
However, in Brand's case, the opposite obtains: Brand in no sense responds 
to the expectations of the community. Although he was persuaded to 
abandon his original project of spreading the gospel of Allor Nothing in the 
great world, and genuinely believes that his duty lies with his poverty-
stricken congregation, he never really gets past his radical loathing of his 
fellow men, and is thus in an important sense as remote from community as 
the isolate hero of Ibsen's later works. Believing himself to be the herald of a 
new spiritual dispensation, he insists that the community live up to the 
stringent demands of his personal ethics. 
Brand declares that his law is universally binding and knows no 
exceptions, and thus the same criterion applies both to his flock and in his 
family relationships, although it is through the Agnes-Alf nexus that he is at 
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his most vulnerable. His duty, defined as the duty of the messiah of Allor 
Nothing abstracts from every other identifiable social role or duty: as son, as 
husband and as father. It is precisely when he engages with human beings 
rather than operating on the grander plane of mankind that his agony is 
shaped. While we appreciate the satire when the Mayor says 1/ Jeg gj0r 
bestandig og min Pligt, - / men altid indom mit Distrikt" (2.211) - _ we 
have to concede that he does have a point, namely that involvement with 
human beings does entail very specific material duties. And as the 
community figures, however self-interested and corrupt they are, are at 
constant pains to impress upon Brand, this is an extremely needy 
congregation: unemployment, malnutrition, starvation. There are urgent 
issues of survival that question the relevance and humanity of Brand's 
mISSIon. 
But when his congregation finally abandons him on his ascent to the 
Ice Church on the grounds that they have duties and responsibilities at 
home, Brand dismisses these duties as lame excuses used to cover up for 
deficiencies of the will. And it is this collision between the duties which 
attach to certain functions and roles and duty in the formalist sense that 
finally constitutes the terror he confronts and the tragedy he plays out 
3.5 Duty vs. Duties 
Brand is able to talk of filial duty quite comfortably, for he conceives 
of his duty to his mother as one which begins when her life ends, in the 
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sense that he will honour her spiritual debts. Brand's mother conceives of 
her son's duty as a material duty not to dissipate her fortune, which in her 
view is as exacting a duty as is his demand for spiritual wholeness. After 
much negotiating, her final offer does not exceed renouncing nine-tenths of 
her worldly goods while Brand insists she go utterly naked to her grave. He 
sees his denial of her as she faces death as proof that his will has triumphed. 
But there is no real conflict here, for as Brand explains to Agnes there was 
never any love between him and his mother, and his childhood had been 
tainted by the enduring image of his mother plundering his father's death-
bed.27 
In contrast to Brand, the doctor, out of no other motive than duty, the 
duty specific to his profeSSion, goes to attend to the dying woman. He is not 
fond of the old woman, complains that she does not pay him adequately, 
and the journey to her house is a difficult one. However, the value of Brand's 
denial is questioned by the actions of the doctor, who forces Brand to 
acknowledge that his rigid formalism compromises the rights of others. 
But when confronted with his duty qua father, All or Nothing becomes 
suddenly relativized and Brand nearly crumbles. The doctor urges him to 
take his son away to a healthier environment as the boy will perish if left in 
the sunless fjord. Here the relationship is of an entirely different order from 
that with his mother. Brand sees Agnes and Alf as the only two creatures 
who have been able to cultivate the capacity for love in him, and therefore 
the parental duty that the doctor enjoins on him is one that Brand can accept 
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as binding. The doctor points out that he must be a father entirely to Alf, for 
he is guilty of being neither All nor Nothing in his family relationships, as 
his wife and child have entered into a hierarchy in which Brand's calling 
automatically relativizes their claims on him. 
Alf is not to be saved. The doctor points out to Brand that by taking 
his family away from the valley, he is indeed responding to his duty qua 
father but is not living up to the stringent demands he has made on his 
mother and his flock. The doctor mirrors an unpalatable truth; Brand 
remains in the valley and thus his duty literally to remove his son from the 
valley of death is contorted into a replay of the Abraham and Isaac story, by 
which he recasts the duty to save into the duty to sacrifice. 
3.6 Mellem Lykke og Pligt 
The Doctor can argue with Brand on the level of duty and ethics. The 
Mayor tackles him on the level of common sense. He points out to Brand 
that he is indeed blessed. In a community stricken as much as this one by 
poverty, Brand's welfare is incontestable. The Mayor points out to Brand 
that he has all the good things in life, and if he does not leave the valley: 
FOG DEN. [ ... ] er Deres Jordliv 0dslet bort. 
De ejer aIle Verdens Goder 
er arving till en grundrig Moder, 
De har et Bam at leve for, 
en elsket Hustru; - Lykkens Kaar 
blir rakkt Dem som af milde H~nder. 
BRAND. Og hvis jeg endda Ryggen v~nder 
Till hvad De Lykkens Kaar har kaldt? 
Ifald jeg maa? (3.252) 
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Here Brand makes a clear statement of the hierarchy of duties, and that his 
duty to his calling trumps all other considerations, and can even exact his 
entire life and all his happiness. 
Brand loses his son and, after demanding Agnes's absolute dedication 
to his calling, loses his wife too. He forces the bereaved mother to relinquish 
everything that gives her comfort in her grief for her dead child, insisting 
that it is idolatrous to mourn him: Alf was a sacrifice to God, a sacrifice 
which if not made willingly has no moral worth. Even though Agnes stands 
firmly by Brand's side, even in this decision to jeopardise the health of their 
son, it is clear that she is broken with grief. A gypsy woman with a half-
naked baby freezing to death sees the baby clothes and demands "Giv mig, 
giv mig, giv mig all". Brand persuades Agnes to give Alf s every last 
garment "Du ser din Pligt" (4.297). 
To hold on to half, or even one keepsake would compromise the 
worth of the sacrifice as it would not constitute an absolute response to an 
absolute demand; it would be on the same level as his mother's offer of only 
nine tenths of her property - morally worthless. His instruction to give away 
the clothes, all the time emphasisising that the value of the action does not 
inhere in the giving itself, but in the degree of willingness with which it is 
done: 
BRAND. Si mig ferst om det var villigt 
at du gik til Gavens Gru? 
AGNES. Nej. 
BRAND. Din Skjcenk er slcengt i Havet. 
Over dig er endnu Kravet. (4.229) 
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This is an example of the Kantian distinction between the inner and 
the outer life of an action; both a moral and a non-moral man may perform 
the same action, but what transforms the action into a moral one in the case 
of the latter is the will to obey the morallaw.28 
Agnes suddenly confesses to Brand that she has lied, having kept 
back Airs christening cap, which she carries next to her heart. But just as 
quickly as Brand denounces this idolatry, Agnes relinquishes the cap, 
willingly, declaring her last connection with the world severed: 
AGNES .... siste Baand som bandt till Swvet! 
(staar en Stund ubevcegelig stille; lidt ejter lidt gaar 
Udtrykket i hendes Ansigt over till hey straalende Glcede. 
Brand kommer tilbage; hun fLyver ham jublende imede, 
kaster sig om hans Hals og raaber): 
Jeg er fri! Brand, jeg er fri! (4.300) 
Thus the astonishing transfiguration of Agnes takes place, from 
grieving mother stripped even of her last baby clothes into someone 
"straalende" and "jublende", who announces a radical freedom, a freedom 
from worldly bonds, and freedom from grief. She has attained "intelligible" 
happiness as she knows she acted morally in giving the gypsy mother Airs 
clothes willingly. This is the non-participatory happiness Kant talks about, 
which we discussed above. But more arresting than this is Agnes's ecstatic 
announcement that she is free, because stripped completely naked, even of 
her grief, she can experience that variant of happiness which is the 
happiness derived from having overcome and from being free from 
inclination. This happiness, we remember, is an element of Seligkeit, and 
does not belong in the sensible world. Agnes has thus come full circle during 
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the course of the play, having lived through happiness on all levels Kant 
attends to. 
Agnes's preparation for death comes across very clearly in that it is 
now she that talks to Brand about the demands of his calling and explains 
that he must choose her or his calling, and if he chooses his calling he has to 
stay true to it. Even before Agnes thanks Brand and bids him good night, it 
is clear that she is already dead. "Rver den, som ser Jehova, d0r" (4.291). She 
has done her duty, given All. Agnes has gone from being Einar's 
masterpiece "som lyste Lykken" to Brand's masterpiece "med straalende 
glCEde" - a version of happiness that beckons death.29 
Brand, however, finds it difficult to match her gift Standing in the 
valley of choice he resists this final sacrifice, ''Ve mig, hvilket lys du tCEnder! 
- / Nej! Og tusind Gange nej! / [ ... ] Lad kun aU paa jorden glippe; / hver en 
Vinding kan jeg slippe, - / 0, men aldrig, aldrig dig!" (4.301) - lykke and pligt. 
It is Agnes, who, like the doctor, reminds him of his calling and his duty, 
makes him confront the fact that within a moral scheme which turns on the 
capacity of the agent to address imperatives to himself and on his testing the 
integrity of these imperatives against the standard of universalisability, he 
finds it much easier to legislate to others than to himself, to universalise 
before he can personalise. 
The central Kantian distinction between duty and inclination, and the 
moral distribution in which happiness always has to concede territory to 
duty defines Brand and Agnes's relationship from the outset. When Agnes 
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decides to leave Ejnar for Brand, Ejnar formulates her choice as the choice 
Uimellem Storm og Stille! [ ... ] gaa og bliv [ ... ] Fryd og Sorgen, [ ... ] Natt og 
Morgen [ ... ] Ded og Liv!" (1.230-1). While Brand recognises that Agnes has 
cultivated the capacity for love in him, he is to a great extent resistant to it 
for the reason that the happiness love brings is bound to conflict with duty. 
When the doctor tells him that while the account for his strength of will is in 
credit, his canto caritatis is empty, Brand launches into a diatribe against love 
as an evil snare and a veil to disguise weakness: 
Ej noget Ord blev selet ned 
i Legn som Ordet Kjcerlighed; 
Det lcegger de med Satans List 
som Sler udover Viljens Brist; 
[ ... ] 
Er Stien trang og bratt og skred, 
den knappes af - i Kjcerlighed; 
gaar en ad Syndegaden bred, 
han har dog Haab - i Kjcerlighed; 
[ ... ] 
men her, mod Slcegten slapp og lad, 
ens bedste Kjcerlighed er Had! (3.239) 
Thus the only way his ethics can deal with what Kant calls 
"pathological love"and the happiness which can accompany it, is by 
distorting it into an evil and resting instead on upracticallove", "the attitude 
of concern that one can will oneself to have toward another human being, 
and which is, for that reason, a part of morality".30 This kind of will-
governed love is exemplified by Brand's dedication to his parishioners. 
Brand's attempt to immunise the will from any possible threat from love 
involves a total sacrifice of the sensible to the rational. But it is not only his 
own happiness which is lost in this quest. One characteristic of Ibsen's 
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heroes is that the battlefield on which the struggle to follow their calling 
takes place is strewn with corpses; but rarely enemy corpses. The irony is 
that although these characters proceed within the framework of a highly 
personal ethics, their choice to sacrifice personal happiness to perceived 
duty is one which inevitably requisitions the happiness of others. 
However, it is an integral part of Brand's necessary identity that he 
does not abandon his quest, relocate and settle down to happy domesticity. 
Doing so would mean that he was no longer Brand, in the same way that 
Williams suggests that had Ajax not committed suicide after suffering 
dishonour, he would have renounced his identity. As Brian Johnston 
explains, "the claims of spiritual truth and freedom [ ... ] override those of 
happiness, and only the great and authentic individuals such as Brand are 
capable of living at this tragic level" .31 
Brand stays on in the valley after Agnes's death, and eighteen months 
later he has completed his great building project - his church, which was to 
be the shrine of All. However, he is forced to see it for the shoddy 
compromise that it has become, and he realises as Solness is to realise, that 
he has betrayed his vocation in that his church has acquired the trappings of 
the state church, which now seeks to absorb him with honours and 
compromise. It is only after he leads the people up the mountain and is 
abandoned by them half way that he stands alone with the knowledge that 
his demands are too exacting for the average person to live by. The only two 
individuals who are steadfast are Gerd, the half-gypsy outcast, said to be 
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mad, and Ejnar redux who has turned his back on a life of vice to become a 
caricature of Brand. He is so extreme as to force Brand into normal 
discourse. Brand describes his life with Agnes as a mixture of happiness and 
sadness. Ejnar is only interested in the manner of Agnes's death, not the 
story of her life. 
At the heart of the failure of Brand's project lies the fact that he was 
legislating a morality for his fellow men without feeling any real 
involvement in their community. He can no more participate in their fate 
than they in his. His final isolation at the top of the mountain (the spiritual 
dimension of Ibsen's landscape needs to be noted here) suggests how the 
legislature of the self needs something bigger than the self in which to 
ground itself, and to provide mankind with some kind of measure in order 
to prevent it from collapsing into arbitrariness, and universalising ultimately 
unattainable standards of morality. 
The final sequence finds Brand exhausted and debilitated at the Ice 
Church at the top of the mountain, alone with Gerd. Brand is the archetype 
pariah, or in tragiC terms, the apolis rejected and ostracised by the 
community, his only companion a similarly reviled figure. 
During this final ascent and test of will, Brand has seen visions and 
heard voices, which have driven him to the brink of madness. An invisible 
choir addresses him with the damning message that Brand can never be like 
Christ, and whether or not he chooses to serve Him, he is damned, and his 
life's work has been for nought Brand cries out in agony to his dead child 
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and wife, acknowledging the unspeakable sacrifice he made: "Agnes, Alf, de 
lyse Dage, / Liv i Fred og Liv i Hvile, / bytted jeg mod Kamp og Klage, / 
rev mit Bryst med Offerpile, - / f~1te dog ej Folkets Drage" (5.354). The choir 
reiterates, though in milder tones, its stern judgement, emphasising to Brand 
that he was created for life in this world, and it is life that he has been 
fighting all these years. 
The judgement that his sacrifice has been meaningless, makes Brand 
reach out to his memories for strength and comfort, in precisely the same 
way that he forbade Agnes to do. The Figure, which Brand immediately 
takes to be Agnes, appears. His spiritual temptation is great. She offers him a 
chance to go back in time so that Alf and she would still be alive. In order to 
accomplish this he has to follow the Doctor's diagnosis and purify his soul of 
, All or Nothing'. Brand resists the Figure, his hardest trial. But there is no 
sense that he is wrong to do so. His anagnorisis has been a slow process 
which will last the entire act. From the moment he rejects the new church to 
the final curtain, he is aware that he has to redefine himself not only in 
relation to his calling but also in relation to his Jordliv. But this is not an issue 
of changing, or willing a different course of action, even with the benefit of 
hindsight. Raymond Williams puts it aptly: "This is not ethical tragedy, 
where a different choice would have brought safety. The choice and fate 
admit no real alternatives" .32 
Gerd presents him with an image of himself as someone great, proud 
and strong, an image consonant with his own manifesto of resurrecting 
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Adam: uDu er Manden som er st0rst" She then examines his hands and sees 
stigmata wounds on them UNaglesaaret! / Blodets drypp jeg ser i Haaret, _ / 
[ ... ] Dig har Korsets Tr~ jo Baaret!" (5.360). She proceeds to fall at Brand's 
feet and worship him like Christ. Remote from life, light, community and 
love, Brand is finally able to appreciate the value of Lykkens Kaar and his 
only response is to weep. Gerd is deeply affected by the warmth of Brand's 
tears as they fall onto the winter landscape. Brand has learned humility from 
this sublime encounter with human value: uJeg kan gr~e, / jeg kan knCEle, 
- jeg kan bede!" (5.362). Gerd lifts up her rifle to shoot the falcon of 
compromise, akkardens aand, brings him down and precipitates the 
avalanche. Part of the function of these supernatural elements, and their 
concentration at the end of the play is to show the rigid hero in crisis, being 
more open to forces and guidance outside himself, and opening the way for 
his last lines. 
Brand turns to God, outside himself to ask for guidance, "Svar mig, 
Gud, i D0dens Slug; - / gjCElder ej et Frelsens Fnug / Mandeviljens quantum 
satis - !"33 His answer, (although given after he, and by implication the entire 
community, that is, his project has been buried in the avalanche) is simply 
"Han er deus caritatis" (5.362), showing that Brand's dogmatic formalism is 
too monolithic a guide to live by, only adequate for directing choices, and 
his measuring of human worth deeply flawed. This message shows Brand 
the way to break out of his deterministic angst over inherited sin. Allor 
Nothing, far from being adequate to discern what is valuable in life, such as 
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love and happiness, is ultimately inimical to them. Croce's description of the 
"ultra-Kantian" is apt even Kant acknowledged a subordinate role for 
happiness in morals on the grounds that it promotes moral conduct, and 
that its opposite encourages the opposite.34 
In contrast to Johnston's assessment stands Shaw's: "Brand dies a 
saint, having caused more intense suffering by his saintliness than the most 
talented sinner could possibly have done with twice his opportunities".35 
However, what Shaw fails to appreciate in his anti-idealist condemnation of 
Brand, is the verdict of the community: even though it abandons him, it 
realises, like Agnes did, that life will not be the same after Brand. For Ibsen 
what is defining of his great individuals is that for them, being is always at 
issue; as Brand complains in Act I "I skiller Liv fra Tro og Leere; for ingen 
gjcelder det at vJ:?re "(1.194). This line not only posits the democratisation of 
tragic potential, but will also prove to be axiomatic for the definition of the 
modem tragic hero. This is a modification of the search for truth definitive of 
tragic figures who find their pedigree in Oedipus. Ditmar Meidal was the 
first to point this out 
At Brands hele Kamp har en tragisk Karakter, ligger 
deri, at hans Vilje ikke alene er ren og cedel, men ogsaa 
rettet paa Sandheden, og at den alligevel maa knuses. 
Fejlen ligger f0rst i hans Erkjendelse eller rettere 
Mangel paa Erkjendelse af Midlerne og Vejen, og dette 
f0rer omsider gennem Senderdrivelsen af hans Indre 
til en Forvildelse af hans Begreb om Maalet.36 
However, the truly disturbing question raised by this tragedy is not 
that posed by Brand as the avalanche falls. Nor the fact that Brand does not 
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hear the answer: it was the asking that showed a profound anagnorisis, not 
the need to hear the answer. The question Brand's progress over five acts up 
the peak leaves us with is this: Is ethical action possible at all in this world, 
located as it is mellem lykke og pligt? 
If the play leaves us with any answer at all, it is simply this, that the 
tragic constitutes the space between these poles. And as in Greek tragedy, it 
is the hero's very excellences that make him vulnerable to hamartia. Brand's 
hamartia is just as dispositional as Oedipus's, and this points to a theme 
which we see emerge again and again in Ibsen's tragedies: that there is a 
canker at the heart of human action, reaching though it might towards 
excellence. 
Atle Kittang, who in his study of heroism in Ibsen gives special 
emphasis to Brand, argues against interpretations that read its hero as a 
moral sadist, or who would see him as a study in psychopathy. He writes: 
nettopp fordi Brand truleg er det ncermaste Ibsen 
nokonsinne kom til a skrive ein tragedie, er den 
vanlege realistiske malestokken mindre relevant 
Utfordringa blir a fa tak i kva slags dramatisk refleksjon 
over det d VCFre menneske Ibsen har gitt symbolsk gestalt i 
dette skodespelet om ein kompromisslaus, 
beundringsverdig og likevel djupt feilande ung prest 37 
In the following chapters, we will see how Ibsen develops a version of 
the tragic hero which can stand up to "den vanlege realistiske malestokken". 
I will examine the relationship of tragedy to realism and what implications 
Ibsen's Et Dukkehjem and Gengangere have for the "death-of-tragedy" school 
of dramatic theory. Although Ibsen temporarily suspends his presentation of 
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the kallstragedie in these two works, his presentation of Brand bridges the 
aesthetic distance between the history plays and the contemporary tragedies, 
while retaining the Aristotelian demand for consequentiality. All the 
reversals in Brand are the results of decisions made by him, decisions which 
are the necessary outcome of his tragic character. 
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The tragic idea survived the 
loss of the gods and it 
survived the loss of the tragic 
hero. - Oscar Mandel 
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ChapterN 
Optegnelser til nutids-tragedier 
4.1 "The Death of Tragedy" 
This chapter makes the case for the potential of realism to 
produce tragedy. It will begin with a brief discussion of the various 
main positions that deny realism's scope for tragedy and then question 
the terms of the denigration of the mode. It will then argue that two of 
the most realistic plays Ibsen wrote, Et Dukkehjem and Gengangere, 
succeed in evincing the tragic within realist conventions. Finally, I 
analyse Et Dukkehjem from this perspective. Gengangere will be 
considered separately in Chapter V. 
George Steiner is by no means the latest contribution to the 
seemingly inexhaustible debate on tragedy. However, his opinions 
continue to dominate discussions of the genre, and are in this sense 
almost as unavoidable as Aristotle's. And since his views on Ibsen and 
tragedy have been immensely influential, it is wise to confront them. 
In The Death of Tragedy (1961) Steiner, in dialogue with The Birth of 
Tragedy (1872), provides closure for Nietzsche's genealogy, dating the 
demise of the genre with the passing of Racine. Steiner argues that "the 
natural setting of tragedy is the palace gate, the public square, or the 
court chamber" because these spaces represent the stable and manifest 
hierarchies of worldly power, be they in Athens, Elizabethan England or 
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Versailles. 1 He acknowledges Ibsen's importance m the history of 
theatre: 
With Ibsen, the history of drama begins anew. This 
alone makes of him the most important playwright after 
Shakespeare and Racine. The modern theatre can be 
dated from Pillars of Society (1877).2 
Nevertheless, Steiner attacks Ibsen, dismissing him as a "pedagogue", 
"reformer", and social philosopher - in short a producer of "tracts". Steiner is 
adamant that the plays from Samfundets Stetter to En Folke.fiende do not qualify 
as tragedy because the problems they explore are all "secular dilemmas 
which may be resolved by rational innovation" and that there exist" specific 
remedies to the disasters which befall" the characters. Not tragedy, argues 
Steiner, but" dramatic rhetoric summoning us to action in the conviction that 
truth of conduct can be defined and that it will liberate society".3 
The fact that Ibsen turned his back on royal courts and palaces, 
confining his characters to the bourgeois drawing room, and that he put the 
words of ordinary language into the mouths of ordinary men when "tragic 
drama [ ... ] requires the shape of verse"4, was not in itself enough in Steiner's 
account to deprive modernity of tragedy. No, Steiner argues that the cause 
was extra-theatrical, and lies outside tragedy in history, more precisely in the 
weakening of the organic world view which was brought on by the "triumph 
of rationalism and secular metaphysics." This was the "point of no return".5 
The implication seems to be that with the passing of various world 
views constructed around cosmic orders of stable hierarchies in which each 
man played his recognisable part, or of a religious cosmology and an 
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accepted theodicy, tragedy loses its footing. The nineteenth century in 
particular was a century of great social, political, religious and intellectual 
upheaval. It also saw a substantial loss of faith in Christianity and a 
concomitant ascendancy of rationalism and scientificism. According to those 
whom Thomas Van Laan refers to as the purveyors of the "death of tragedy 
myth", these factors made modernity impervious to tragedy.6 
It is not difficult to register a certain amount of astonishment with Van 
Laan at tragedy's many epitaph writers. For, as he argues, they do more to 
obfuscate than to illuminate, as this myth 
stands in the way of any reasonably objective study of 
nineteenth and twentieth century plays and novels, of 
properly understanding and evaluating writers like 
Ibsen ... , and of even properly defining tragedy (if one 
believes ... that the canon of tragedy has been extended 
during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and the 
nature of tragedy modified in the process).? 
Indeed, Ibsen has been a recurrent thorn in the flesh of several 
autopsies. His presence disturbs, and is either met with vitriol (Dorothea 
Krook), or simply dismissed on account of his realism (a dirty word, 
apparently), which is in turn denigrated as an aesthetic form in order to 
sustain the attack (Peter Szondi). 
As Van Laan points out, for many critics tragedy equals Greek tragedy, 
and they only concede Ibsen canonical status where he is seen dutifully to 
resemble Sophocles and reject him when he presumes to diverge. It is one 
thing to look for origins and family resemblances, quite another to insist on 
faithful reduplication, which, in view of historical change, is inappropriate. 
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If our earlier working-definition of tragedy as a genre which asks at 
the deepest level how we should live at moments of crisis and intense 
suffering holds, it does so regardless of whether the gods it engages with 
constitute an entire pantheon, a monotheistic divinity or even a deus 
absconditus, for the vacuum of the space vacated by the dead or departed god 
remains as tangible a presence and as formidable an opponent on Ibsen's 
realist stage as the living gods of stages past 8 And surely it is its generic 
modifications, its mutations, its responses to historical change, rather than an 
attempt to discipline it into a monolithic, nostalgic, abstract template based 
on a small selection of surviving Greek works and on just one theoretical text, 
the Poetics, which constitute the challenge of tragedy, not its death? Especially 
when the theoretical text at stake is the Poetics, which, as we have seen, gave 
the clarion call for the secularisation of the genre long before the advent of 
modern rationalism and scientific thinking. 
The other factor that so disturbs Steiner is the absence of strict social 
hierarchies in modern tragedy. The demand for the hero of high birth and 
station carries with it the assumption that kings and princes represent so 
much more than themselves. In them, entire orders, religious and political, 
can rise and fall. Ibsen develops this notion most clearly in Kejser og Galila::?er. 
But as we saw in Brand, obscure characters working in obscurity can carry 
equal dramatic force, and do not need the outward trappings of rank to have 
heroic stature. Brand is thus a pivotal hero. Moreover, it can be countered, as 
Arthur Miller does that, while ideas of hierarchy and social structures change, 
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what persists is the modality of tragedy, the question form: what we have to 
ask of a life that could have been different. Miller concedes that there is a 
legitimate question of stature here, but none of rank, 
which is so often confused with it. So long as the hero 
may be said to have had alternatives of a magnitude to 
have materially changed the course of his life, [ ... ] he 
cannot be barred from the heroic role. 9 
This is clearly a more fruitful approach than the accusations that 
realism killed tragedy, or enfeebled it. To reiterate, my case is that tragedy 
involves human beings examining the question of how to live at moments of 
crisis, and in this examination, a notion of what it is to be human becomes 
distilled. Tragedy is no more stable a category than its subject, the human. It 
is historically determined and thus the ethical co-ordinates which structure 
the quest of the protagonist are too, of necessity, historically determined. 
At this point it would be profitable to ask why Ibsen made this turn 
away from more conventional tragic matter and form in favour of bourgeois 
characters and settings and language, and to do so it will be necessary first to 
make a short detour via realism, both in art and philosophy. 
4.1.2. Realism and Naturalism 
Realism, unlike naturalism and many other so-called schools, does not 
have a coherent programmatic body of theoretical writing, but only a few 
scattered journals and musings by various writers and critics, most of them 
concentrating on the novel form. Unlike naturalism, realism did not 
constitute a particular philosophy. Nevertheless, the two terms are often used 
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almost interchangeably, though naturalism tends to be preferred "if a term of 
abuse is needed".10 
The basic grounds for the attack on naturalism seem to be its "denial of 
free will and a substitution of a mechanistic behaviourism and an essential 
pessimism as the basic tenets of experience."ll In addition to the belief that 
morality is largely determined by heredity and environment, there is also an 
" aesthetic divagation" which seeks out the ugly and the repellent in 
existence. 
Although realism can accommodate this vision, it tends to extend 
beyond it. Realism is generally felt to have taken over the novel by the mid-
eighteenth century, and to have arrived on stage more tardily. It seems that 
the term was first used in 1835 in the context of painting, to describe 
Rem brand t' s verite humaine as distinct from the idialile pDitique of neo-classical 
painting.12 Moreover, when applied to Ibsen, as suggested above, the term 
usually communicates something limited and mean in his art, particularly 
when related to interrogations of that canonical aristocrat tragedy, which 
would sneer or even balk at the representation of the 'low' subjects, 
traditionally reserved for morality plays, comedy, farce and burlesque and 
opera buffa - there to reassert and not to question the existing order. 
What Ibsen was doing when he broke with his own historical and epic 
verse dramas to embrace the quotidian was to make the audience feel that 
they were experiencing something that was actually happening, and that 
what was being presented on stage was the gjennemlevd - in Keatsian terms, 
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something proved upon the pulse, as opposed to the concrete experience of 
the opplevd. It was not to take a lurid excursion into a sordid anti-romanticism 
as his contemporaries suspected, but an attempt to represent a reality on a 
scale more accessible and familiar to his readers and audiences than the lives 
of the great men and women he had previously treated.13 And this turn from 
the stylised to the illusionist medium par excellence raises the question of why 
Ibsen felt it necessary to experiment, and what kind of truth or reality he was 
hoping to access that his previous formal modes had denied him. 
I would argue that Ibsen, beginning with Samfundets Stetter by making 
such a radical break with his own method, by abandoning idealite poetique in 
favour of verite humaine, was interrogating at the deepest level both the notion 
of reality and the theatre's potential for exploring it. And this leads to my 
second point that Ibsen, whose self-appointed task "har vceret 
Menneskeskildring" (HU XV.417) and how mennesker should live,14 was 
responding to this task in relation to changing notions of ethics. That is to say, 
he was absorbing ethical realism with its disavowal of attempts to 
understand ethics in terms of divinity or mystery into his aesthetic realism. 
This raises questions very pertinent to our examination of the modern 
mutations of tragedy. 
Therefore, although realism cannot be said to be a philosophy, it can, 
as already stated, accommodate a naturalist philosophy, and, moreover, does 
have its own theoretical base, which emerges most clearly in its rejection of 
Romantic idealism. It has a relentlessly critical, anti-traditionalist turn; it 
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seeks to free itself of old assumptions (ghosts); it lays emphasis on semantics-
on the problem of the correspondence of words and reality; and above all it 
offers the demarcation of the area of inquiry as the reality experienced by the 
individual investigator, in all its subjectivity. The supernatural is seen as 
something that people might believe in, not as a substantial category in itself. 
Charles Taylor identifies in modernity a definite shift in perspective 
regarding the nature of the self, with a rejection of the view of the human as 
part of a cosmic order as a participant in a divine history - what Steiner refers 
to as the IIpoint of no return". Like MacIntyre, he views this as part of the 
enlightenment utilitarian thrust which militated against needless suffering 
inflicted on human beings in the name of larger orders: III want to describe 
this as the affirmation of the ordinary life. This last is a term of art, meant 
roughly to designate the life of production and the family".15 
Ordinary life in previous schemes had been the background to 
Aristotelian examinations of the good life and of the activities of the citizen, 
but not in itself worthy of ethical enquiry. The Reformation and the 
modernising and democratising impulse of its Christianity put the ordinary 
life into focus as the locus of the good life, and what was under examination 
now was the manner in which it was lived - the god-fearing lived through 
marriage and through calling. Higher forms and status ethics were dethroned 
and the elites that sustained the old cosmic orders were attacked. Underlying 
this turn is the emerging bourgeois self-consciousness, the Marxist apotheosis 
of man the producer, and a sense of the value of the unremarkable life: 
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The notion that the life of production and reproduction, 
of work and the family, is the main locus of the good life 
flies in the face of what were originally the dominant 
distinctions of our civilisation. For both the warrior ethic 
and the Platonic, ordinary life is part of the lower range, 
part of what contrasts with the incomparably higher. 
The affirmation of the ordinary life therefore involves a 
polemical stance ... towards downgrading ordinary life, 
of failing to see that our destiny lies here in production 
and reproduction, and not in some alleged higher 
sphere, [towards] being blind to the dignity and worth 
of ordinary human desire and fulfilment.16 
According to Taylor, this prompts a morality structured along three 
(very Kantian) axes: the first axis (paramount also in ancient Greek ethics) 
represents the dignity, that is, the respect I command from others. This axis 
incorporated without remainder the second axis: the good life. The third axis 
is the axis of modernity - respect for others. In this scheme, hierarchical 
orders are no longer capable of forming the horizon for the whole being in the 
West. These hierarchical structures were largely discredited by the 
Reformation and its contention that the ordinary man and the cleric had 
equal access to God, and that ordinary activities, such as work and family life, 
were as suffused with holiness as the sacrament. It was not what you did, but 
the spirit in which you did it that mattered, and therefore, distinctions of 
high/low were redundant. 
Taylor explains how this democratisation of action and station was 
productive of enormous tensions and moral confusions: 
We are as ambivalent about heroism as we are about the 
value of the workaday goals that it sacrifices. We 
struggle to hold on to a vision of the incomparably 
higher, while being true to the central modern insight 
about the value of ordinary life. We sympathise with 
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both the hero and the anti-hero; and we dream of a 
world in which one could be in the same act both.17 
Having taken this detour through philosophical shifts, it is possible to 
get a clearer picture of why realism as a mode is so undervalued, and why it 
is seen by some as inimical to tragedy, traditionally seen as an aristocratic art 
form, reproducing and depending on hierarchies which organise the divine, 
the human, the social and ethical. Indeed, classical tragedy was seen as the 
affirmation of the extraordinary: kings, princes, demigods, not housewives, 
doctors, country clergymen and bankers. And it is a resistance to this shift 
that motivates Steiner's reductive analysis of Ibsen's realist plays as untragic 
"secular dilemmas" (italics mine). 
The modernist ambivalence to the extra-ordinary is often seen to 
preclude the totalising effect of classical tragedy. This, in combination with 
the New Testament and utilitarian legacies of the reduction and the 
minimising of human suffering, together with a belief in meliorism, takes a 
humanist and humanitarian tum against the classical agon, both with its 
explorations of suffering as the ultimate human experience and its sense of 
the vulnerability of happiness and goodness. 
Another defining aspect of the affirmation of the ordinary is its 
interiority. This inwardness, the characteristic inflection of the Reformation 
conception of the self with the Lutheran promotion of faith over good works, 
emerges on Ibsen's realist stage as the investigation of not only the outer 
public existence but also the far more important inner life of characters in the 
process of self-examination and self-transformation, coupled with the 
133 
awareness of the self as something which has to be sought to be realised, and 
moreover, something which in itself can be a vital source of moral energy and 
knowledge. 
Two things are clear: firstly that Ibsen, dissatisfied with higher forms, 
was consciously effecting the belated entry of the theatre into this modern 
Weltanschauung; secondly, that he was consciously taking tragedy with him 
over the threshold of modernity, viz. the draft title of Et Dukkehjem as the 
modern tragedy (nutids-tragedien) and of Gengangere as a familiedrama by 
em bracing the prosaic in both senses of the term. 
It is my contention that, with Et Dukkehjem of 1879 and to an even 
greater extent in Gengangere in 1881, Ibsen was putting the ordinary under 
dramatic and ethical strain. Ibsen's awareness of the potential for the 
ordinary in drama had already declared itself by 1851 in a review of Karl 
Gutzkow's Haarpidsk og Kaarde. In it he compares the French theatre 
unfavourably with the German theatre, because the characters are too 
frequently "rene Abstraktioner". In contrast the Germans present "ikke blot 
Mennesker, men endog trivielle Hverdagsmennesker, saaledes som vi daglig see og 
hRfYe dem". Ibsen continues with an aesthetic defence of his preference: "men 
Hverdagsmenneskets Charakteer er fra et kunstnerisgt Standpunkt ingenlunde 
triviel: Som Reprod uktion af Kunsten er den ligesaa interessant om enhver 
anden" (HU XV 48-49 - italics mine). 
In Nora Helmer's and Helene Alving's quest for freedom we see this 
defence of the ordinary transformed into an embrace of the ordinary, not only 
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In his subjects, but in his aesthetic subtraction. The untheatricality18 of 
Helene's suffering breaks through and asserts itself over the conventions of 
the well-made play. 
We will return to Gengangere in the following chapter. For the moment 
we will consider the equally well-constructed dukkehjem which Nora Helmer 
occupies, in which the conventions of the well-made play themselves become 
interpretative. After this it will be evident that rumours of the death of 
tragedy are greatly exaggerated. 
4.2. Et Dukkehjem 
With Et Dukkehjem (1879), we register a "decisive shift in tragic style 
from the antiquarian re-creation of an unverifiable past to the normative 
values of the everyday, from Catiline and Vikings at Helgeland to the tragedy of 
the lady next door".19 In this analysis, I will demonstrate that Ibsen, while 
remaining firmly within the bounds of this most - to borrow Charles Taylor's 
phrase - "counter-epiphanic" literature,2o successfully makes a tragedy out of 
Nora's narrative. 
Despite the play's unassuming subtitle of skuespill, it directly addresses 
the tragic genre, forcing dominant contemporary theatrical codes into a 
confrontation with it Toril Moi makes a clear statement of the innovation of 
the work when she writes: "Nora apner veien til et moderne teater. Nora er 
ikke bare Ibsens heltinne, hun er en figur for Ibsens dramatiske prosjekt"21. 
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Ibsen's Optegnelser til Nutids-tragedien of 1878 establish the divide 
along which Nora's experiences have to be organised: the male (articulated 
by law and authority) and the female (articulated as loving instinct and faith). 
This divide throws the gender issues which the play elaborates into relief, but 
it is Ibsen's final observations in these notes which point to the core of this 
and so many subsequent works: "Pludselig tilbagevendende angst og rcedsel. 
Alt rna bceres alene. Katastrofen ncermer sig ubenherligt, uafvendeligt 
Fortvivelse, kamp og undergang" (HU VIII. 368-369). 
Fear, terror, the isolate hero, despair, struggle, defeat a strangely 
classical combination, - elements all exploited in Et Dukkehjem. But the key to 
these contemporary tragedies is not the issues they adumbrate but the fact 
that the catastrophe is inexorable and inevitable, ubfJnherligt, uajvendeligt - in 
true Aristotelian spirit So what, then, is so 'contemporary' about this 
tragedy? 
I would argue that beyond the technical innovation and the 
contemporary setting, Ibsen has made an enormous, daring break with tragic 
tradition, one that many of his detractors have still to forgive him for: the 
g6ttliche Gegensatz of his earlier plays has long since exited. In Et Dukkehjem 
the divine antagonist (whether a named divinity, a mythological triad, an 
abstraction of fate or chance in her many guises, or even God Himself) has 
not only been absorbed by a secular belief in an equally baleful detemlinistll, 
but with Rank, the naturalistic dispensation has transformed the anrit"\nt 
familial curse into a debilitating, inherited disease, in a renlorsl'll'ss 
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anatomisation of sin and transgression. And if no curse has been set in 
motion, the social environment constitutes an equally implacable opponent. 
It is this fatalism that allows Nora to live for so many years in a child-
like state, uncritical of the status quo until the status quo questions her. It is 
this determinism which informs Torvald's belief that heredity and 
environment condition people morally and which leads him to the conclusion 
that Krogstad, morally degenerate as he is, has "forgiftet sine egene oom 
[ ... ]." He explains that dishonesty "bringer smitte og sygdomsstof i et helt 
hjems liv" (1.307). His insistence that immorality is corrosive is 
complemented by the conviction that morality is genetically encoded 
resurfaces in his conclusion that Nora was inevitably corrupted by her father: 
"AIle din faders letsindige grundscetninger har du taget i arv. Ingen religion, 
ingen moral, ingen pligtf0lelse - " (3.352). It is this belief that partly informs 
Nora's decision to leave. But her conviction that her presence will corrupt her 
children stems more from her recognition of her moral immaturity. 
Moral inheritance can announce itself from within the sickly bodies of 
blameless offspring, as it does in the case of Rank's congenital disease visited 
on him by his father's profligacy, an idea which receives full treatment in 
Gengangere. This is a terrible instance of a baleful providence at work, and it 
points to an unjust distribution: "Med d0den i hcenderne? - Og scUedes a b0de 
for en andens skyld. Er det retfcerdighed i dette? Og i hver eneste familje 
rader der pa en eller anden made en slig ub0nh0rlig gengceldelse - " (2.320). 
Here we encounter the long arm of Nemesis once more. The nanny Anne-
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Marie does not even entertain questions of justice and injustice when 
contemplating her fate. Forced by society to give up her illegitimate child and 
to raise somebody else's child, she identifies good fortune in her misfortune: 
"Nar jeg kunde fa en sa god plads? En fattig pige, som er kommen i ulykke, 
rna vrere glad til" (2.310). 
Only Krogstad and Kristine break out of this determinism, (which they 
recognise has hardened them and deprived them of happiness), to assert a 
commitment to exploiting whatever potential for happiness life may still 
have. The effect on Krogstad is clearly ennobling. He cancels the debt and 
returns the IOU, thus averting what Torvald considers to be his tragedy, and 
adding a further level of clarity to Nora's tragic insight 
Enmeshed in this dense deterministic fibre of heredity and 
environment is the individual who must realign himself in order to rend the 
fabric in an assertion of selfhood, however crudely perceived. The mode of 
this assertion is always painful and can ultimately destroy the protagonist, 
but not without positive remainder. In works such as Et Dukkehjem and 
Gengangere in which Ibsen strictly observes the axioms of sequentiality and 
inevitability, there is a discernible re-enactment of the Aristotelian gesture of 
secularization of tragedy. 
Here Ibsen can be seen both to have brought tragedy round to a full 
secularisation within a realistic/ naturalistic framework, and at the same time 
he turns this gesture of secularisation round to such an extent that there is no 
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material or dramatic difference between the role played by previous divine 
antagonists and naturalistic beliefs. 
4.2.1 Lykke 
In Et Dukkehjem, the focus is less on contingency-Iykke denoting the 
area of human activity which lies beyond the control of the individual than 
on the lykke denoting happiness and its essential vulnerability. In the plays 
considered so far, a number of versions of happiness have been put forward: 
In Catilina there was the conflict posited between domestic bliss in obscurity 
and active participation in history; Fru Inger til 0strdt emphasised the price of 
having a calling, which has to be paid for in personal happiness; Ha?rmamdene 
pd Helgeland focused on conflicting loyalties and sacrifices of and for love, and 
how happiness is irrecoverable. Kongsemnerne showed the happiness 
attendant upon good fortune and how happiness is denied those who live 
inauthentic ally. Brand threw the incommensurability of happiness and duty 
into relief, showing how the latter inexorably demands the sacrifice of the 
former. Kejser og Galila?er explored the quality of the radiant possibilities of 
restored gra?ske lykke. But in Et Dukkehjem Ibsen considers the question of 
happiness from a new perspective. 
Et Dukkehjem is one of the few Ibsen plays to open onto vistas of well-
being. The opening sequences build on this impression of good cheer and 
harmony, the sense of a real home. Good news of a promotion and easier 
times ahead reinforce the image of a happy home, followed by a visit 
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involving a conversation where Nora will declare herself thoroughly 
contented. 
Throughout Act I Nora reinforces the visual suggestions of well being 
established in the opening scene. Torvald's news of his new appointment, 
which Nora describes as en stor lykke - removes any financial worries they 
may have had. Nora declares herself to feel Ulet og lykkelig" (1.281). From her 
conversations with Helmer and then with Kristine Linde, Nora gives the 
impression that she identifies lykke with what Aristotle called "external 
goods": we recall that these include money, a good spouse, children and 
friends and she is also physically attractive and aware of it. Good fortune 
certainly seems to be in attendance. Rank even refers to her later as a lykkebarn 
(3.348). Nora insists on her happiness; the eight years since she and Kristine 
last met have been U en lykkelig tid" (1.279), and she twice exclaims that it is 
"vidunderlig deiligt at leve og vrere lykkelig" (1.283; 1.289). 
Life for Kristine Linde has been less pleasant in the intervening eight 
years. She has had to take care of her ailing mother, two younger brothers, 
work extremely hard, and sacrifice personal happiness in response to these 
duties. She is blessed with none of the external goods that Nora has a 
sufficiency of. She is poor, has no family beyond her brothers (who no longer 
depend on her) few friends it seems and no children, and her looks have 
suffered as a result of these exertions. Nora's emphasis on happiness leads 
her to conclusions about luck, her main conclusion that without sufficient 
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money to get by, there is little happiness to be had from life, and that 
straightened circumstances can have a negative effect on character. 
But there is more depth to Nora than her vocabulary of vidunderlig and 
deilig and lykkelig would suggest. Her sacrifice to save Torvald involved 
forging her father's signature to obtain an illegal loan, which she has been 
struggling hard in secret to payoff. This is an enormous source of pride and 
all of her self-esteem seems to be located in that action: "Hun har begat falsk, 
og det er hendes stolthed" (VIII.368). However, when Krogstad the 
moneylender comes to blackmail her with exposure unless she can save his 
job at the bank by using her influence on her husband, the entire edifice of her 
lykke is clearly at risk 
Act II finds Nora in an intense state of anxiety and agitation. From her 
perspective it is inconceivable that an action performed out of love to save her 
husband's life and protect her father could be used against her and be 
punishable under law. Her happiness, so insistently staked out in Act I, now 
confronts the classic tragic gap between doing good and living well. 
Errol Durbach has written a compelling comparison of Nora and 
Antigone, reading both heroines as caught in a Hegelian conflict between two 
incompatible values where no Aufhebung is possible: 
Antigone cares nothing for codified systems that violate 
her sense of decency and the primal sanctity of human 
connections; and the great choral odes on 'Man' and 
'Love' define the life-affirming values for which she is 
prepared to die. [ ... ] The dialectics of the Antigone are 
everywhere apparent in A Doll's House - from Torvald's 
condescending dismissal of Nora's feather-brained 
sense of how the law operates, to the great final 
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confrontation where his constellation of male I duties' 
confronts her mode of moral conscience.22 
But as Durbach states, the opposition between two systems has already been 
set up in Act I when Krogstad comes to blackmail Nora. When Nora's 
unschooled instinct is confronted with the fact that the law takes no account 
of motive in cases of forgery, she responds with vehement outrage: 
Da rna det vcere nogen meget darlige love [ ... ]. En datter 
skulde ikke have ret til at skane sin gam Ie d0dssyge 
fader for cengstelser og bekymringer? Skulde ikke en 
hustru have ret til at redde sin mands liv? Jeg kender 
ikke lovene sa n0je; men jeg er viss pa, at der rna sta 
etsteds idem, at sadant er tilladt (1.303) 
But when she sees that not only the law but also her husband takes no 
account of motive, she is brought low. 
In the Antigone, we are left in no doubt that the heroine 
acts in accordance with God's law. But in Ibsen's 
demythologised and secular universe there are no Gods 
to sanction Nora's value-system, no absolutes to grace 
the woman's I criminal naivete' and affirm decency and 
love as pre-legal imperatives for human conduct.23 
Nora makes no further references to lykke in Act ll. The satisfaction she 
derives from these external goods recedes and this version of lykke modulates 
into a yearning for II det vidunderlige som nu viI skje". This miracle, which 
involves Helmer standing by her through this crisis fails dismally to 
materialise. This concept is one that she has recovered from her everyday 
discourse of the previous act, when she makes repeated use of it, usually 
collocated with lykkelig and dejlig. She is trying to dredge up some kind of 
value from the lykke she has been living with for the past eight years and 
which has sustained her. Durbach describes this turn of vidunderlig as Nora 
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straining II towards the heights of a Romantic wish-dream of heroic male 
sacrifice and wifely self-immolation" .24 
The shift in focus from well-being and happiness to waiting for the 
extraordinary to rise out of the ordinary has a strange effect on Nora. She 
becomes oddly fatalistic and tells Kristine that there is no point in her trying 
to intervene with Krogstad as she is powerless to avert the inevitable: "Det 
skulde du ladet vcere. Du skal ingenting forhindre. Det er dog igrunden en 
jubel, dette her, at ga og vente pa det vidunderlige" (2.336). And this, just 
seconds before the countdown to her death. 
Act III charts the painful process through which this Romantic vision 
of det vidunderlige recoils in on itself through the agency of Helmer's legalistic, 
moralistic condemnation of Nora and his belittling of her motive of love. He 
tells her: "Nu har du 0delagt hele min lykke" (3.352). Helmer's lykke can only 
be interpreted as located in his public image, and has no place for the 
domestic lykke that Nora cherishes and the lykke that knows no limits to the 
sacrifice it would make for loved ones. He further accuses her of destroying 
his future (neglecting the fact that had it not been for Nora's crime, he would 
be dead). He agrees to keep her on at the doll house on sufferance, for the 
sake of appearances, but she is to have no access to the children. This 
arrangement will be devoid of any potential for happiness: "Herefterdags 
gcelder det ikke lcengere lykken; det gcelder bare at redde resteme, 
stumperne, skinnet" (3.353). 
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Nora attempted to find salvation by adding substance to her lykke and 
by transfiguring it into an object of almost religious faith. But a lykke 
compounded only of external goods cannot support such a burden, and Nora 
cannot will any deeper content into it. She is forced to accept that the lykke she 
had laid so much store by and under whose sign she had chosen to live, has 
no substance, and she mistook secondary goods for happiness itself. She is 
forced to recognize that she has been complicit in its frivolity by acquiescing 
so totally in her husband's trivialisation of her. There is no salvation in Nora's 
domestic lykke. As Helmer says, happiness is no longer relevant; what is 
urgent is salvaging the pieces of the wreckage, and Nora's most urgent 
project is her own moral and social education. 
Durbach shrewdly highlights the different qualities of happiness 
explored in this play. He points to the lykke anatomised so carefully by Nora 
throughout Act I and contrasts it with a more elusive breed of lykke whose 
profile is hard to construct. Durbach locates this distinction at the heart of the 
process of tragic recognition, explaining that 
... the heroic temperament is compelled to seek the 
terror out, to ask question after question even if the 
answers uproot the stability of the hero's very existence. 
During the tragic process the hero loses what Ibsen calls 
lykke, a term encompassing all of life's superficial and 
fleeting happiness, the entire panoply of everyday 
domestic gestures that Nora defines in Act 1 25 
Durbach is drawing too rigid a line here. It is not lykke itself that is 
suspect, but implied is a condemnation of Nora's failure to supply it with any 
content weightier than' secondary goods' of bourgeois comfort. Further along 
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in his argument, Durbach commends gla?de ('happiness' in an unambiguous 
sense devoid of the dimensions implicit in lykke) as a more substantial value. 
GICl?de, argues Durbach, is a "term encompassing the profound joy of clear-
sightedness and insight". However, the text supports no such distinction. 
GICl?de is used infrequently and casually, and never in contrast to lykke.26 
In another context, concerning the final sequence, Durbach seems to 
refute his own distinction. After Nora rejects Torvald's forgiveness as 
insufficient reason to stay on at the doll house, she has achieved such a level 
of clarity that she can see into the heart of her (un)happiness: 
HELMER. Har du ikke vceret lykkelig her? 
NORA. Nej, det har jeg aldri vceret. Jeg trode det; 
men jeg har aldrig vceret det. 
HELMER. Ikke - ikke lykkelig! 
NORA. Nej; bare lystig. (3.358) 
Durbach argues that Nora has now gained such insight into her changed 
situation that she is able to distinguish between 
authentic and inauthentic qualities of being, between 
'love' and the ephemeral pleasures of merely being 'in 
love', between lykke and lystighed; joy as an 
indespensible condition of human relationships and 
'happiness' as the sporadic pleasure that has replaced 
joy in their lives.27 
Here Durbach gives the impression of having restored lykke to a sign for 
substantial happiness in contrast to lystighed which clearly denotes a more 
superficial happiness, such as that he identified above in lykke when he 
opposed it to glCl?de. However, the whole point of the final sequence is that in 
order for values of any kind to be established, a radical and very painful 
reassessment has to take place; an ethical reassessment which will involve the 
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individual in an isolated confrontation with "resteme, stumpeme", but not 
"skinnet". Nora has to assert herself at this basal level: "ferst og fremst et 
menneske" (3.359). Unless this level of maturity is attained, there can be no 
duties such as those Helmer enjoins on her, in however metaphysical a guise, 
and there can be no hope for lykke either. 
What Nora's experiences with Krogstad, the law and above all with 
Helmer, have afforded her is a general tragic insight into the vulnerability of 
happiness and the impossibility of insulating a life against reversal. Nora is 
unique among Ibsen's tragic heroes in that her crime, the forgery, was an 
unequivocally selfless act, designed to save the life of the man she loved. She 
is forced to see that well-intentioned purposive action can demand 
transgressions of social, legal and moral laws, which can eclipse the language 
of love and sacrifice. In addition to this generalised insight into the tragic 
condition, she gains personal insight into the deluded life she leads and is 
confronted by lithe merciless obligation to be oneself' .28 
4.2.2 My Station and Its Duties 
With Et Dukkehjem Ibsen gives us the tragedy of the "lady next door" 
by extracting the tragic from the everyday. Durbach identifies the same 
operation of tragic recognition and the heroic attempt at realignment at work 
in the playas in Oedipus. Just as Oedipus embraces the terror of knowing, 
Nora likewise lives through "a willed and searing deconstruction of a false 
sense of self - [ ... J in the will to 'reconstruct' another being, 'at blive en 
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anden''' .29 The Oedipal quest for identity is clearly the spine of this tragedy, 
but another comparison from Greek tragedy also suggests itself here; Nora's 
career is a reverse image of Hecuba's. 
Nora's rejection of the duties which had previously defined her 
(mother, wife) in response to her highest duty, to herself, shows that for Ibsen 
human identity is no longer strictly commensurate with social function in the 
Aristotelian sense. Nora qua mother and Nora qua wife do not equal Nora. 
Nora is an identity that has to be negotiated and chosen in the 
Kierkegaardian sense. Therefore, the contrast to Hecuba is arresting: Hecuba 
is stripped of her humanity as a result of having lived through unspeakable 
horrors including the murder of all but one of her children, social 
degradation from queen to slave and betrayal by a trusted friend. Hecuba is 
the most wretched of creatures, left apolis - without a city, and by extension, 
without an identity. Nora, conversely, in order to achieve her humanity, 
consciously abandons husband, hearth, children and social position. Whether 
her self-imposed exile on the margins of society will provide the conditions 
for her education is, of course, unknown. It is her moral courage that is of 
interest to Ibsen, not her subsequent narrative. 
This Hecuba-Nora contrast illuminates very precisely the moral 
dilemma Nora has been pushing towards, and, which, once identified, allows 
no retreat. Nora does not reject 'duty' as a category like Peer Gynt does; 
neither does she position herself outside the pull of morality or invent her 
own morality like Julian and Brand. In an important sense, Nora locates 
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herself in the pre-ethical, arguing that in order to defer to any of her duties, she 
must first try to find an adequate response to being herself. 
Just as Ibsen rejects the deus ex mach in a solution as a valid lusis in true 
Aristotelian spirit, so Nora rejects Torvald's change of heart, because the 
recognition which has arisen from her reversal leaves her no choice. She is 
now steered by an urgent sense of necessity: "NORA .... Jeg ved bare, det blir 
n0dvendigt for mig" (3.360). Torvald insists that in leaving him she is 
abandoning her holiest duties. Even though this is an unequivocally secular 
tragedy, whose heroine has declared herself an atheist, Nora hangs on to this 
religious-ethical vocabulary and uses it in all seriousness: 
NORA. Jeg har andre ligesa hellige pligter. 
HELMER. Det har du ikke. Hvilke pligter 
skulde det vcere? 
NORA. Pligterne imod mig selv. 
HELMER. Du er ferst og fremst hustru og 
moder. 
NORA. Det tror jeg ikke lcengere pa. Jeg tror 
jeg er ferst og fremst et menneske, jeg, ligesavel som 
du, eller ialfald, at jeg skal forsege pa at bli'del 
(3.359) 
Nora's decision is a departure from the tragic formulations hitherto 
explored by Ibsen. Hitherto the crises encountered by his heroes and heroines 
could crudely be reduced to the conflict between duty (to a calling) and a 
more earthly happiness (love, earthly renown, power), that is, a conflict 
between duty and value. These tragic divisions have in other words been 
plotted along deontological and axiological lines. 
If, when instructed concerning what ought to be, I ask 
for reasons, the answer may be in terms of duties, 
obligations, rights, ideals (of justice, of goodness, of 
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fairness), or values (moral, aesthetic, religious). [ ... ] 
Philosophers have divided the study of these reasons 
into two broad fields: deontology (theory of obligations; 
from the Greek Deov, that which is binding, needful, 
proper) and axiology (theory of values; from a~toc;, worth, 
as in worth more than). The former deals with what ought 
to be because it is required by one's stations and its 
duties, by the web of obligations and commitments the 
past has spun. The latter deals with what ought to be 
because its being so would be good, or at least better 
than its alternatives.3D 
Nora stands faced with a choice which is an interesting inversion of 
Brand's. He was forced to choose between his calling and serving his 
parishioners and his family. Nora is choosing between the duty to herself and 
her family. The basic difference is that Brand loved Agnes, and had her full 
support in his calling; Nora finds herself married to a man she finds she 
barely knows and who cannot conceive of her as having any duty that is not 
at least tangential to his own existence. "Alt rna bceres alene". It is these 
specific duties that Nora rejects. 
The English idealist philosopher F. H. Bradley published Ethical Studies 
in 1876, two years before Et Dukkehjem. Under the section "My Station and Its 
Duties" Bradley explains that each person has a specific place in society, 
broadly characterisable by the rights and the duties that attach to that 
position. All one's relationships, by blood, by marriage, by association, by 
indebtedness contribute to the definition of that position, and this position 
sets up definite moral requirements. To live morally is to live in accordance 
with the demand of one's station.31 But Bradley points to the tension within 
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morality that this produces, for it strains to accommodate ideals and the 
notion of freedom to pursue the goal of self-realisation and understanding. 
The ideal of a life in freedom and love creates its own 
categorical imperative, but our station's duties may 
close off any possibility of response. It may seem that, in 
such a situation, there is a resolution, a morally correct 
resolution, of the conflict, namely revolution. But the 
revolutionary places himself in a role subject to a 
conflict of an exactly similar structure. The 
revolutionary himself proposes thus to sacrifice himself 
and if necessary his whole generation for the sake of the 
coming community that he serves.32 
According to Bradley, it is "'through faith and through faith alone, [that] self 
suppression issues in a higher self-realisation."33 Bradley's image of the 
revolutionary and the self-suppression leading to self-realisation captures 
exquisitely an important aspect of the Ibsenian agon, although it is only Julian 
and most obviously Brand who truly fits the profile of the rebel as herald of a 
new dispensation. 
Nora has rejected not only her religion but also her station and its 
duties, but she has not lost a sense of value. Self-knowledge is for her the 
highest value- it is holy. She is looking at a pre-social sense of self which 
involves a choice and a process. She is unique among Ibsen heroes in that 
while rejecting established modes of thought, belief and behaviour, she does 
not try to legislate, or set herself up as a moral authority. She is not the 
intransigent hero; she wants to change. She must change, must blive en anden. 
She must, in short, pursue what is potentially valuable in her. In other words, 
Nora seeks to conflate the deontological with the axiological by locating value 
in her as yet unattained selfhood, and a duty in respect of that potential in the 
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here and now. A duty to what may become valuable in the future, rather than 
a set of obligations towards the past The fact that Nora resisted suicide gave 
the play the openings for tragedy. Had she committed suicide, it would 
simply have been death in defeat and despair, and would not have fallen in 
the purview of the tragic, for it would not have raised crucial issues of 
identity and freedom. Ibsen gives full dramatic treatment to this in 
Rosmersholm. 
Nora's tragedy shows that there is nothing pre-given about authentic 
identity. While it is true that society provides very clearly defined roles for 
people to step into, the individual is not locatable in these roles, as the ethics 
of Aristotle's functional view of man would argue. Nora slams the door on 
the functional view of man, leaving Torvald behind in his melodrama, exiting 
in tragedy's new clothes - a "simpel blA hverdags drakt".34 
What Et Dukkehjem demonstrates is realism's capacity for carrying 
tragedy. It gives us the suffering, isolate hero, whose experiences fall out in 
such a way that they cluster into an irreversible fate that pushes them 
inexorably towards a freedom which, once obtained, immediately assumes 
the contours of necessity. Far from precluding tragedy, Ibsen's realist stage 
takes what is paradigmatic of modernity and gives it the inflections of 
tragedy, all the time making it vraie, simple, grand, in accordance with Zola's 
aesthetics. 
If Et Dukkehjem shifted the focus of tragedy onto the quotidian, 
Gengangere established the ordinary life as its locus, except that in this work, 
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technically much simpler but all the more powerful for it, only the 
inauthentic have the luxury of slamming doors. For Fru Alving, the 
confrontation with authenticity is internalised and the home, instead of 
representing a pre-ethical playroom/prison, becomes a metaphor for the self, 
from which there is no escape. Gengangere is Ibsen's Huis Clos. The conditions 
for the tragedy of the ordinary life and the centrality of livsglc£den will be the 
mainstay of the discussion in Chapter V. 
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IIaTpo(J)v 6' £KTtV£U; nv' a8Aov 
- Antigone 
M aU, hvad vi i den moderne dramatiske 
litteratur har lcest, er Gengangere det, som 
kommer det antike drama ncermest [ ... ] 
den gamle tragedie kaldes skjcebne - eller 
slcegtsdrama, den tragiske skjcebne gik i 
arv i cetten. Ogsa her har vi en 
familietragedie, men den er tillige et 
samfundsdrama, den antike tragedie, 
gjenopstaaet paa moderne jord - P. O. 
Schj8tt, 1882. 
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Chapter V 
Gengangere - Livsglceden - kan det vcere redning i den? 
5.1 Introduction: Tragedy? 
Gengangere has been caught in a seemingly endless interpretive tug-of-
war. Critics are either of the opinion that this play is as close as modernity 
could ever get to pure tragedy, heralding Ibsen as "the subtlest master of the 
stage since Sophocles"l, or, conversely, they hold that it is a very poor, and 
ultimately flawed attempt at tragedy. Evert Sprinchorn has highlighted the 
inherent contradiction in this situation, pointing out that Gengangere, of all 
Ibsen's realist plays, is at the same time the one which "bears the closest 
resemblance to ancient tragedy and the play that has most frequently been the 
object of critical censure".2 
This radical divergence of opinion can be traced back to the realism 
debate, the terms of which were discussed in the previous chapter. More 
narrowly, the conflict lies in the issue of whether naturalistic determinism can 
carry the dramatic gravitas implied by a g6ttliche Gegensatz or not. 
I will proceed with a close reading of the play which will argue that the 
absence of any named fate makes it a secular tragedy in true Aristotelian 
spirit, and that the tragic core is located in the sphere suspended uneasily 
between moral responsibility and contingency. In this play, the naturalistic 
philosophy which materialises in the face of Osvald's degenerative inherited 
disease takes the place of luche, chance, and reposes between the moral and 
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the contingent However, the naturalistic-deterministic aspect has been over-
emphasised by interpreters. As Michael Robinson points out, 
hereditary fate in naturalistic guise is only one 
dimension of the disaster that befalls the real protagonist, 
Fru Alving. It is her struggle for fulfilment and truth, 
and the moral guilt which she incurs, that really interests 
Ibsen, and which initiates what can therefore be seen as a 
single fated action moving to unavoidable catastrophe.3 
Osvald is not, after all, the hero. There is a more compelling sense of 
retribution in the play, which arises from the union betweeen Osvald's 
parents. In his notes for the play, Ibsen wrote of such marriages, "Det bringer 
en Nemesis over afkommet at gifte sig af udenforliggende grunde selv 
religi0se eller moralske" (HU IX.136). 
This reading will show that the re-definition of the tragic hero is at 
stake here even more than in the case of Et Dukkehjem as the progress of the 
action is much more ubennherlig than in the previous play, and the tragic 
potential of the ordinary is put under greater scrutiny. Not only is the heroine 
an unexceptional middle-aged woman, but, by making Fru Alving the heroine 
and withholding the tragic role from Osvald, Ibsen was depriving her of 
essential dramatic resources: action and event I will also show how this play 
foregrounds the issue of happiness in the concept of livsglCl?de. It is the 
protagonist's changing understanding of livsglcr?de which first retards and 
finally makes way for her anagnorisis. 
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5.2.1 Gengangere 
Gengangere is a play about a woman who is trying to overcome her 
painful past through a great public act of mourning which is to lay the ghost 
of her debauched husband and secure a more adequate future for herself and 
for her son. At least, this is the play that Helene Alving has scripted for 
herself. 
Helene Alving, pressured by her widowed mother and aunts into a 
marriage of convenience with the well-off Chamberlain Captain Alving when 
she was in love with another man, Pastor Manders, finds married life 
intolerable. This is in part because of her unfulfilled longing for Manders and 
in part due to her husband's unremitting drunkenness and philandering. 
After a year of wedlock, she flees her home, Rosenvold, to seek refuge in the 
embrace of the Pastor. However, Manders repels her in the name of duty, and 
admonishes her to return to her husband and to honour her marriage vows. 
She returns a broken woman, and not long thereafter becomes pregnant, 
nursing the naIve hope that the birth of the child will be the salvation of her 
loveless marriage. The captain's indulgence merely intensifies with time, and 
in a monumental exercise in damage limitation she takes control of the 
running of the estate. She also takes to drinking with him in a desperate 
attempt to keep him inside the house and from disgracing himself in public. 
Things come to a head, however, when Alving gets the maid Johanne 
pregnant. Fru Alving pays her off and with the money Johanne is able to 
secure a husband and nominal father for the child in Engstrand, local 
carpenter and rogue. 
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Meanwhile, she has her son Osvald sent away to Paris to protect him 
from the corrupting influence of his father, but brings him up to believe that 
the Chamberlain is a pillar of the community. Osvald establishes himself in 
Parisian artistic circles and makes a name for himself as a painter of talent He 
does not return to Rosenvold as long as his father is alive. 
Alving dies, and so does Johanne. Fru Alving takes in Johanne and 
Alving's daughter Regine (who is ignorant of her true parentage). From the 
day Manders sends Fru Alving back to Rosenvold until the present action he 
has not set foot in her home. 
The occasion for his visit now is the fact that he has accepted the 
responsibility for administering the memorial Fru Alving wants to set up in 
honour of her husband, I'IKammerherre Alvings hjem", (aptly, an orphanage), 
on the tenth anniversary of his death. She is confident that this charitable 
contribution will pre-empt any idle gossip in the community about Alving's 
dissolute life. This is a memorial which is specifically designed to enable her 
to forget, if not erase the past, albeit on a material level. For Fru Alving this is 
her chance to cancel her debt to Alving. She has carefully calculated how 
much he was worth at the time of their marriage and has separated this sum 
from the money she has made since taking over the management of the estate. 
It is Alving's money that has paid for the orphanage. In this way, when the 
time comes, Osvald will inherit everything from his mother, nothing from his 
father. 
Osvald has returned from Paris, ostensibly for the occasion, and to his 
mother's great delight has announced that he will spend the winter with her, 
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giving her the chance to make up for lost time and to win over her son. During 
Act I Manders judges Fru Alving as a bad wife and a failed mother, accusing 
her of putting her own desire for happiness before her most sacred duties. She 
decides to speak out and inform the Pastor of the full extent of her misery, and 
her motive for sending Osvald away. She is optimistic that the memorial will 
clear the way for a brighter future with Osvald. 
Her optimism begins to fade, however, when she hears glasses clinking 
in the next room and Regine's protests of N slip mig" 4 as she is being pursued 
by Osvald, calling up the first appearance of ghosts in the play: "FRU 
ALVING (farer sammen i rCEdsel.) Ah! ... (Hun stirrer som i vildelse mod den 
halvdbne dRlr.) [ ... ] Parret fra blomstervCErelset - gar igen" (HU IX.1.BS). And on 
this gasp, Act I closes. 
In Act II Fro Alving develops the theme of ghosts as more than 
revenants and as having a much more insidious hold over us - they are dead 
ideas which control our moral reflexes and judgements. As the action 
develops, we see these ghosts working their power. Fru Alving changes the 
focus of her life-narrative from that of blaming the pastor for sending her back 
to a loveless marriage in the name of duty to a rewriting of the past in which 
she is complicit in the family tragedy. Her engagement with progressive 
reading material has enabled her to question the validity of the duty which 
sent her back to Alving, and has helped her to register the crippling effect it 
has had on her chance for happiness. In Act ill she confesses "Jeg er reed, jeg 
har gjort hjemmet uudholdeligt for din stakkers far, Osvald" (3.122). She 
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explains, "Din stakkers far fandt aldrig noget afleb for den overm~gtige 
livsgliI!de, som var i ham" (3.122). 
Critics have traditionally seen this as Fro Alving's epiphany; the 
tragedy's moment of anagnorisis, and with this interpretation tends to follow a 
quite spirited berating of Fro Alving as an inadequate wife, chastising her for 
not being more sexually responsive and a more cheerful companion for a man 
she did not love. 
Joan Templeton faults this interpretation (which has almost become a 
critical commonplace) for being defective in several respects: firstly, as she 
points out, "Nothing could be more out of character for [Ibsen] than requiring 
human beings to fulfil unwanted, unfelt obligations". She argues that what 
this interpretation suggests about the "relation between love and passion [ ... ] 
as well as what it suggests about the relation between duty and love - seems 
nothing short of absurd". Templeton goes on to stress that such an 
interpretation ignores an important dimension of Fru Alving's narrative - that 
her flight from Alving was not only motivated by his debauchery, but also by 
the fact that she was so hopelessly in love with another man that she violated 
social taboo by leaving her husband to be with him. Templeton argues that 
this misreading arises from both a retrograde conservatism and a worryingly 
bourgeois morality that would perpetuate the institution of the marriage of 
convenience and the female marital-sexual debt, which seems to be the very 
institution that Ibsen is attacking.5 Further, it betrays a view of tragedy which 
is too rigidly Aristotelian, the demand that there be a climactic moment of 
anagnorisis.6 
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But there are additional reasons why this interpretation sits ill. 
Gengangere, like other realist works, is a play before which critics 
display astonishing confidence concerning what it is 'about', in comparison to 
later plays such as Rosmersholm, which inspire much more tentative responses. 
Fro Alving is read as someone who has fallen on the wrong side of the 
happiness/ duty divide and has ruined her own chances of happiness, and so 
it seems, everybody else's too. 
This is the received wisdom. But surely, if this reading of Fro Alving is 
taken to its logical conclusion, it has to be argued firstly that the play endorses 
livsgliEden as a positive, if not the highest good, the value she has stifled and 
neglected, and before which she is guilty. If this is the case, it is surely 
remarkable that a dramatist who took such an organic view of his oeuvre 
should allow such a crucial concept, livsgla?den, to disappear completely after 
this work, at least in name? Surely there would follow at least one instance of 
livsgliEden in antanaclasis 8, some development, some refinement, in the way that 
key Ibsenian notions such as lykke and pligt are developed? Secondly, we have 
to examine the characters who represent livsgla?den and ask what it means to 
each of them, and what it means to the playas a whole. 
Preliminary conclusions all raise stumbling blocks for the traditional 
interpretation, for Alving and his children as representatives of livsgla?de do 
not convince as paradigms of how to live well. Important though Alving is, he 
is a purely diegetic character and there is not enough textual evidence to 
support a reading of him that would align him with Beate as a victim of soul-
murder. 
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5.2.2 Livsgla?den - kan det ViEre redning i den? 
The first instance of livsgla?den comes in Act I when Manders, Fru 
Alving and Osvald are discussing the late Chamberlain. Osvald has made his 
first entrance in the drawing room where his mother and Pastor Manders are 
discussing the legal provisions for the orphanage. Manders, who has not seen 
Osvald for several years, is profoundly disturbed by the similarity between 
him and Alving - he behaves as though he has seen a ghost 11 (stirrende). Ah-! 
Det var da m~rkv~rdigt -[ ... ]Nej, men er det virkelig -?' (1.71) and later 
explains his consternation: "Da Osvald kom der i d0ren med piben i munden, 
var det som jeg sa hans far lyslevende" (1.72). The reference to the pipe 
activates Osvald's (as it turns out, his only) childhood memory of his father. 
He recalls the day he went to Alving's room where he remembers him as liSa 
glad og lystig" (1.72) - a description of Alving which can only be read as that 
of a child translating the sight of his drunken father into terms familiar to his 
experience. He describes how his father sat him on his knee and encouraged 
him to taste his pipe. However, this moment of intimacy between father and 
son takes on horrendous dimensions when the father goads his son into 
inhaling the tobacco until the boy turns pale and breaks into a sweat, 
whereupon the father bursts out laughing until the tearful mother arrives and 
carries the boy off to the nursery where he duly vomits. This experience is one 
which Osvald has not been able to understand fully, and asks, again filtering 
the experience through a child's mind "Gjorde far ofte slige spilopper?" (1.73). 
Although the question is directed to his mother, Manders jumps in, answering 
"I sin ungdom var han en s~rdeles livsglad man" (1.73). 
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At this point we must question Manders's choice of words. Manders's 
reflex would have been to slip into his sanctimonious rhetoric of decency _ 
Manders was a childhood friend of Alving's and was certainly aware of his 
excesses. There is strong reason to believe that he chooses the word with care, 
a tactful attempt on the part of an adult to preserve an ideal, an interpretation 
which is supported by his subsequent attempts to dissuade Fru Alving from 
revealing the truth about Alving to Osvald. There is little in this exchange to 
suggest that livsgla?den is in any sense being posited as a positive value. Its 
function here is no more than a euphemism in the service of damage control 
and maintaining the status quo, and this is underscored by the fact that it is 
Manders who uses this word; Manders, the natural enemy of the spontaneous 
joy which livsgla?den in ordinary language connotes. Furthermore, its position 
within the dialogue juxtaposes it with two central issues in the play: that of the 
ghost, in the physical sense; and that of a father making his son sick.9 
Livsgla?den resurfaces in Act IT, in the scene where Fru Alving has 
opened a bottle of champagne for Osvald to calm him in his overwrought 
state. He has just revealed the fact of his illness, and his doctor's bleak 
prognosis that he will never be able to work again. He also tells his mother 
that the doctor diagnosed him as having been vermoulu from birth, and made 
the biblical judgement that "fcedrenes synder hjems0ges pa b0rnene" (2.106). 
This is a much grimmer version of the anatomisation of sin and the conflation 
of naturalism and morality than experienced in Et Dukkehjem. Osvald's 
account of his diagnosis is central to an understanding of the play's tragic 
orientation. He is convinced that the doctor has misdiagnosed his illness. As 
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well as expressing the ontological irreversibility that lies at the heart of 
o 
tragedy, "A, kunde jeg bare leve om igjen, g0re det ugjort altsammen!" 
(2.106), he longs for exculpation in the form of a deterministic curse: "Havde 
det endda VCEret no get nedarvet, - no get, som en ikke selv kunde g0re for. 
Men dette her! Pa en sa skammelig, tankel0s, letsindig made at ha sl0set bort 
sin egen lykke, sin egen sundhed, alting i verden, - sin fremtid, sit liv _ !" 
(2.106). As Sprinchorn suggests, Osvald's assertion that his fate would have 
been bearable had it simply been a question of inherited disease, not involving 
a free choice to live a certain way, "would seem to undercut the deterministic 
philosophy of the play [ ... ] Here Ibsen is clearly suggesting that the 
deterministic series of events does not encompass the tragedy; it is only one 
element in it" .10 
Regine has been sent off to fetch a bottle of champagne. At this point 
Osvald turns to his mother and comments on Regine's physical appeal, twice 
emphasising the fact of her robust good health: she is ka?rnesund and ka?rnefrisk 
(2.111). And it seems that when Regine made it clear to him that she had taken 
seriously an old offer of his to take her to Paris, and had even started learning 
French - this girl whom he had barely noticed before is suddenly transformed 
into a symbol of redemptive potential: 
Mor, - da jeg sa den prCEgtige, smukke, 
kCErnefriske pige sta der for mig - f0r havde jeg jo aldrig 
lagt videre mCErke til hende - men nu, da hun stod der 
ligesom med abne arme fCErdig til at ta' imod mig - [ ... ] -
da gik det op for mig, at i hende var det redning; for jeg 
sa der var livsgliEde i hende. (2.111- my italics) 
165 
To which Fru Alving replies "Livsgla?de - ? Kan der v~re redning i 
den?" (2.111), thus posing a question which demands a serious engagement on 
the part of readers and critics. Critics have traditionally assumed the answer 
to be yes. Regine returns with the champagne glass Osvald has instructed her 
to bring for herself, but strangely fails to fill. While she sits clutching her 
empty glass, it is clear that for Fru Alving her question was not simply 
rhetorical, and she reopens the discussion of livsgla?den. Osvald explains to her 
that it is a quality foreign to Rosenvold, at least in his experience. Apparently, 
livsglCEden is synonymous with the joy of work, something discernible in every 
face derude, in France: 
... her l~res folk op til at tro at arbejdet er en forbandelse 
og en syndestraf, og at livet er noget jammerligt no get, 
som vi er bedst tjent til at komme ud af jo fer jo heller 
[ ... ]. Der er ingen der, som rigtig tror pa den slags 
l~rdomme l~nger. Derude kan det kendes som no get sa 
jublende lyksaligt, bare det at v~re til i verden. Mor har 
du lagt m~rke til, at alt det, jeg har malet, har drejet seg 
om livsglCEden? Altid og bestandig om livsglCEden. Der er 
lys og solskin og sendagsluft, - og stralende 
menneskeansigter. Derfor er jeg r~d for at bli' her 
hjemme hos dig. (2.112 - my italics) 
Osvald's definition of livsglCEden as the joy of living in the most 
elemental sense raises as many questions as it ostensibly answers. Firstly, 
there is the matter of Regine, whose identification with livsglCEden (in the same 
way as Manders's initial identification with it) automatically ambiguates its 
status as a value, and not simply because she can be read as the living 
assertion of Alving's own livsgla?de. 
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Ibsen goes to great lengths to develop Regine's character. Indeed, he 
gives her the opening scene. She is not simply a token domestic, nor is she a 
purely symbolic character; the opening scene shows Regine to be cold, 
impatient, calculating and ambitious (in this sense resembling her nominal 
rather than her natural father) - someone with neither aesthetic aspirations nor 
ethical concerns; she wants to get on in life. And the French she learns, which 
Osvald takes for a sign of the joy of living, is simply in preparation for better 
things. And the way she peppers her language with French phrases is 
designed to establish a social distance between her and her supposed father, 
Engstrand. Indeed there is very little that is spontaneous about Regine. The 
fact that she repeatedly rephrases what she says in keeping with the accepted 
register of the situation demonstrates this admirably. Moreover, it is difficult 
to see what there is in Regine that for Osvald suggests either livsgla?de (beyond 
the physical) and even less the element of salvation. 
For his own part, Osvald seems to be using Regine for rhetorical effect 
In a gesture which flies in the face of social convention, he insists that she 
bring a glass to join him in a drink of champagne. His mother does not demur; 
Regine brings the glass, rather nonplussed at Osvald's suggestion, but she is 
never offered any champagne to drink, which suggests that Osvald is not 
really concerned with her at all, but is drawn to her vitality as something 
which he knows is for himself unattainable. Moreover, as the play progresses, 
we learn how Osvald had mentally appointed Regine to be his companion and 
nursemaid, as the one person he would be able to rely on to give him 
morphine during the next crisis. She, like his mother, will be useful to him.ll 
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Seeming to have forgotten Regine temporarily, and to have dropped 
her from the livsglcede equation, Osvald goes on to define livsglceden as 
synonymous with the joy of work, insisting that this is an alien concept to his 
mother and all in Norway who have been poisoned by an ethic that saw work 
as a punishment and life as a cursed estate, best left as soon as it is entered. 
Again, this passage cannot go unexamined. 
It seems that Osvald's point about work is highly subjective; he is an 
artist and immediately turns the discussion onto himself and his paintings, 
and this has to be seen in light of the fact that he will never be able to work 
again. However, in this context if we recall his mother's words to Manders in 
Act I, we will see that she, contrary to Osvald's rather stark accusation, does 
not see work as a curse, but indeed as her salvation. In Act I she had explained 
to Manders that it was her work that had kept her sane all those years with 
Alving. Moreover, she sees freedom as something that can be obtained though 
work: "Jeg ma arbejde mig ud til frihet" (2.89). For Fru Alving, work is clearly 
not a curse, but it is necessary and desirable. 
The description Osvald gives of his art as a depiction of happy people 
derude bathed in joy and light is indeed appealing, and a contrast to the 
greyness we see on stage, which Osvald complains is eating into his soul. 
However, we know enough Ibsen to be wary of this level of aestheticism, 
reminiscent of the young Ejnar in Brand. We also know that there is no 
salvation in unexamined positions, irrespective of whether they embrace life 
and light or conversely abjure happiness in favour of a formulaic duty, like 
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Aline Solness. In both cases the ethic is easy, and both offer easy solutions to 
complex moral problems; something which Ibsen is never tempted to do. 
Osvald goes on to express his fear that his livsgfa:?de will be polluted and 
corrupted by the jammerdal that is life at home with his mother. It is at this 
point that what Trilling calls "the summation of the play" is heralded. 12. Fro 
Alving declares: "Nu ser jeg den for f0rste gang. Og nu kan jeg tale" (2.113). 
This epiphany prefaces her supposed recognition speech in which the burden 
of guilt is assumed and the tragedy is adumbrated. 
However, her anagnorisis is forestalled by the news of the fire down at 
the orphanage which closes the second act. It transpires that Engstrand, 
having lured Manders down to the orphanage for a dedication service, 
commits arson and manages to manoeuvre Manders into believing that he was 
responsible for it. He then offers to assume responsibility for it and persuades 
Manders to join him in his project of the sailors' home. In some ways 
Engstrand's account of Manders extinguishing the flame carelessly and 
causing untold damage as a result can be read as an allegory of what he did to 
Fru Alving's love for him all those years before - although Engstrand is an 
unlikely candidate for moral arbiter. Osvald sees the fire as the consummation 
of his father and his entire legacy, heralding his own collapse. For Fro Alving 
it clears the way, quite literally for the truth, and cancels all need for pretence, 
drawing the appalling comedy as she puts it, to a close. 
After the fire Fru Alving sits Osvald and Regine down to tell them the 
truth of Regine's parentage and to relieve Osvald of his self-reproach. Again, 
livsglcrden is the catalyst 
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Du kom f0r til at tale om livsgl~den; og da gik 
der ligesom et nyt lys op for mig over alle tingene i hele 
mit liv. [ ... ] Du skulde ha' kendt din far da han var 
ganske ung 10jtnant. I ham var livsgl~den oppe, du! [ ... ] 
Det var som et s0ndagsvejr bare at se pa ham. Og sa den 
ustyrlige kraft og livsfylde, som var i ham! (3.121) 
What is striking about this speech is its echoes and its repetitions. She 
repeats Manders's point about the exuberant young Alving, and if we recall 
Manders's motivation behind his choice of words and the context which 
provoked it, Fru Alving's statement cannot be taken at face value. 
Furthermore, she echoes Osvald's own rhetoric of light and sunshine in order 
to make her account speak to Osvald - that it was sendagsvejr just to behold 
him. This is, moreover, the language of romance, or remembered love; it 
seems doubtful that Fru Alving ever found the experience of looking at Alving 
so uplifting, or experienced any kind of joy in a marriage of convenience 
which quickly turned sour. The fire of the orphanage may have cleared the 
way for the truth, but in her statement the ghosts of the past merely rise from 
the ashes. 
Her so-called epiphany plays itself out thus, with Alving transformed 
into sacrificial victim: 
Og sa matte sligt et livsgl~dens bam, - for han var 
som et barn, dengang, - han matte ga herhjemme i en 
halvstor by, som ingen gl~de havde at byde pa, men 
bare forn0jelser. Ma tte ga her uden at ha' noget 
livsformal; han havde bare forretninger. Ikke eje en 
eneste kamerat, som var m~gtig at f0le hvad livsgl~de 
er for noget; bare dagdrivere og svirebr0dre - . (3.122) 
And thus all the extenuating circumstances of Alving's 'debauched 
existence' are trotted out for the benefit of his son: the restrictions of a small 
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town of limited possibilities; lack of interest in his work; no real sense of 
calling; bad company, consisting of roisterers with no inkling of the meaning 
of livsglCEden. Again, Fru Alving is structuring her description around Osvald's 
own, almost point for point environment and work. However, she does not 
let her defence of Alving rest there - but rather brings it to a climax in an 
astonishing volte face retraction of everything she had said in Act I: 
Sa kom det, som det matte komme [ ... ]. Din 
stakkers far fandt aldrig noget afl0b fra den overmeegtige 
livsgleede, som var i ham. Jeg bragte hener ikke 
s0ndagsvejr ind i hands hjem. [ ... ]. De havde leert mig 
noget om pligter og sligt noget, som jeg har gatt her troet 
pa sa leenge. Alting sa munded det ud i pligterne, - mine 
pligter og i hans pligter og -. Jeg er reed, jeg har gjort 
hjemmet uudholdeligt for din stakkers far, Osvald. 
(3.122) 
Again, we have the repetition of sf1ndagsvejr. What Fru Alving is doing 
here is berating herself for not having been a good wife, indeed, erasing 
entirely all sense of self and of a right to, if not at very least, an instinct for 
happiness, in exactly the same vein as critics have been berating her ever 
since. And thus, as Templeton so aptly puts it, "[t]he cornerstone of the 
modern theatre is read as a play about a woman who failed as a wife" .13 
Indeed, it certainly seems out of character for Ibsen to make such a clear 
indication of the anagnorisis; it seems too obvious that the dramatist of 
interiority should make the moment of recognition so unambiguous to the 
extent that he announces it before it takes place. It could almost have been 
included in the stage directions: "FRU ALVING [makes her recognition 
speech]." 
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But even if we reject this standard reading of Fru Alving's epiphany, 
we certainly have to find an explanation for these lines, and why so much 
space is devoted to them at such a crucial point in the play, the revelation of 
Regine's paternity. Again, Templeton's explanation convinces: here is Fru 
Alving's desperate attempt, having certainly gone some way in her battle 
against gengangere. This is not an anti-idealist gesture to rid Osvald of the very 
life-lie that she cultivated in him and for which Pastor Manders applauds her 
as the only positive thing she ever achieved in her dismal career as failed 
mother and wife. No, she is not on an anti-idealist mission. Rather she is in 
open combat with the truth, the truth of Regine's paternity, which she feels 
she has to disclose so that Osvald can choose whether he wants to pursue his 
happiness with Regine nevertheless. It is an attempt above all to relieve 
Osvald of his self-inflicted torture resulting from his understanding of the 
(Etiology of the disease, namely his consorting with the happy band of 
liberated artists in Paris.14 
The reading she gives Osvald of his father's career is a highly 
naturalistic account in which social environment is the determining factor in 
his dissipation (small town, bad company, limited opportunities, sour home-
life) as is her account of her own part in his unhappiness, that is the 
conditioning of a loveless ethic of duty. This would indeed seem to 
circumvent the possibility of tragedy,15 and it tells us little more than we have 
already surmised - that Helene Alving should never have married Alving, or 
at least should never have returned to him having realised the boundless 
misery that the union caused. 
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John Northam talks of Fro Alving's "generosity" in assuming the blame 
for the fact of Alving's degeneracy, but leaves this instinct unexamined. It is a 
highly problematic speech.16 First of all, it negates the portrait of Alving so 
carefully established in Acts I and IT, and the portrait of the degenerate 
Chamberlain is not simply the work of a bitter widow; it is partly 
corroborated by the man's childhood friend. But surely, the most striking 
vignette of Alving is that presented through childhood recollections of his son, 
perhaps the least biased account we get. This distressing picture of family 
misery would strip the fact of Engstrand's transformation of the orphanage 
into Chamberlain Alving's 'rest home' for sailors of its clearly ironic 
dimension. 
Moreover, it provides a rupture in Fru Alving's own life-narrative 
which has hitherto been constructed around a series of choices, albeit 
disastrous ones, involving varying degrees of freedom, from her marriage to 
her abandonment of Alving and her flight to Manders; her decision to return 
to Alving even though it militated against her very nature; her decision to try 
to make the marriage work through the birth of the child; her choice to protect 
her son from Alving by sending him away from Rosenvold; her decision to 
payoff the pregnant Johanne and subsequent decision to take in Regine after 
Alving's death; her decision to take control of the running of the estate; and 
finally her decision to cleanse her son of the Alving inheritance by dedicating 
the orphanage to his memory. Her entire life is thus a catalogue of choices and 
actions, however constrained. This last speech would sit better on Fro Solness 
than on Fru Alving. 
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Further, it gives the impression of a man who is slowly broken by a 
cold, duty-crazed wife; but we hear immediately afterwards that II din far var 
et nedbrudt mand fer du blev fedt" (3.122); Osvald we are told, was born only 
about two years into the marriage. Her confession fails to convince. Ibsen 
explained in a letter of 1887: 
De forskellige andsfunktioner udvikler sig nemlig ikke 
jevnsides og ikke ligeligt i et og samme individ. 
Tilegnelsesdriften jager fremad fra vinding til vindig. 
Moralbevidstheden, 'sammvitigheden' er derimod meget 
konservativ. Den har sine dybe redder i traditionerne og 
i det fortidige overhovedet Heraf kommer den 
individ uelle konflikt (XVIll.128) 
This view of uneven ethical development has clear application here: on 
the one hand Fru Alving can be seen to bow to conservative pressure to play 
the scapegoat, and on the other to pursue truth and to chafe against taboo. 
And thus she follows her account with the devastating revelation that Regine 
is Alving's daughter. Osvald seems strangely unmoved by the news. Regine's 
reaction again reinforces the earlier argument that her livsgl~de exists only 
inasmuch as Osvald declares it, or at least his definition of this particular kind 
of joy, which had emerged in his defence of free love. Regine's reaction is 
conservative, and inevitably, it is her mother who comes under censure, not 
Alving - another instance of the reduplication of the hypocritical economy of 
blame in which the woman emerges as the sinner: 
REGINE. (hen for sig). Sa mor var altsa slig en. 
FRU ALVING. Din mor var bra' i mange stykker, Regine. 
REGINE. Ja, men hun var altsa slig en alligevel. (3.123 -
italics mine.) 
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Realising that her dream of marrying Osvald can never come to 
anything, and that to remain at Rosenvold would involve ministering to the 
sick, she announces her departure: "Nej, jeg kan rigtig ikke ga her ude pa 
landet og slide mig op for syge folk [ ... ]. En fattig pige far nytte sin ungdom; 
for ellers kan en komme til at sta pa en bakke fer en ved af det Og jeg har 
ogsa livsgl~de i mig, frue!" (3.123). 
Her valedictory speech culminates in a triumphant declaration that she 
too has livsglCFden in her, which makes it impossible for her to remain in the 
enclosed hospice that Rosenvold will become. Here livsglCFden seems to 
represent an overweening instinct for survival which cancels all trace of 
human sympathy and compassion. On one level Regine's use of the word can 
be seen as a further example of how she adjusts language to fit a given 
situation - livsglCFden has been the key word in the discussion. Her entire 
reaction to her new reality operates on a level of social status and ambition, as 
she goes off to claim her father's inheritance: " ... jeg er lige sa n~r tillidt af de 
pengene, som han - den f~le snedkeren" (3.124), sinking into a deterministic 
rhetoric which shows she will inherit the worst of both her fathers. For Regine, 
progress was only a question of social advancement Now that this path is 
closed to her, she aligns herself ethically with Manders and Engstrand, and 
with her inheritance from her parents, making her drama a naturalistic one. In 
other words, she chooses not to choose in an ethical sense. And as Fru 
Alving's final sequences show, choice is the most difficult thing to face. 
Regine's insistence that there is livsglCFden in her is greeted with a "Ja, 
desv~rre" by Fru Alving, which again makes her defence of Alving on the 
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grounds of his thwarted joy in life all the more suspect In relation to Regine, 
Fru Alving sees it as a sign of her imminent decline and corruption, that is of 
everything that Alving had stood for in Act I, and she admonishes her not to 
throw herself away. Regine then reproaches Fru Alving not for her crime 
against the truth, but for having cheated her out of the upbringing she felt she 
was entitled to, and with a resentful glance at the unopened bottle of 
champagne which was never served to her, asserts that she may yet Ukomme 
til at drikke champagnevin med konditionerte folk" (3.124). This statement 
and the visual re-foregrounding of the champagne bottle underscores not only 
how close Regine had come to fulfilling her social aspirations, but also how 
the champagne ceremony of the previous act had radically different 
significance for Osvald and Regine. For Osvald, it was drinking to life and to 
vitality, a salut in its most literal sense to his vision of livsglCl!den to which he 
had co-opted Regine as his redemptive angel. For Regine, however, the entire 
semiology of France can be reduced to a superficial taste for social 
advancement The champagne bottle can be seen to function as an index for 
livsglCl!den: alcohol for Fru Alving reminding her of her husband's excesses 
and those appalling nights of drinking him under the table to limit his 
activities to Rosenvold, and livsglCl!den as a by-word for it; for Osvald the 
champagne represents the free, aesthetic life; his version of livsglCl!den. Finally, 
for Regine, an outward show of continental sophistication and social ambition. 
When she leaves Rosenvold, her livsglCl!de preventing her from remaining, she 
has material advancement in mind.17 
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Regine is the last character to leave. She exits to team up with her 
adoptive father and Pastor Manders, for as long as they will be useful to her. 
And she leaves of necessity. There is no question that she should stay at 
Rosenvold. Apart from the reasons she gives, she had no genuine feelings for 
Osvald, and does not fall into the trap of a misguided sense of duty to her 
half-brother. But in trying to liberate herself and make a clean break with her 
past at Rosenvold, she is, by virtue of the alignment she makes, simply re-
enacting the past: she embraces the Alving legacy, defiantly asserting that she 
will become like her mother. Indeed if she does end up in Chamberlain 
Alving's Refuge, she will, ironically acquiesce to both Manders's and 
Engstrand's demands from Act I that she pay her debt of filial duty, and 
become the tes that Engstrand wants her to be (1.55; 1.58; 3.119). 
Fro Alving and Osvald are finally alone, and Osvald disabuses his 
mother of the notion that she has shattered his illusions and affections for his 
father, contrary to Manders's predictions. Osvald insists that he cannot feel for 
his father in his misery on more than a general human level (this is a 
dimension absent from Regine) and the fact that Alving was his father was 
simply a matter of biological fact - nothing more, nothing less: "Jeg har aid rig 
kendt noe til far. Jeg husker ikke andet om ham, end at han engang fik mig til 
at kaste op" (3.125). Fru Alving is appalled at the bare honesty of this account 
and objects, "Dette er forfcerdeligt at ~nke sig! Skulde ikke et bam fele 
kcerlighed for sin far alligevel?" (3.125), thus lapsing into the very rhetoric of 
natural affections and duty that Manders promotes and Engstrand exploits 
and which she herself subjects to critical questioning in Act IT: 
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PASTOR MANDERS. Har De glemt at et bam skal 
agte og elske sin fader og sin mor? 
FRU ALVING. Lad os ikke ta' det sa almindeligt 
Lad os sperge: skal Osvald agte og elske kammerherre 
Alving? 
PASTOR MANDERS. Er det ikke en rest i Deres 
morshjerte som forbyder Dem a nedbryde Deres sens 
idealer? (2.90) 
In the event it turns out that this voice Manders appeals to is easily 
subdued in times of rational armchair discussion. But when Fru Alving is 
confronted with the disintegration of her son (in whom she has invested her 
redemptive vision just as Osvald invests his in Regine) the same voice which 
had once before redirected her progress towards freedom to a death-dealing 
formalism of unexamined positions, in which Osvald was conceived and into 
which he was born, once more takes hold of her. For not only has she echoed 
her own words of Act I describing her own condition when she fled 
Rosenvold as grenselest ulykkelig (3.125), but she is also playing out the 
censonous reaction she predicts she would have had to face from the 
hypocritical community had she not gone to such lengths to cover Alving's 
tracks: "Havde folk fat noget at vide, sa havde de sagt som sa: stakkers mand, 
det er rimeligt, at han skejer ud, han, som har en kone, der leber ifra ham" 
(2.89 - my italics). It is not only the sudden application of the epithet stakkers to 
Alving which reveals her vulnerability to the very ideas she is trying to release 
herself from, but also the fact that she subjects her own unhappiness to the 
dominant economy of blame. 
Both mother and son, the one morally, the other physically, are 
regressing. Osvald is aware of this turn in his mother, commenting that there 
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is no reason why a son should love a father he barely knew and had nothing 
to thank for. He dismisses such injunctions as mere superstition and registers 
his surprise that his mother, II som er sa oplyst forresten" should trot out such 
an opinion, which is nothing more than lien af disse meninger, som er sat i 
oml0b i verden og sa - II (3.125). She interrupts him, hearing the echo of her 
own words from Act II, words uttered before the ghosts she was so anxious to 
expose themselves took hold of her and made her articulate in their service. 
She finishes the sentence for Osvald, Gengangere, realising that intellectual 
engagement with these ghosts in books and periodicals is meaningless, and 
that all ethical engagement has to be gennemlevd. 
Osvald has indeed spoken for her at last and it is significant that 
despite his weakened condition he does not fall back on these ghosts and dead 
ideals for comfort. Not only does he challenge his mother's resurgent 
conservatism regarding the parent-child relationship, (what Manders in Act I 
had declared to be natural affection), but he also refuses to permit himself or 
his mother the luxury of the illusion of intimacy and love, even in this critical 
moment when it could offer solace. 
When Osvald reminds her of the ghosts of dead ideas, which are more 
important to her than the ghost of Alving, she is forced to probe beyond 
surfaces and ask him whether he in fact loves her or not. Osvald's honesty is 
bare: he tells his mother that at least he knows her, and is grateful for her 
affection for him, and points out that she will be very useful to him now that 
he is sick. 
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And it is at this point that Fru Alving srruggles with her most 
formidable opponent - the necessary stage in her path to freedom - that is her 
gengangeragtige belief in the sanctity of the mother-son bond. In the next 
sequence we see her at her most vulnerable, fighting to keep both the illusion 
of her son's recovery and of the primal, meaningful relationship alive. This 
has functioned as the defining moment of happiness for her throughout the 
play, her morslykke. 
Her desperation is signalled by her absurd statement that she is almost 
grateful for his sickness in bringing him back to her, giving her the 
opportunity to earn an affection she can no longer take as given. 
But Osvald makes it clear that it is too late for such redemptive visions; 
whether or not she does manage to win him is academic; he is a sick man, 
with barely enough strength for himself, let alone the emotional resources for 
worrying about others. He goes on to reveal to her the full extent of his 
condition, and explains to her that the illness eating into his brain could at any 
moment render him as helpless as an infant. He makes it very clear to his 
mother that he expects her to administer the fatal dose of the morphine he has 
hoarded in the event of such a debilitating attack. He tells her she has to 
promise to do this, otherwise the fear of regressing and living a life which for 
Osvald is not human, is too much for him. Of course this is anathema to Fru 
Alving, who rejects the idea out of hand. But Osvald insists that she must, 
accusing her of depriving him of Regine, who would have gladly 
administered the fatal dosage as she would not have been able to stand seeing 
him in such a reduced state. The fact that Regine left of her own accord and 
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would not in any case have stayed around long enough for Osvald to reach 
such an advanced state of deterioration is beside the point. Regine, even in the 
best case, would have given Osvald the drug to relieve her own burden, not 
his, and thus livsgla!den can only mean the survival instinct. 
He is taking his mother at her word, challenging her maternal reflexes 
in statements such as the promise that there was nothing in this world that she 
would deny her son. The ultimate challenge and crisis comes when Fru 
Alving reacts against this plea with every fibre of her being: 
OSV ALD. Ja, nu far altsa du gi' mig 
handsr~kningnen, mor. 
FRU ALVING (skriger h0jt). Jeg! 
OSV ALD. Hvem er n~rmere til det end du? 
FRU ALVING. Jeg! Din mor! 
OSV ALD. Just derfor. 
FRU ALVING. Jeg, som har givet dig livet! 
OSV ALD. Jeg har ikke bedt dig om livet Og hvad 
er det for et slags liv, du har givet mig? Jeg viI ikke ha' 
det! Du skal ta' det igen! (3.129) 
It is now clear to Fru Alving that all her nursery talk, promising her 
little boy that everything will be all right, is simply empty rhetoric, and the 
only way she can ease her son's suffering is by taking his life away together 
with the pain. She tries to rush out to call the doctor, an action Osvald pre-
empts by locking the door, and excluding all social, external and unthinking 
responses. She returns to Osvald, with the words mit barn, now imbued with a 
vision of horror and the ground on which her relationship to freedom is to be 
tested. Osvald appeals to her maternal feelings, forcing her to redefine them 
radically through his emotional blackmail, echoing Manders: "Har du et 
morshjerte for mig, - du, som kan se mig lide af denne un~vnelige angst" 
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(3.130). She capitulates, but immediately tries to comfort herself with the 
thought that it will never be necessary, and reverts to her previous language 
of mother comforting son, as if after a nightmare. 
As Horst Bien argues, the rhythm of the play is constructed in such a 
way that the further away from the past the action of the play gets, the more 
formidable the opponents of the dead moral inheritance become, and the more 
the present reproduces them: "Pa denne maten gj0r Ibsen det fortidige til en 
funksjon av samtiden." 18 
But there is no respite. She is immediately confronted with the spectacle 
of Osvald's final collapse and his descent into senselessness. The sun has 
already risen and the starkness of the glaciers glowing in the morning light is 
discernible on stage. Despite this, Osvald in his delirium repeatedly begs his 
mother for the sun. The agony of her scream "Dette bceres ikke" (3.131) is 
interrupted by her frantic rummaging in his pockets for the morphine, 
screams which are entirely muffled and overshadowed by the malles TtEdsel 
following the stark positing of the decision that confronts her: "Nej; nej; nej;! -
Jo!- Nej; nej!" (3.131). All the while Osvald continues to demand the sun that 
illuminates this most inarticulate of tragedies. 
Critics who try to decide one way or the other whether or not Fru 
Alving does go on to administer the morphine effectively reduce the play to a 
piece iz these. And the demand for closure is extraordinary in a supposedly 
post-modern age. Ibsen himself professed not to know for certain. In any 
event, the problem is extra-textual in the most basic sense. Some critics do not 
hesitate to write the end of what they, perhaps following Ferguson see as too 
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truncated an ending, an unfinished play.19 Theoharis C. Theoharis for example 
writes of how the last scene demands that she "kill her only son [ ... and that] 
she transform that ultimate crime into the exonerating, liberating service of 
what Oswald has called 'the joy of life'''.20 On the contrary, Ibsen demands 
nothing. He only asks, and as Fro Alving's struggle has shown, there is 
probably no salvation in the joy of life. 
And the question which surely persists after the final curtain is not 
whether Fru Alving has managed to take Osvald's fear away, as he hopes, but 
of how much progress she has made since the beginning of the play, and 
whether she has laid enough of the ghosts of conventional morality to be able 
to make a genuine choice in full freedom or whether the ghosts will choose for 
her. 
The starkness of her response reduces her horror into noiseless terror. 
No discourse of homely maternity can even suggest itself here, and Ibsen's 
choice to have Fru Alving retreat physically from a paralysed, atrophying 
Osvald, instead of having her support his lifeless body, deliberately resists the 
sunlit pieta arrangement and the soothing lullabies which close Peer Gynt - an 
ending that Fru Alving has been gesturing towards through her infantilisation 
of Osvald, right up to his demand for the sun: 
FRU ALVING (bejet over ham). Det har veert en 
forfcerdelig indbildning hos dig, Osvald. Altsammmen 
indbildning. Du har ikke talt alt dette oprivende. Men nu 
skal du fa hvile ud. Hjemme hos din egen mor, du min 
velsignede gut. Alt, hva du peger pa, skal du fa, som 
dengang du var et lidet barn. -Se sa. Nu er anfaldet over. 
Ser du, hvor det gik! A, det vidste jeg nok. -Og ser du, 
Osvald, hvilken dejlig dag vi far? Skinnende solvejr. Na 
kan du rigtig fa se hjemmet. (3:130) 
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As Theoharis points out, (perhaps unnecessarily), Helene Alving does 
not kill Osvald on stage. And since Ibsen did not shy away from stage 
representations of death, one can conclude that had his final scene demanded 
Osvald's euthanasia, he had sufficient theatrical resources to allow her to 
suggest a less ambiguous ending. Moreover, to indulge more than fleetingly in 
such extra-textual speculation seems pointless, but to base an interpretation of 
the play on an outcome that post-dates the final curtain seems ill-advised. By 
ending the action where he does, Ibsen may indeed invite criticism of having 
produced a "truncated" tragedy, but he is certainly not guilty of 
sensationalism. Neither do we need to finish the playoff for him with one or 
another totalising reading.21 
Surely what Ibsen intended to highlight, with the ambiguous aid of the 
sun symbolism (a symbol of truth finally breaking through, or a symbol of the 
inexorable rhythms of nature that go on unmoved by the activities of men?) 
was Fru Alving alone in her final moment of choice. This moment reveals how 
isolating and terrifying freedom can be without the ghosts of the unexamined 
life to process our decisions and without conditioned ethical reflexes to take 
away the fear. It also exposes the full extent of the 'pollution' the miasma 
incurred by a life led in deference to these ghosts. Fru Alving's inarticulate 
terror presages the gaps and the silences in Beckett. 
The modalities of the ghostly existence were easy rhetoric and morality; 
the transvaluation of this rhetoric in the intellectual fight for freedom also had 
a voice. But the insight into true freedom obtained at the end is neither 
184 
glamorous, nor glorious, nor suggestive of any alternative modality beyond 
the muffled scream of the horror Fru Alving somehow senses when she 
condemns the human race as gudsjammerlig lysredde. 
Thus in affirming the ordinary as the locus of dramatic and ethical 
exploration, Ibsen was at once affirming the capacity of the small man for 
suffering and for working towards his freedom. As the curtain goes down on 
Gengangere leaving Fro Alving to confront the light on her own, none of 
Steiner's "rational innovations" even vaguely suggest themselves to 
compromise the tragedy. 
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o generations of mortals, 
I count your lives as equal 
To nothingness itself. 
For who, tell me who, 
Has happiness that stretches further 
Than a brief illusion 
And, after the illusion, decline? - Oedipus 
Tyrannus 
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Chapter VI 
Rosmersholm: Lykken sam Livsmal 
6.1 Tragedy or Tragi-Comedy? 
Rosmersholm has always divided critics. In Norway contemporary 
taste dimissed it as an "altfor abstrakt tankedrama" to have any future on the 
stage,l while in France the play received more positive treatment at the 
hands of Lugne-Poe and was greeted as the herald of a new dramatic 
expression.2 
Academic criticism tends to focus on its generic status: tragedy or 
tragi-comedy? The dominant voices in this debate tend to be those denying 
tragedy. Here the objection seems to be less to the failure of the secular 
world-view to accommodate tragedy than a failure of the new world view to 
cut its heroes to the old cloth. In Rosmersholm, it is clearly the protagonists 
who are at issue. 
John Hurrell argues that because neither Rosmer nor Rebekka is 
suited to the tragic role, their death "restores no order, teaches no lesson, and 
finalizes no experience."3 There are obvious difficulties with such a didactic 
view of the function of tragedy, but Hurrell is not alone. John S. 
Cham berlain also points to the lack of any convincing fit between the 
protagonists and the tragic role, and asserts that Ibsen's presentation of these 
two characters is in itself a "sardonic commentary of the high seriousness of 
their tragiC roles".4 Chamberlain concludes that the spirit of the play is that 
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of tragi-comedy, as the ending is but" the effective culmination of the ironic 
contrast between the appearance of tragic heroism in a Romantic mode and 
the pathetic and ultimately humiliating realities of the central situations once 
the Naturalistic and therefore specifically secular and temporal identities of 
Rosmer and Rebecca are understood".5 Chamberlain is expressing a popular 
misconception that the secularisation of tragedy was both something new 
and something terminal. 
Jens Kruuse (writing before Chamberlain) also felt that the tragic 
status of Rebekka and Rosmer was at issue. He argues that Ulrik Brendel 
compromises the tragic integrity of the protagonists by announcing their 
great project of liberation before they do and by foreshadowing their 
sacrifice at the end of the play. He has no other dramatic function. 
"Dramaturgically this means that the two idealists are under suspicion. [ ... 
Brendel] functions as a bond between the two heroes and the ridiculous. An 
ironic mood is suggested."6 J0rgen Haugan's anti-idealistic reading in 
Diktersfinxen also insists on the lack of heroic dimensions in the protagonists. 
He dismisses Rosmer's project of ennobling his fellow men as "substansI0se, 
kristelig klingende fraser om "lutring' og .. adling'''.7 For Haugan these 
perceived shortcomings in the heroes define the work as a "nihilistisk 
stykke. Personene t0mmes for ideale formal [ ... ] Det er intet forsonende ved 
deres ded".8 
These arguments pay scant attention to the internal dynamics and 
shifting focus of the play. Ulrik Brendel cannot define the action and lead 
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interpretation; the political contours of the work do not even begin to 
suggest the measure of the conflict which lies at its heart. As Marie Wells 
points out, such views fail to take into consideration "the fact that after Act 
IT, the focus of the play narrows. The comically-tinged political manceuvres 
of Kroll and Mortensgard are replaced by the searing psychological and 
moral self-examinations and cross-examinations of Rosmer and Rebekka."9 
At this point a few observations about the special status of this play 
within the Ibsen canon will enable a more considered response to these 
criticisms. Rosmersholm is unique among the plays thus far discussed in that 
the tragic experience is filtered through two protagonists. Even in Gengangere 
the tragedy is mother's rather than son's, not mother's and son's. And 
looking forward to John Gabriel Borkman, even there, despite the scenic 
organisation and the palpable suffering of the twin sisters, they do not carry 
the tragedy but are only aspects of Borkman's peripeteia and anagnorisis. No 
single consciousness holds sway throughout the action of Rosmersholm, and 
Rebekka and Rosmer do not even experience tragedy in parallel, nor indeed 
do they arrive at tragedy through the same terms until the final sequence. 
Van Laan has traced the "shifting protagonist" of the play and 
concludes that throughout Act I and for most of Act IT Rosmer is clearly the 
protagonist and he carries the dramatic interest. However, when he proposes 
marriage to Rebekka and she executes that famous voIte face from ecstatic joy 
to a sudden, aggressively crescendoed withdrawal not only from the idea of 
a marriage contract but also from Rosmersholm and from life itself, Rosmer 
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is dislodged and Rebekka takes centre stage. She remains the focus of the 
drama until Rosmer insists on his own experience of tragedy and his loss of 
belief in his ability to transform mankind. It is here the tragedy becomes 
truly dual.1° The tragic dyad of Rosmersholm is however supported by a 
dramatic structure so finely balanced that the play is widely held to be the 
peak of Ibsen's technical achievement 11 
In writing this double tragedy Ibsen was risking much. By this stage 
he had firmly established his capacity for creating compelling tragic 
protagonists who could carry the burden of the tragedy alone, in the spirit of 
Chapter XIII of Aristotle's Poetics. Therefore, abandoning this template in 
Rosmersholm was a significant departure, especially since it is difficult to 
argue for the double suicide as part of the romantic Liebestod tradition. (If 
anything the Liebestod can only stand in ironic relationship to Rosmer and 
Rebekka as their death is not about love in any romantic sense).12 The double 
perspective offered in this drama risked the fragmenting of the tragic 
expenence. 
But the tragic experience of Rosmersholm is far from fragmented. The 
analysis which follows sets out to demonstrate this through an examination 
of the play's main problematic, lykke. The play's treatment of the happiness 
issue is another aspect which distinguishes it from within a perspective new 
to Ibsen's stage. All tragedy is concerned with lykke in various manifestations 
but Rosmersholm openly declares it its dominant thematic preoccupation. 
Edvard Beyer was one of the first critics to underscore this point 
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"Rebekka er den ferste av Ibsens natidskvinner som har mot og kraft til a 
kjempe med aIle midler for lykken". Beyer draws our attention to a speech 
from one of Ibsen's drafts for Rosmersholm in which Rebekka declares" det er 
noget af det sterste ved den nye tid, at vi vover abenlyst at proklamere lykkell 
som livsmal".13 It is for this reason that Rosmersholm is so important to Ibsen's 
evolving sense of happiness, and why a close reading is necessary. In this 
play, the pursuit and promotion of happiness as the highest good is the 
guiding principle of the action. That Rebekka and Rosmer fail in this project, 
both on a public and a private level, signals a new tragic variant - the 
tragedy of a flawed Utilitarianism. 
6.1.2 Ibsen and Utilitarianism 
Utilitarianism has stimulated little interest in Ibsen research; index 
entries for "Utilitarianism" and its chief proponents in full-length studies are 
hard to come by. Where they do occur, they tend to be references to the 
feminism of Et Dukkehjem, or Ibsen's correspondence with Georg Brandes on 
the occasion of Brandes's translations of J. S. Mill and the Dane's failed 
attempt to convert his friend to Utilitarianism. 
Brandes's translation of The Subjection of Women (1869) was published 
in the same year under the title Kvindernes Underkuelse and his translation of 
Utilitarianism (1863), Moral Grundet paa Lykke - eIler Nytte Principet came out 
in 1872. Brandes recalls a recalcitrance on the part of the playwright to "read 
Mill and turn Anglo-Saxon"14, while Ibsen for his part wondered why 
193 
Brandes should want to waste his time on a philosopher like Mill.I5 Brian 
Johnston, taking Ibsen at his word, enlists the dramatist's distaste for British 
empirical philosophy and his admiration for Hegel and German idealists as 
proof of his dramatic intentions.16 
Brian Downs, in a much earlier study, probes beneath the bombastic 
surface of Ibsen's statement, suspecting that there was perhaps too much 
coincidence of disposition between the two men for Ibsen's comfort, hence 
the haughty dismissal.17 Downs argues that in Ibsen 
there was, often overlaid or qualified, a deep strain, 
probably derived from Rousseauistic romanticism, 
which made the happiness of the individual the 
ultimate criterion in morals - precisely the tenet of the 
'hedonistic calculus' propounded by Jeremy Bentham, 
Mill's great predecessor .18 
Bentham's hedonistic or felicific calculus rests on "that principle which 
states the greatest happiness of all those whose interest is in question, as 
being the right and proper and universally desirable, end of human 
action."19 Happiness is the great value; unhappiness or pain the disvalue. 
Moreover, a sense of equality is embedded in Bentham's dictum "everybody 
is to count for one, nobody for more than one". As Mill explains, this means 
precisely that one person's happiness must be assumed to be equal to 
another's and counted in exactly the same way.20 For Bentham this principle 
is grounded in an essentialist anthropology, as expressed in a characteristic 
display of whimsy: "By the natural constitution of the human frame, on most 
occasions of their lives men in general embrace this principle without 
thinking of it. For such is the stuff that man is made of" .21 
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One of the most attractive things about Utilitarianism is its claim that 
the felicific calculus can give us the right answers in questions of morality. 
These answers may be hard to find, but they are there. 
Obviously the two Brians were writing very different books. Downs is 
wise to caution against being too deferential to Ibsen's own pronouncements, 
especially his more unequivocal declarations concerning influence (as in the 
cases of his well-known disavowal of the kvindesage in 1898 and the influence 
of Kierkegaard in 1870). However, in the case of Utilitarianism, there are 
three crucial aspects to it which render it prima facie uninteresting from the 
perspective of tragedy. Firstly, as the philosophy of amelioration, 
Utilitarianism is by its very nature forward-looking, whereas "the tragic 
tense" is the past tense; it is that which is "beyond recall". 22 Secondly, 
interrogating the past is a somewhat alien activity to the Utilitarian: his 
emphasis will be on maximising happiness in the future. When things go 
awry in the Utilitarian world, regret is not given room for free play. Thirdly, 
there is no reliance on luck, and, as we shall see, at Rosmersholm no quarter 
is given to the sense of contingency. Finally, as a monistic view, it would 
seem to be out of sympathy with tragedy, which is so often engendered by 
conflicts borne of pluralistic ethics. 
The following reading of Rosmersholm will argue against Johnston's 
attempt to banish Mill from Ibsen's stage world, but at the same time will 
offer a serious caveat to Downs's assertion that in Ibsen "the happiness of the 
individual" was "the ultimate criterion in morals" in the narrow Utilitarian 
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sense he proposes, because Rosmersholm, far from asserting the validity of the 
hedonistic calculus, registers its defeat 
6.2 Act I 
6.2.1 Ulrik Brendel 
It is through Brendel that the happiness problem opens up, albeit 
indirectly. Prior to his visit lykke is only an absence, asserted through 
scattered references to the past, to Beate Rosmer's "sidste ulykkelige levetid" 
(HU X.1.350). Brendel occupies a minimal amount of stage time, but his 
effect both on the other characters and on critics is far from negligible. It is 
necessary to examine the role of Brendel in this act and the implications he 
bears for an interpretation of Rosmer before we can make any confident 
statements about Rosmer and his project 
As we have seen, Brendel is sometimes taken as reason enough to 
disqualify Rosmer and Rebekka from the tragic. For many, the fact that 
Brendel announces his project in terms similar to those Rosmer subsequently 
employs, automatically subjects Rosmer to the reductive glare of irony. 
Kruuse, we recall, identified Brendel as Rosmer and Rebekka's "bond with 
the ridiculous". His argument seems logical enough. But were Ibsen to want 
to deconstruct Rosmer in this way, surely he had enough dramaturgical 
resources at his disposal to allow Rosmer to do that himself? Would 
Rosmer's stature be substantially altered were the part of Brendel to be 
excised altogether? Moreover, does this reading not imply that Ibsen is 
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undermining the remaining two and a half acts of text, only to reintroduce 
Brendel in the final act to remove all pretence of tragedy from the last 
sequence? 
While this is undeniably a play of action foreshadowed, mirrored and 
repeated, readings such as Kruuse's reduce it to an undifferentiated string of 
actions and events. I would argue, in direct opposition to this reasoning, that 
the function of Brendel is precisely the opposite. Rosmer's struggle with him 
is not conducted in the same realistic terms as his struggle with Kroll is. His 
struggle with Brendel is more of a reflection of an internal struggle with 
nihilism, a struggle in which Brendel does not prevail. He does pose a 
challenge to Rosmer's integrity, but he is overcome. 
Brendel's impact is instantly felt. Ibsen allows him to release 
immediate confusion. Throughout this act and during his reappearance in 
Act N he disrupts, dislocates, annexes and parodies meaning until he 
himself degenerates into nothing less than a sinister sign of nihilism. One 
function of this histrionic entrance is to introduce the theme of identity and 
convictions as unreliable categories and to establish the vulnerability of 
meaning. His parodic foreshadowing of Rosmer's decision to step back into 
the public realm is uncanny, but as we shall see is not enough in itself to 
discredit his project. He declares that he is on his way to take up the fight in 
the great battle of life, a struggle which will take the form of a lecture tour - a 
sacrifice at "frig0relsens alter", as he puts it, inserting a tragic dimension into 
this struggle, claiming that this is not his personal wish but "enfin - den 
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tvingende n0dvendighed" (1.361) - the phrase Ibsen later gives to Borkman 
to explain the compulsion that drove him to sacrifice Ella (XID:2.85). The 
gratuitous French filler underscores the fact that for Brendel language is 
nothing more than a rhetorical tool. With Brendel's inflated moral currency 
Ibsen provides a caricature of the man with a calling. 
All meaning is vexed in Brendel's hands. Referring to the turning 
point he has reached, he cites the scriptures" -Jo, du, nu viI jeg if0re mig et 
nyt menneske" in direct reference to Ephesians 4:24 "... men legge av det 
gamle menneske og kle dere i det nye menneske", before literally putting on 
Rosmer's clothes, going on a drunken binge in them and then pawning 
them. The mock-heroic reach of his rhetoric is undermined by the 
philosophy he embodies. A self-styled sybarite, Feinschmecker, Brendel 
locates the good life in a debased version of the epicurean life, as something 
tangible and quantifiable. For him happiness is tantamount to a slavish 
satisfaction of the appetites. He calculates that if pleasures are indulged in 
solitude, they are twice as enjoyable. In direct mockery of Kroll's temperance 
society, he expresses a wish to sign up for a week. Kroll, rising to the bait, 
informs him that they do not accept applications on a weekly basis. Brendel 
belittles the society further by proposing a toast in faulty French - to 
happiness, la bonheur (1.364).23 
It is clear that Brendel's version of bonheur consists in responding to 
what John Stuart Mill called the "nearer desires", to appetite and self-
ind ulgence. Mill argues that many fine men often prefer the nearer desires to 
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the nobler as the noble character requires cultivation if it is not to fall into 
misuse. Brendel's version of epicureanism has absolutely no moral purchase 
in Rosmer's world.24 
Kroll's stiff reaction of barely veiled contempt for Brendel is in 
character. Rebekka's admiration can be attributed to her previous reading of 
Brendel's work which she found in her foster-father's library (and perhaps 
because of the bold philosophy expressed in these works, marvels at the fact 
that Brendel is still alive (1.359)). Rosmer's reaction is very charitable. He 
lends him clothes and money, and admires him for having "mod til at leve 
livet efter sit eget hode" (1.365) - something Rosmer himself has only just 
started to do. Rosmer's reaction can be explained in part by this and in part 
as the result of a vestigial fondness for an old tutor who once had great 
influence over him and a desire to compensate for his father's harsh 
treatment of him. Brendel does not call down the ironic death-blow on either 
tragic protagonist. 
6.2.2 Frig0relsens V ~rk 
The remainder of the act is dominated by Rosmer's exegesis of his 
new political vision, his "frig0relsens v~rk" (1.367). The terms of his new 
calling require detailed attention to refute Haugan's sceptical reading of it as 
something compounded of no more than "substansI0se, kristelig klingende 
fraser om #lutring' og #adling"'.25 Indeed, there is much apparent support in 
the text for Haugan's interpretation. 
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Rosmer's rhetoric is highly Christian both in letter and in spirit He 
has given up the cloth (his father's choice for him, not his own calling) and 
has also renounced his faith, his "bametro" (1.386). We have no reason to 
doubt the sincerity of Rosmer's apostasy, and must not underestimate the 
social significance of his departure from the church. In leaving the church 
Rosmer was effectively stepping out of his genealogy and the Rosmer 
embetstradisjon, in which his moral authority was vested. Furthermore, 
Rosmer never gives us cause to believe that the renunciation of his faith was 
just a "forbigaende anfektelse" (1.386) as he puts it himself. In contrast to 
JUlian's, there is nothing in Rosmer's vision of a better world to directly 
oppose the Christian spirit; indeed there is much to reinforce it Rosmer 
speaks of the ideals of "fred og glcede og forsoning" (1.369), and Psalm 119 
echoes in his words: "De som elsker din lov, har fred og lykke", as does 
Psalm 165: "Han gir lykke og fred i ditt land". It is peace and happiness 
which Rosmer reads into" den store sandhedens og frihedens verden som nu 
er ble't mig iibenbaret" (1.368 - italics mine). 
This is no empty rhetoric. Rosmer criticises Kroll for violating the 
spirit of Christian agape, with" al den ukiErlige tale, du der f0rte, - aIle dine 
hadefulde udfald mod dem, som star pa den anden side, din hiinende 
jordemmelsesdom over motstanderne" (1.369 - italics mine). He is appealing to 
the basic Christian message of "love thy enemy" and still operating within a 
vestigial Christianity, but this does not in itself undermine the integrity of 
his vision, and Haugan's "klingende kristelige fraser" fail to give adequate 
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representation of his political mission. 
The point is that Rosmer has embraced a version of Utilitarianism, 
and as such has preserved much of the non-theistic Christian message intact 
(Forsoning, it must be remembered, also has a secular reach, that of 
conciliation, in addition to its dominant religious sense of atonement) He 
has arrived at these principles through another path, and believes that they 
can be sanctioned independently of religious institution and divinities. 
Rosmer is the Ibsenian rationalist par excellence, a true spokesman for 
Enlightenment morality, with its faith in the perfectibility of the autonomous 
rational individual. 
Haugan's charge that Rosmer's vision is "insubstantial" implies that 
Rosmer's rhetoric, like Brendel's, has no ethical or idealistic underpinning. 
This judgement does not stand up to very close scrutiny. Firstly, Haugan 
fails to take into account the fact that Rosmer, unlike Brendel, does not cite 
the scriptures for effect or self-aggrandisement Secondly, the role of 
reformer is not one that Rosmer relishes; like Hamlet, he is reluctant to 
assume an active role. However, his decision to declare his apostasy in 
public and intervene in the status quo is prompted by his identification with 
the values that he embraces and as the response to his duty towards them. In 
order to prevent the spread of hatred he has had to put aside his reservations 
and overcome his natural inclinations: "Da stod pligten uafviselig for mig. 
Menneskene blir onde under den strid, som nu pagar. Her rna komme fred 
og glcede og forsoning ind i sindene" (1.369). Prior to that he had thought he 
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could internalise his epiphany and devote his life to reading enlightening 
texts: "Jeg tcenkte, jeg kunde bli' ved at leve her som hidtil, stille og glad og 
lykkelig (1.368- italics mine)". There is a definite tension here: The great 
world of truth and freedom that has been revealed before him does not 
inspire him to intervene in the affairs of men, but rather to withdraw into a 
world of contemplation, thearia not praxis. 
Rosmer conforms to Aristotle's portrait of the eudaimon man, 
described in Book X of the Nichomachean Ethics as the contemplative man: 
"Happiness, then, is co-extensive with contemplation, and the more people 
contemplate, the happier they are, not incidentally, but in virtue of their 
contemplation, because it is in itself precious. Thus happiness is a form of 
contemplation" (l178b29). Like Aristotle's man of contemplation, Rosmer is 
no ascetic, for the contemplative life requires the support of external goods, 
food for example. Since Beate's death Rosmersholm has turned into a real 
home for Rosmer, "godt og hyggeligt - og fredsomt" (1.366). Like Aristotle's 
contemplative man Rosmer is not a seeker of truth. He considers that he has 
already achieved wisdom and seeks to contemplate it further, "at fordype 
mig", as he puts it. What Rosmer is yearning for comes close to the 
Epicurean and Stoic notion of ataraxia, the tranquility which was the proper 
goal of life.26 But the point is that Rosmer denies himself the tranquil 
contemplative life and overcomes his instinct to keep his apostasy to himself 
in order to enter the fray. This, after his apostasy, cannot be taken as 
anything but a sign of integrity and good faith. Moreover, although we see 
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this clear alliance between eudaimonia and the contemplative life in the 
Nichomachean Ethics, in the Poetics Aristotle expressly states in Chapter VI 
that eudaimonia expresses itself though praxis, action: "For Tragedy is an 
imitation, not of man, but of an action, and life consists in action, and its end 
is a mode of action, not a quality." 
Rosmer declares himself an independent, non-partisan champion of 
democracy, whose project he defines thus "Jeg vii leve og scette alle mine 
livsens krcefter ind pa dette ene, - at skabe det sande folked0mme i landet" 
(1.367). He sees the true task of democracy to lie in the ennoblement of all, to 
"g0re alle mennesker i landet til adelsmennesker" (1.367). This vision of 
universal ennoblement is given a decidedly Utilitarian flavour by the 
afterthought "sa mange som muligt i alle fald" (1.367) - a clear dedication to 
the principle of the maximisation of utility. 27 He aims to do this through a 
process of liberating minds and purifying wills. When Kroll expresses his 
scepticism at Rosmer's ability to achieve this transformation in this 
"ulykkelige land", Rosmer counters that he sees himself more as a facilitator 
for this revolution; "jeg viI bare s0ge at vcekke dem til det. G0re det, - det rna 
de selv" (1.368). 
In two significant ways Rosmer reminds us of John Stuart Mill. On a 
biographical level the similarities are striking: Rosmer like Mill has rebelled 
against his upbringing and his father and rejects his father's beliefs and 
philosophies, although his rebellion takes a different direction. Mill rejected 
his father's absolute dismissal of God and religion and his strict version of 
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Utilitarianism, and questioned the wisdom of emotionally starving a child 
for the sake of a first class rational education. Rosmer has also rebelled 
against his father. It was his father's choice that he should enter the church, 
not his, and thus in rejecting this role, Rosmer is making a stand against 
paternal and paternalistic authority and against imposing callings and 
beliefs on others. Rosmer has effectively stepped out of the Rosmer line. And 
like Mill, Rosmer is a rather shy character, given more to contemplation and 
study than active engagement with his environment. 28 
As the dialogue with Kroll develops, it is not only Rosmer's deep-
seated belief in tolerance as an indispensable social good that suggests Mill 
to us, but also his preoccupation with the question of happiness. It is this 
principle of universal happiness that enjoins the duty on him to stand up 
and be counted. Here for the first, and perhaps the only time in Ibsen, 
happiness (here glc£de) and duty pligt are in agreement. Indeed, Rosmer is 
expressing a duty to happiness. 
The above points serve to situate Rosmer ethically. He stands in 
marked contrast to the sybaritic version of pleasure represented by Brendel. 
The contrast here is that Rosmer's goal is happiness, which he conceives of 
both in personal and social terms. This makes him a eudaimonist; Brendel, 
whose goal is pleasure is a hedonist and their versions of the good life differ 
radically. Furthermore, Rosmer does not revel in the theatricality of his role 
as Brendel does. 
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6.2.3 Lykke 
It is in terms of his eudaimonist quest that Rosmer should be viewed. 
His vision is not vague as is often believed. The problem is that few critics 
have taken the trouble to give Rosmer due consideration, with the notable 
exception of Errol Durbach. Durbach interprets Rosmer's utopian vision of 
universal happiness as the product of a romantic world view. His constant 
recourse to concepts such as lykke, gla?de, frihed echo from deep within the 
lexicon of what he calls, after M. H. Abrams, "high romantic words". 29 
And the norm of life is joy - by which is meant not that 
joy is the standard state of man, but that joy is what 
man is born for: it is the sign that an individual, in the 
free exercise of all his faculties, is completely alive; it is 
the necessary condition for a full community of life and 
love; and it is both the precondition and the end of the 
highest a rt. 30 
This is a dangerous line to pursue in the case of Rosmer. For it seems 
to me that this kind of Romantic joy that Durbach is asserting is of a very 
different species from that of Rosmer's rationalist ethics. As Adam Potkay 
points out, the eighteenth century obsession with happiness was U eclipsed in 
the Romantic era by the praise of 'joy', which denotes an exaltation of spirit, 
less a conscious way of life than a surge of emotion in the moment"31 Surely 
what Rosmer wants to establish is precisely happiness as a universalizable 
"conscious way of life"? 
Durbach goes on to distinguish different qualities of response to the 
world in lykke, lyksalighed and gla?de. Gla?de is distinct from lykke with its 
"overtones of good fortune, or the sort of happiness that derives from 
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temporary pleasure, and fryd, which suggests delight - not as a condition of 
being but as a response to the world."32 Durbach is right to underline the 
difference between them, and to draw attention to the duality of lykke and 
the less porous notion of gla!de, which he sees as a conceptual descendent of 
Osvald Alving's livsgla?de. However, I think that his reading falters on two 
counts: if Rosmerian gla!de is a "direct descendent" of livsgla!de, it is guilty by 
association, for as we saw in the previous chapter, livsglJ!de is a suspect 
category. Secondly, as already noted, all the terms Rosmer incorporates into 
his Utilitarian vision are of biblical descent, a natural choice of lexicon for a 
former clergyman. Furthermore, without denying Ibsen's highly nuanced 
use of apparent synonyms, even the closest of readings would be stretched 
to sustain any consistent differentiation between the lykke cognates Rosmer 
employs. Most of the time it is synonymity for the sake of reinforcement 
And by the end of Act N lykke and gla!de along with all other words have 
been reduced to talemdder and the salvaging of meaning takes place through 
symbolic action, not linguistic rehabilitation. 
Rosmer has a vision of the regenerative possibilities for human 
beings, one that is generalisable from the personal to the social. He can live a 
lykkelig life by taking on oppressive institutions and inspiring the people to 
nobility and happiness. Rosmer, by comparison with several other Ibsen 
heroes, is exceptional in that his 'life-plan'33 is not obviously flawed. There is 
much in the text that underscores the extent of Rosmer's influence in the 
community, both as a representative of a long line of high-ranking officials, 
206 
(which gives him automatic stature in tragic terms) and we also hear of the 
reach of the influence of Rosmersholm from Madam Helseth, albeit 
negative.34 Neither is his vision in itself outrageous nor potentially 
destructive. Thus in many respects he is highly plausible. And whatever its 
vestigial Christianity, Rosmer is not, unlike Solness, in direct competition 
with God, but rather is mounting a challenge to the representatives of 
moribund social institutions. He is guilty of none of what Atle Kittang calls 
the "moralsk terrorisme" of Brand35; none of the ineffectual narcissism of 
Alfred Allmers, none of the volatile defiance of Solness, and his vision does 
not point to an enormous chasm between potential and present reality that 
Borkman's vision does. While Solness and Borkman mask their personal 
torment in quasi-Utilitarian terms, Rosmer's quest is Utilitarian. His 
secularised morality is grounded in a belief in the perfectibility of mankind 
and in happiness as the crown of this perfectibility, freed of superstition and 
coerCIon. 
Rosmer moreover retains a sense of community with those around 
him. When Kroll labels him a renegade, Rosmer confesses that the 
knowledge that his conversion would cause distress to his old friend and 
mentor blunted the happiness he would otherwise have fell "Jeg skulde ha' 
f01t mig sa glad, - sa inderlig lykkelig ved det, som du kalder frafaldet. Men 
sa led jeg pinligt alligevel. For jeg vidste jo nok at det vilde volde dig en 
bitter sorg" (1.366-7 - my italics). This happiness which derives from a sense 
of peace and security in new convictions is vulnerable to Rosmer's sense of 
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moral community which entails a sensitivity to the feelings of his fellow men 
and their capacity for suffering, however alien he finds their views. 
By the end of Act I it is clear that Rosmer is committed to his project 
in that he has rejected his public role and has found the courage to declare 
himself in order to assume a role that, all things being equal, he would 
rather not perform. His vision of happiness also seems specifically 
Benthamite, beyond its political agenda, in that it is definable as what is 
known as the "mental state version" of happiness, in other words happiness 
is a state of blissful contentment, or immunity from pain.36 This version of 
happiness contrasts with the "desire satisfaction account", which sees all 
action as purposive and directed towards getting what one wants. But as the 
play unravels, it will become increasingly clear that both these accounts of 
happiness are too thin.37 
It is not Brendel who casts suspicion on Rosmer. At this stage the only 
aspect of his confession which announces his imminent downfall is his 
consummate certainty and security in his position. Formulae such as "nu er 
jeg kommen pa det rene med mig selv i alle dele" (1.365); "fuld vis shed" 
(1.386) poise him for certain peripeteia. This is underscored by Ibsen's choice 
to close the act on Rebekka's foreboding of the white horses instead of 
Rosmer's supreme self-confidence. 
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6.3 Act II 
6.3.1 Kroll and Mortensgard 
Rosmer remains confident despite Kroll's formal dissolution of their 
friendship. When Kroll returns the following day, Rosmer is sure that it is in 
order to make amends, but Kroll's next line of questioning precipitates 
Rosmer's peripeteia. He reopens the question of Beate, and for the first time 
the fact of Beate's suicide is clearly stated, free of euphemism ("den vej, som 
Beate gik"). Rosmer believes that her suicide was the action of an "ulykkelig, 
syg, utilregnelig" woman, governed by her "ustyrlige, vilde 
lidenskabelighed, som hun forlangte, jeg skulde gjeng~lde. A den r~dsel 
hun indg0d mig!" (2.377). He explains how her mental instability was 
further compounded by her sense of guilt at being childless but he assures 
Kroll that his sister was always treated with the greatest delicacy by himself 
and Rebekka: she was never burdened with his ongoing spiritual crisis, nor 
was she given access to the literature Rebekka had concerning the proper 
function of marriage.38 He and Rebekka had absolutely no part in her 
decision to take her own life. Here again we feel that Rosmer's confidence is 
dangerous. He has already admitted to his sexual rejection of Beate and 
therefore must acknowledge some part in her unhappiness. 
Kroll then makes the devastating revelation that "den stakkers, 
forpinte og oversp~ndte Beate gjorde ende pa sit eget liv for at du skulde fa 
leve lykkelig, - fa leve fritt og - efter din lyst" (2.378 - italics mine). Here the 
notion of lykke continues to call up a sense of quiet contentment, shored up 
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by a sense of freedom and self-determination, unhampered by any sense of 
marital pligt, the duty Beate felt she had to release Rosmer from. Rosmer is 
horrified by the suggestion that Beate sacrificed herself so that he might 
marry Rebekka and live happily as the father of her child. Beate's sacrifice 
can be interpreted within Utilitarian terms as an attempt to diminish 
burdens and maximise benefits. It can be reduced to such a calculation, and 
it is possible that Beate had come to see herself in these impersonal terms. 
Rosmer is perplexed as to why Kroll should have kept these 
confidences to himself for so long, and why he had never cast any aspersions 
on the nature of his co-habitation with Rebekka. Kroll explains that he had 
had no idea until the previous evening that Rosmer and Rebekka were a 
"frafalden mand" and a "frigjort kvinde" (2.380). It is in response to this 
reactionary labelling that Rosmer articulates a basic premise of his new-
found belief in the natural morality and perfectibility of the human being: 
"Du tror altsa ikke at der hos frafaldne og frigjorte mennesker kan findes 
renhedssind? Du tror ikke, de kan ha' s~delighedskravet i sig som en 
naturtrang?" (2.380). This concept arose during the Enlightenment when the 
perfectibility of mankind ceased to be the exclusive property of God. The 
terms of Rosmer's new beliefs thus have their origins both in Christianity 
and bourgeois morality: renhedsind - purity, the opposite of sin, so 
fundamental to Christianity, and SCEdelighedskrav - a term of bourgeois 
morality. Perhaps this insistence on purity (sexual purity here) fills a 
vacuum left by his abandoned barndomstro; but it will also receive fuller 
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expression when Rosmer faces his crisis. 
Rosmer's belief in an inborn ethical sensibility is reminiscent of Mill's 
humanism. In On Liberty, Mill asserts, U Among the works of man, which 
human life is rightly employed in perfecting and beautifying, the first in 
importance is surely man him self." 39 It is a secular reformulation of Brand's 
words to Ejnar in Act I: "Frem af disse Sjcelestumper, / af disse Aandens 
Torsoklumper, / af disse Hoder, disse Hcender / et helt skal gaa saa Herren 
kjender / sin Mand igjen, sit st0rste Vcerk" (HU V.1.195). Kroll is categorical. 
The only version of perfectibility he will countenance is that available to man 
via God's church: uJeg bygger ikke stort pa den slags scedelighed, som ikke 
har sin rod i kirkens tro" (2.381). 
Now convinced that concupiscence lies at the core of Rosmer's 
apostasy, Kroll concedes that his profoundly unhappy marriage mitigates his 
behaviour to a certain extent, but now, instead of taking Rosmer to task for 
keeping his break with the church to himself, insists that this is a private 
matter and cautions him to keep his opinions within Rosmersholm: UDette 
her er jo en rent personlig sag. Der er da ingen n0dvendighed for at sligt 
rabes ud over hele landet" (2.382). But Rosmer resists this location of his 
apostasy in the sexual, private realm, and still convinced of his integrity, is 
determined to collapse the distinction between the private and the public 
man and be transparent He declares it a necessity for him to declare himself 
pUblicly, to ukomme ud af en falsk og tvetydig stilling" (2.382). Kroll 
considers this a violation of his pligt, both to the traditions of Rosmersholm, 
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"den rosmerske familjetanke" and to the people; to do so would provoke 
confusion, "en usalig, en ubodelig forvirring" - miserable, irreparable 
confusion (2.382). 
But for Rosmer, his duty to "~nde lidt lys og glCEde her, hvor slCEgten 
Rosmer har skabt m0rke og tyngsel gennem aIle de lange, lange tider" 
(2.382) trumps this imputed duty. He considers it his overriding duty to 
cancel out the effect of the "rosmerske familjetanke" (2.382), even though he 
is more temperamentally suited to the role of the man of contemplation, 
despite the fact that, as Kroll points out (or perhaps because of it) he is the 
last in the line. There is never any suggestion that there might be 
regeneration through progeny in this work, either from Rosmer or 
Rebekka.40 Rosmer insists that his duty lies not only in intellectual inquiry 
but " .. . jeg viI nu med i livsstriden en gang, jeg ogsa" (2.382), again in 
defence of his principles and of his integrity. By now Brendel has been 
reduced to a muted echo by the tension and antagonism of this scene. Kroll 
defines this battle as one to the death, and when his archenemy Mortensgard 
is announced suddenly, he jumps to conclusions and declares his weapons -
knives, not the noble weapons that Rosmer had pleaded for in the previous 
act. 
Mortensgard's visit to Rosmersholm mIrrors that of Kroll's the 
previous day. Like Kroll he has come to co-opt Rosmer to lend moral 
authority to his political publication. Like Kroll he warns Rosmer against 
going public with his apostasy, as it is his identification with the church and 
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tradition that makes him invulnerable on a personal level. Rosmer is 
characteristically undeterred, and once again insists on his unimpeachable 
integrity: "Jeg f0ler mig usarlig pa alle personlige omrader, herr 
Mortensgard. Min vandel lar sig ikke angribe" (2.387). But like Kroll, 
Mortensgard also has information from Beate which calls for a revaluation of 
Beate's suicide. He warns Rosmer that he will become a marked man if he 
goes public with his apostasy: "De ma huske pa, De er ikke nogen fredlyst 
mand herefterdags" (2.390). 
The combination of these two visits, from both left and right, radical 
and reactionary, has finally led to a crisis in Rosmer's seemingly 
unshakeable confidence. It is as though he has had a double curse visited 
upon him, and is confronted with a riddle - "m011efossens gade" as Kroll 
terms it - which is to supplant his previously declared quest, that of 
ennobling souls. This has left him utterly demoralised. A perceptible loss of 
faith in his fellow men has also taken place; for the first time Rosmer 
condemns the "ra sind" and "u~dle 0jne" (2.392) of those who seek to sully 
the purity of his relationship with Rebekka with innuendo. Kroll and 
Mortensgard have each in turn through their anxiety to appropriate the 
Rosmer name for political ends reduced him to a sign of inherited, 
institutionalised respectability, in short everything he rejects, and then 
threaten him, in parallel, with becoming a sign for the opposite if he fails to 
toe the line. They have crushed and demoralised him by closing off all 
avenues of self-expression. Deprived of his freedom and his peace of mind, 
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he finds himself without a centre. He is left with the irony that the only 
moral authority he has derives not from his own integrity, but from the very 
values he has deserted. He now has to confront the intolerable gap between 
the image of the man he seems to be and the man he thought he was, as well 
as the emergence of a worse self. 
6.3.2 Den stille, glade skyldfrihed 
Rebekka's role for the rest of the act is clearly defined. She uses all her 
powers of persuasion to try to halt Rosmer's descent into doubt and despair 
and to prevent him from resurrecting Beate with any identity that might 
conflict with the one they buried her with. It is no longer a mad barren 
woman but a tortured, betrayed, sacrificial victim who threw herself into the 
mill-race out of love for her husband. Rosmer has begun to question his 
conviction that he has no guilt in Beate's decision to jump to her death, and 
the more his doubts increase, the more "uhyggelig levende" (2.392). Beate 
becomes. He now feels the compelling urge to get to the bottom of Beate's 
mental state, "at se til bunds" (2.372). This process begins with the 
realisation that Beate cannot have been blind to the fact that he became so 
lykkelig after Rebekka's arrival at Rosmersholm. He goes on to reconstruct 
Beate's sense of exclusion, jealousy and despair at their relationship. This 
devastates him. Rebekka asks Rosmer if it were in his power, whether he 
would reverse Beate's suicide. He dismisses this suggestion as irrelevant to 
the agony, the agony of confronting what is uigenkaldelig (2.394) - that which 
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in William Chase Greene's words is "beyond recall". And it is at this point 
that Rosmer begins, however slowly, to open himself to tragic possibilities. 
Rosmer has been violently wrested from the realm of future 
possibility and thrust into the grim, implaccable past. Alert to this 
realignment, Rebekka knows that she must rescue Rosmer from despair, and 
thus attempts to switch the focus back to the future and impresses on him 
the importance of starting the new life he had planned: "Du havde gjort dig 
fuldt fri - til aIle sider. Du f01te dig sa glad og sa let -." She returns to scenes 
of intimacy between them, which had laid the foundations for this 
emancipation: 
REBEKKA. Hvor dejlig det var nar vi sad der 
nede i stuen i m0rkningen. Og vi sa hjalp hinanden at 
lCEgge de nye livsplaner til rette. Du vilde gribe ind i 
det levende liv, - i dagens levende liv, - som du sa'. Du 
ville ga som en frig0rende gCEst fra det ene hjem til det 
andet. Vinde sindene og viljerne for dig. Skabe 
adelsmennesker rundt omkring, - i videre og videre 
kredse. Adelsmennesker. 
ROSMER. Glade adelsmennesker. (2.394) 
Rosmer insists that it is gliEde, joy which ennobles. Rebekka asks 
whether smerte, pain, cannot achieve the same thing. These two poles, pain 
and joy, have enjoyed a long philosophical tradition, from Aristotle to 
Bentham to Nietzsche. Rosmer replies that pain has an ennobling capacity 
only if overcome, and in his case the pain is insurmountable because his 
guilt is intractable. This is the first test Rosmer faces. It would be natural for 
him at this point to seek sanctuary in his "barnetro", but he does not This is 
evidence that his breach with his Christian faith is a substantial one. There is 
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no potential here for forgiveness, and this fact opens up the unbridgeable 
gap between moral and tragic guilt, between sin and hamartia. 
I will return to the issue of tragic guilt, but at this point the basic 
conflict is between glc£de and smerte. The former ennobles, the latter destroys. 
This reveals a distinct fragility at the core of glC£de, which for Rosmer lies 
within a prelapsarian structure that is all too easily disillusioned. The doubt 
that has taken root in his mind is invincible and will always function as an 
obstacle between him and "det som g0r livet sa vidunderlig dejligt at leve 
[ ... ] Den stille, glade skyldfrihed" (2.395). This foregrounding of innocence 
as a definitive mental state version of happiness has an alienating effect on 
Rebekka; she reacts physically by taking a step back, the first direct 
intimation of her guilt. Still determined to keep Rosmer from being crushed 
under the hooves of the white horses, whom they both hear approaching, she 
insists that the only way he can conquer them is by creating new conditions 
for living, "at skabe nye forhold", in short, become a man of action: "leve, 
virke, handle. Ikke sidde her og gruble og ruge over ul0selige gader" (2.395). 
Rebekka is trying to replace Rosmer's mental state version with a goal-
directed mode of existence. Action instead of being. Rosmer's ontological 
formulation, "if you are x, you will be happy" for "if you do y, you will be 
happy". 
Rebekka is clearly alert to the vulnerability of the mental state version 
of Rosmer's happiness. Once disturbed it is difficult to re-establish and 
seems inadequate to sustain any material dislocations. This is why she urges 
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him to create new circumstances and, moreover, to act, instead of losing 
himself in guilty thought. 
This leads Rosmer to re-evaluate his platonic friendship with 
Rebekka, which for him had represented the ideal of a chaste relationship 
between man and woman, "det som binder os sa inderligt til hinanden, - vor 
fCElles tro pa et rent samliv mellem mand og kvinde" (2.396). He states that 
this condition (and he repeats his formula for happiness expressed earlier to 
Kroll, "stille, lykkelig fred" (2.396» is best suited to times of peace and 
harmony, but now that he is literally fighting for his life, his emancipation 
and freedom, he needs to establish a new reality as a base from which to 
conduct this struggle. He astonishes Rebekka by asking her to become "min 
anden hustru" (2.396).41 This results in what is arguably one of the most 
famous moments on the Ibsen stage: 
REBEKKA (et kJyeblik mdllkJs, skriger op i glcede). 
Din hustru! Din - ! Jeg! 
ROSMER. Godt Lad os pr0ve det. Vi to viI VCEre 
et. Her rna ikke lCEngere sta noget tomt rum efter den 
d0de. 
REBEKKA. Jeg - i Beates sted - ! 
ROSMER. Sa er hun ude av sagaen. Helt ude. 
For evig og altid. 
REBEKKA (sagte og bcroende). Tror du det, 
Rosmer? (2.397) 
Rosmer's response is a departure from the rational responses he has 
been giving so far. It foreshadows the words and intensity of the suffering of 
Halvard Solness,42 trying to correct an intolerable situation through willing: 
Det rna ske! Det rna! Jeg kan ikke, - jeg vil ikke 
ga igennem livet med et lig pa ryggen. HjCElp mig at 
kaste det af, Rebekka. Og lad os sa kVCEle aIle mindelser 
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i frihed, i fryd, i lidenskap. Du skal vcere for mig den 
eneste hustru, jeg nogen sinde har havt (2.397) 
Rosmer is now stepping out of the past, in a desperate attempt to 
foreclose tragedy by erasing the past through a deluded project of stifling 
memory in freedom, joy and, suddenly, passion. This may at first appear to 
be an attempt to recapture innocence, but one of the organising principles of 
his happy innocence was the freedom from passion - he later describes his 
relationship with Rebekka as "denne stille, glade, begcerl0se lyksalighed" 
(3.406). His wish to escape the riddle of the mill-race is so intense that he is 
confounding all the terms of his vision and using them to avoid confronting 
himself. He does not realise how utterly absurd this proposition is because 
memory, where it represents truth, cannot be thus stifled without 
compromising the very values he wishes to enlist In trying to avert tragedy, 
Rosmer perverts his vision. 
Although Rebekka refuses to join him in this attempt to stifle the past, 
she does not wish to confront it either, for reasons which will become 
apparent in the following acts. This is evident from the fact that her 
inexplicable withdrawal from Rosmer results in a linguistic regression into 
the suicide euphemism established in the first act Rebekka threatens to "ga 
den vej, som Beate gik", showing a resistance to uncovering truth. 
Rosmer, prompted by the facts revealed to him by Kroll and 
Mortensgard, has experienced his peripeteia. His quest, to ennoble his fellow 
men has turned into a riddle, not only on the level that Kroll suggests 
"n10llefossens gade" but also in the tragic sense. Like Oedipus, Rosmer sees 
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himself as the one whose duty it was to save an ulykkelig land, but is 
subsequently consumed by the riddle of who killed Laius/Beate. Rosmer 
resists the task of solving the riddle, because ultimately, like Oedipus's 
riddle, it is the riddle of identity, and it reaches beyond questions of fact. 
The riddle of the mill-race extends beyond Beate's suicide and establishes 
itself firmly in Rosmer's conscience as the riddle of identity itself. The riddle, 
unlike the problem, admits of no solution; rather initiates a crisis of 
perspective: "The Greeks were drawn to enigmas. But what is an enigma? A 
mysterious formulation you could say. Yet that would not be enough to 
define an enigma. The other thing you have to say is that the answer to an 
enigma is likewise mysterious."43 
Rosmer has been forced to see that Beate's narrative of rejection, loss 
and sacrifice will not submit to his logic of mad desperate action, and to see 
til bunds as part of him feels he now must, will involve a similar loss for him: 
the loss of the sense of an unimpeachable moral self. This, in combination 
with the demoralising effect Kroll and Mortensgard have had on him, instils 
a debilitating terror in Rosmer. 
6.4 Act ill 
6.4.1 Lykke for alle 
Act ill opens in the same way as Act I, with Madam Helseth and 
Rebekka alone on stage. But this time their function is not to build up 
interest in Rosmer. The focus is clearly on Rebekka. What Rosmer says is 
219 
now processed through Rebekka, or seen in relation to Rebekka, not as his 
own beliefs and statements. Kroll's paper Amtstidenden has published a 
malicious article pouring vitriol on Rosmer, condemning him as an 
unprincipled, wanton opportunist, without actually mentioning him by 
name. Rosmer has thus gone from being the guarantor of morality to 
pariah.44 His peripeteia culminates in public ostracism. Rosmer is outraged 
that Kroll should turn on him in such a cowardly and spiteful fashion. He 
feels it imperative that this kind of action is curtailed, as the consequences 
will be dire: 
Her rna bringes redning. AU, hvad godt er i 
menneskene, gar tilgrunde, hvis dette far yare ved. 
Men det skal det ikke! [ ... ] Teenk, om jeg kunde veekke 
dem til selverkendelse. Bringe dem til at angre og til at 
skamme sig for sig selv. Fa dem til at neerme sig 
hverandre i fordragelighed, - i kcerlighed, Rebekka. 
[ ... ] Jeg synes det matte kunne lykkes. A, hvilken fryd 
det da vilde bli' at leve livet Ingen hadefuld strid mer. 
Bare kappestrid. AIle 0jne rettede mod det samme mal. 
AIle viljer, aIle sind stevnende fremad, - opad, - enhver 
ad sin egen naturn0dvendige vej. Lykke for aIle, - skabt 
igennem aIle (kommer til at se ud i det fri, farer sammen og 
siger tungt:) Ah! Ikke gennem mig. (2.405) 
This speech is crucial. Not only does it reiterate the position Rosmer 
had put before Kroll in Act I, that it was his moral imperative to intervene in 
a situation where hatred was being preached, but it also reaffirms Rosmer's 
vision in a more affirmative mode than before of a peaceful creative concord 
of men striving for a better nobler world, suggested by fremad - opad, and his 
programmatic standard of universal happiness - lykke for aIle and tolerance, 
fordragelighed. This suggests a Rousseauistic organic society composed of a 
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single will, a "volonte generale." Moreover, it pulls together a central notion 
in his philosophy, namely that innocence is the sine qua non of happiness. For 
a man who has been trying to lead a transparently blameless existence, the 
knowledge that he is not innocent is almost too terrible to bear. But the irony 
is that Rosmer's own desire to bring others to "selverkendelse" is recoiling 
against him - it is he who is in desparate need of self-knowledge, and is 
vulnerable to regret and shame too. Lykke now comes to stand in opposition 
to guilt, and is thus posited within the Christian ethics Rosmer claims to 
have left behind: "Lykke, - k~re Rebekka, - lykke, det er f0rst og fremst den 
stille, glade, trygge fedelse af skyldfrihed" (3.405). Hjalmar Brenel was one of 
the earliest critics to respond to this aspect 
I Rosmersholm betyder lyckan och gHidjen primart 
skuldfrihel Dramat utvecklar ett av de mest centrala 
lyckobegreppen i Ibsens diktning. Framstallningen 
fragar efter och soker gladje och lycka i allman och 
obestamd mening, men den faststaller samvetets lycka 
och skuldfrihetens sasom betingelse for tillagnelsen av 
varje annan lycka. I bestamningen av den positiva 
sjalsforfattningens art ar den konkreta livsskildringen 
noggrannare an den teoretiska argumenteringen.45 
For the first time Rosmer introduces the concept of security into the 
equation, which serves to underline his sense of radical insecurity in the face 
of experience he is unable to master. Rosmer explains that he has come to 
realise that Beate must have been jealous of his intimacy with Rebekka. This 
friendship is described as something approaching lykke itself: "Det var hos 
deg jeg f01te denne stille, glade, beg~rl0se lyksalighed" (3.406). Love 
without passion, which he variously labels "barneforelskelse" and" andeligt 
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cegteskab" (3.406). Rosmer's rhetoric has moved into very Christian territory, 
nuancing lykke with lyksalighed 'blessedness', and making innocence a 
function of chastity.46 Although Rosmer has not committed adultery in the 
technical sense, he has come to recognise a crime against Beate's love for him 
and its part in her suicide. The riddle of the mill-race may even be Rosmer's 
crack in the chimney; it is not unthinkable that he may have subconsciously 
wished Beate dead. He acknowledges the crime on his hands (" det er br8de 
hos mig" - another example of the Christian straddling the secular, br8de can 
mean both 'sin' and 'crime') and insists on his guilt, even when Rebekka 
tries to force him to question his right to a life "i lykke" (3.406-7). 
Rosmer's quest is now closed off to him by guilt, as is the joy that this 
guilt in turn deprives him of. Rebekka repeats the tactic she employed at the 
end of Act II, that is to realign him in the present and the future. Her appeals 
to his previous decision to cut himself free of the bondage of his Rosmer 
heritage, dismissing these doubts as II slcegtstvil, - slcegtsangst, -
slcegtsskrupler" (which she in turn dismisses by direct association with the 
white horses) fail to impress Rosmer. He has reverted to a focus on the 
irrevocable that preceded his marriage proposal of the previous evening. His 
quest is only open to II en glad og skyldfri mand" (3.407). 
6.4.2 The mainspring of morality has been taken away 
Kroll has come to the conclusion that Rebekka is behind Rosmer's 
apostasy and, confident that Rosmer is unable to lead a revolution on his 
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own, he tries to control the problem at its source by confronting Rebekka 
with the fact of her illegitimacy (unbeknownst to Rebekka, Dr West was her 
biological as well as her adoptive father). He does so in the hope that he can 
thereby subdue her sufficiently into settling down into a life of bourgeois 
respectability as the second Fro Rosmer. Kroll is convinced that if he can 
keep Rebekka from her quest of emancipation, Rosmer will be rendered 
harmless and no longer represent any threat to the status quo. 
But Kroll's information regarding Rebekka's parentage has a much 
more disturbing effect on Rebekka than anticipated, and her protests that 
even for a liberated woman, questions of age and illegitimacy still rankle, 
fails to satisfy. Freud's reading of Rebekka's horror at the realisation that she 
has unwittingly violated the incest taboo is perhaps the most compelling we 
have.47 If there are parallels with Oedipus in the characterisation of Rosmer, 
the incest motif also aligns Rebekka with Sophocles's hero. Through this 
development Ibsen can distribute the burden of the tragedy between the two 
protagonists and have Rebekka undergo an experience parallel to that of 
Rosmer's in the previous act a collapse of identity. Moreover, this 
knowledge suggests that the man who had tutored her in progressive 
morality had only sexual self-interest at heart and was in fact a cynical 
manipulator, of one style with Brendel but of more dangerous substance. 
This also peels back a further level of perception: just as she had been used 
by Dr West to further his own interests in the name of freethinking, she has 
similarly used Rosmer. The result is that she like Rosmer has been deprived 
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of her confidence in her identity, and this loss leads to immense suffering in 
her case too. 
However, Rebekka devotes her energies not to self-realignment but to 
realigning Rosmer. After ceremoniously burning the slanderous pages of 
Kroll's newspaper, Rebekka begins her confession. She outlines a brief moral 
biography beginning with her move to the area from the wild reaches of 
Finnmark with her adoptive father, Dr West She describes the effect her 
new surroundings had on her with the wonder of a Miranda face to face 
with a brave new world - "en ny, stor, vid verden" (3.416). She wanted to 
participate in the changing times and mores the doctor had taught her about 
and set her sights on Rosmer as her partner in moral emancipation. The only 
obstacle was Rosmer's marriage. "Men jeg sk0nte godt, hvor frelsen var for 
dig. Den eneste frelse. Og sa handled jeg" (3.417). 
As the play progresses and as the tension mounts, Rebekka, 
interestingly, increasingly mirrors Rosmer in her use of Christian 
vocabulary. Frelse is a distinctly religious category; redde would have been a 
more neutral expression. She absolves Rosmer of all guilt concerning Beate's 
suicide, insisting "Det var mig, som lokked -, som kom til at lokke Beate ud 
pa de vildsomme veje - " (3.417). She then details the progress of this 
process, how she gave Beate carefully selected pieces of information of 
varying degrees of veracity in order to destabilise her already unhappy 
world, and encouraged the belief in her that as a barren woman she had no 
'right' of abode at Rosmersholm, and it was her 'duty' to yield her position 
22-l 
to a fertile woman.48 
To justify her actions, Rebekka resorts to a brutal version of the 
felicific calculus: "Jeg syntes at her var to liv at velge imellem" (3.419). She 
gives a very actuarial account of the rationale for her choice: with Beate out 
of the way, two people would be happy, a definite "maximisation of 
happiness" in Utilitarian terms. But Rebekka's project is flawed. Not only on 
the grounds that in Kroll's view she was playing God, but it also falters on 
what is one of the most serious objections to Utilitarianism. John Rawls calls 
this the "separateness of persons" objection. Rawls argues that the calculus 
that would align the distribution of benefits and burdens into a net total 
seeks to organise the "desires of one person into one coherent system of 
desire; it is by this construction that many persons are fused into one. [ ... ] 
Utilitarianism does not take seriously the distinction between persons."49 It 
is this lack of regard for the separateness of persons, which clears the way 
for an overly rationalistic, naturalistic ethics. Taking the standard of the 
maximisation of pleasure to extremes can offer no means of evaluating 
certain taboo moral actions as impermissible, only in the sense that they 
might produce a net loss of happiness. As Stuart Hampshire explains: 
For a strict Utilitarian ... the horror of killing is only the 
horror of causing other losses, principally of possible 
happiness; in cases where there are evidently no such 
losses, the horror of killing becomes superstition. And 
such a conclusion of naturalism, pressed to its limits, 
does produce certain vertigo after reflection. It seems 
that the mainspring of morality has been taken away.50 
There is persuasive evidence for reading Rebekka's peculiar 
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brand of manipulative extermination of Beate, Strindbergian sjalamord, 
in these terms. Rebekka tries to offer an account of the nature of her 
moral conflict, and she does so in very distinct terms. Firstly she rejects 
Kroll's interpretation of her as a cold, calculating individual. Secondly, 
she gives her first intimation that she has experienced some kind of 
moral sea-change: "Jeg var da ikke slig, dengang, som nu, da jeg star og 
fortceller det" (3.419). Thirdly, she gives a very reasoned statement of 
her version of human action, which is directed by U to slags vilje" 
(3.419). While she openly admits that she wanted Beate out of the 
picture, at all costs, she never imagined that this could ever be 
accomplished. Yet there was an insistent compulsion forever driving 
her to "friste et bitte lidet gran til. Bare et eneste et. Og sa et til- og altid 
et til. - Og sa kom det" (3.419). The necessity she was under is 
communicated by the formulation uJeg matte friste" (3.419). 
The audience is as horrified as Rosmer and Kroll are at the confession 
that Rebekka in full consciousness drove Beate to her watery grave. 
However, when Rosmer exits in the company of Kroll, there is no sense of 
relief or restored balance. What is important here is to distinguish between 
the Rebekka of the Beate narrative and the Rebekka who confesses to her 
part in Beate's death. She makes it clear that she is no longer identifiable 
with that version of her self; she could hardly expect any material advantage 
from her confession. This act has to be seen as an act of bravery, embracing 
risk and exposing her to an uncertain future; not the sort of calculation that 
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the old Rebekka would ever have entertained. Her declared motive of 
restoring Rosmer's innocence is not in any doubt. She once more intervenes 
in his life. While her first project of emancipation was subsumed under 
personal ambition, this time she intervenes as a response to his suffering, 
which in tum brings on intense suffering in her. That her aim, to restore 
Rosmer's lost innocence, cannot succeed and can bring no closure is clear to 
us as we watch with Rebekka as the departing Rosmer yet again avoids the 
footbridge over the millrace. Rebekka instructs Madam Helseth to pack her 
bags, as she is to leave Rosmersholm. Fear has struck root in her and she 
senses the approach of the white horses, an intimation of death. 
6.5 ActN 
6.5.1 Nu er jeg ble ~t slig 
It is not until the beginning of Act N that we get the full 
measure of Rebekka's suffering. When Rosmer returns it becomes 
evident that Rebekka does not see her return to Finnmark as an escape 
to a new beginning, but as her end. She tells Rosmer that all she can do 
now is "se at fa ende pa det. [ ... ] Rosmersholm har kncekket mig. [ ... ] 
Kncekket mig s0nder og sammen." Rosmersholm has left Rebekka in a 
state of spiritual debilitation with an enfeebled will, once so "frisk og sa 
modig" but now subject to an alien law (4.424). 
Rosmer tells her that he has made peace with Kroll and his circle 
and that Kroll has made him realise that he was not cut out for the 
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(pointless) task of ennobling his fellow men. The accusation that 
follows on the announcement that he has abandoned his quest, that 
Rebekka had never really believed in him and had only been 
manipulating him for her own ends, reveals how central Rebekka was 
to his quest, and now that he has lost faith in her, he cannot hold onto 
his faith in his vision. Rebekka was Rosmer's guarantor, just as Kroll's 
is the church. 
Rebekka insists that he sit down and listen to her one last time, 
as she claims that she has left out the most significant part of her 
confession. It is true that she had come to Rosmersholm with the sole 
purpose of establishing herself there, confident in the strength of her 
will to achieve this end. Her courageous free will was still intact at this 
point and nothing threatened to derail her project. Then something 
happened which started to undermine her will: /let vildt, ubetvingeligt 
beg~r" (4.426). Not love, but passion - the reverse image of Rosmer's 
feelings for her. Rosmer is horrified at the source of the energy of her 
actions. Rebekka likens this passion to "et vejr ved havet. Det var som 
et af de vejr, vi kan ha' ved vintertid der nordpcl. Det tar en, - og b~r' 
en med sig, du, - sa langt det skal v~re. Ikke tanke om a sta imod" 
(4.426). The power of Eros demanded both victor and vanquished. Here 
we gain further insight into her previous confession and her insistence 
that her actions were not the result of cold calculation. Rebekka's 
passion for Rosmer led her into the service of Eros, and it was to Eros 
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that she relinquished control. HIn its grip, Rebekka loses all confidence 
in herself as an autonomous being, self-willed and self-directing. She 
knows now that the rational mind is not always independent of 
irrational impulse."s1 
This confession reveals the tragic protagonist at her most 
vulnerable. She has hitherto been the shrewd calculator of success, lykke 
in the sense of successful purposive action, free of scruple and taboo. 
But coming under the power of desire means that she is at the mercy of 
a force that is stronger than she is. Rosmer cannot understand why then 
she turned down his offer of marriage, when she had him where she 
wanted him, Hfri, - bade i sind og i forhold (4.427)", in response to 
which Rebekka returns to her anatomy of an infected spirit and broken 
will. Durbach argues that the effect of the Rosmer view of life and the 
process of ennoblement she has undergone is parallel to that of her 
description of the effects of Eros, and nomos, the laws of civilisation and 
morality visit her in no less physical a manner than Eros. Durbach 
discusses each of Rebekka's statements concerning this process of 
ennoblement thus: 
There is a destructive kinetic energy... a lived-through 
sensation of the body racked by physically aggressive 
forces - broken, smashed, im prisoned, infected by 
disease, and sapped of strength. But the rending is also 
metaphysical, spiritual, sexual, a complete 
psychosomatic collapse ... Magtstjalet, 'paralyzed', also 
conveys a sense of psychic enervation, impotence, loss 
of vital energy. Stcpkket, 'imprisoned', - a clipping of 
wings, the soul crippled in flight Eros brought down. 
And the entire threnody of loss cries out against a 
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draining away of begja?r, of I sexual passion', a grief 
even more intense than Rebekka's lament over her lost 
existential autonomy.52 
It is, moreover, this U draining away of begja?r" which vacates the 
spiritual space for Rosmer's ideal of U denne stille, glade, begCErl0se 
lyksalighed" (3.406), a variant of his fundamental tenet of guiltless 
happiness. 
V an Laan is right to insist on the importance of the tension in 
Rebekka's narrative: uThe experience she is describing is obviously one 
that requires two sharply conflicting languages for its representation, 
one for which no single signifier is adequate".53 On the one hand she 
describes the slow, silent almost imperceptible process of ennoblement 
that has taken place in her, the result of living in proximity to Rosmer 
and his gentle, noble mind, which displaced this U stygge, sansedrukne 
begCEr" opening her up to uden store, forsagende kCErlighed" (4.428). 
Then her narrative shifts into a wholly different gear without warning, 
replacing descriptions of peace, tranquillity and calm with notions of 
sickness, enfeeblement and decay. Van Laan points to the weight that 
has been accorded Rebekka's attempt to summarise the conflict into the 
statement that the urosmerske livssyn adler. Men [ ... J det drCEber 
lykken" (4.429). He cautions against allowing this statement to 
crystallise Rebekka's experience, arguing that to do so would be to 
accept 
a reduction of [ ... J complexity [ ... J into the sort of 
formula that crushes what it seeks to grasp. When 
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Rosmer again asks her to marry him, she is much more 
successful in summing up her experience as a whole in 
a formula of the kind tragedy readily accommodates: 
I det er jo det forfcerdelige, at nu, da al livets lykke 
bydes mig med fulde hcender, - nu er jeg ble't slig, at 
min egen fortid stcenger for mig' (4.429).54 
This statement of her transformation, "nu er jeg ble't slig", 
insists that not only has she undergone a change, but that this has been 
accompanied by a parallel redefinition of her ends. Lykke to the pre-
Rosmer Rebekka must have named a very different nexus of values and 
associations from what it suggests to the Rebekka who stands before 
Rosmer now, unable to derive joy from her original goals. To the old 
Rebekka, lykke represented success and rational action directed toward 
that success, but neither she nor Rosmer adequately admitted the 
power of chance and the room for errancy in this view of life. 
The dynamics of the last act are such that they permit neither 
Rosmer nor Rebekka to dominate the scene for too long, and just as the 
focus within each speech shifts unremittingly between a discourse of 
ennoblement and a discourse of atrophy, it is relentless in its transfer of 
focus from the one protagonist to the other. 
Rosmer makes a statement of a total loss of faith: a loss of faith in 
his capacity for ennobling mankind; a loss of faith in Rebekka and a 
loss of faith in himself. His disintegration is as total as Rebekka's 
because her collapse involves his loss of the guarantor of his own 
vision, one that if not directed by Rosmer, certainly was animated by 
Rebekka. She is one in a line of a lifetime of influences Rosmer has 
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fallen under: the Rosmer tradition; his father; Brendel; Kroll and finally 
Rebekka. They each try in their own way to co-opt Rosmer for their 
own ends. For Rosmer this loss of faith brings with it a concomitant loss 
of a sense of meaning in life. Rebekka, sensing that he is slipping away 
tries to give him faith in life, insisting on its potential for renewal. But 
Rosmer demands proof, proof that Rebekka's claim that he has 
ennobled her is valid, otherwise "Jeg beerer ikke dette tade, - denne 
forfeerdelige tomhed, - dette, - dette" (4.431). This suffering when 
confronting vistas of meaninglessness is mirrored in the collapse of 
Rosmer's language. 
It is at this point when meaninglessness begins to take root at the 
heart of the drama that Ibsen reintroduces illrik Brendel. This episode 
is as extraordinary as it is seemingly unmotivated. Brendel does not 
come to bring any news that will further the action, nor shed any light 
on the quality of the tragic guilt which is being processed at such a 
fervent pitch. He disappears as suddenly as he appears and Rebekka 
and Rosmer do not even discuss his visit. Van Laan's description of 
him as "a proto-expressionist projection of Rosmer's despair" is apt.55 
His words moreover continue the highly schematic patterning from Act 
I in its foreshadowing of Rosmer's decisions. In this scene he asserts an 
extreme nihilism, a "hjemve efter det store ingenting" (4.431), mobilizes 
a sick vision of sacrifice with his chilling description of how the lady of 
the house must willingly sacrifice her ear lobe and little finger. 
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But from a realist perspective, more arresting than this image of 
dismemberment is the sequence which directly follows, which startles 
in its refusal to engage with the Brendel scene and in its reversal of the 
patterning, which hitherto has had Rebekka insisting in moments of 
crisis on the future and the possibility of recovery. Now it is Rosmer 
who suddenly instructs Rebekka to leave Rosmersholm, reassuring her 
that he has provided adequately for her. But what emerges is that 
neither envisages any future. Rebekka is puzzled at Rosmer's reference 
to her future, and he dismisses any notion of a life after" det ynkelige, 
jammerfulde nederlag", having to abandon the battlefield in defeat 
before the battle had truly begun (4.434). And then it is Rebekka who 
resumes the insistence on the future, but it is always the one insisting 
on a future for the other. She urges Rosmer to take up the battle again, 
for it is in his power to ennoble hundreds, even thousands. She is living 
proof of his capacity to do so. 
But Rosmer has lost faith. Rebekka insists on her right to know 
how it is she can release him from doubt and despair, for this lies at the 
heart of her own anxiety. Being able to restore his faith would bring her 
own liberation: "Ved du no get, som kan frikende mig i dine 0jne, da 
krCEver jeg som min ret at du nCEvner det" (4.435). For Rosmer, 
everything turns on Rebekka's willingness to perform the same 
sacrifice as Beate had, "at ga den samme vejen, - som Beate gik" (4.436). 
This would bear witness to her love for him, an ennobling love, and 
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would thereby restore his belief in both his own capacities and in the 
perfectibility of mankind. 
Rebekka agrees, and out of the perspective Rosmer establishes, 
adds the belief in action in a world in which all verbal signs have been 
undermined. Rosmer momentarily regretting his demand tries to 
persuade Rebekka to leave instead, and walk away from madness. But 
Rebekka points out that the only meaning that can be established which 
can justify faith is through action. All words are no more than 
"talemader", and this is why she resists Rosmer's interpretation of her 
death as defeat. "'Det blir ikke noget nederlag.[ ... ] ... jeg er under det 
rosmersholmske livssyn - nu. Hvad jeg har jorbrudt, - det ber det sig at 
jeg soner" (4.437 - italics mine). Her linguistic progress towards a 
Christian-loaded language has been commented on earlier. But, 
ironically, it is at the very moment of her rejection of meaningful 
language that she begins to exploit this moral lexicon to its full, at a 
stage when Rosmer has ceased to do so. Hitherto her personal morality 
had rotated on an axis on which only concepts of happiness and 
freedom (in the sense of freedom from restraint) had been plotted. Now 
she approaches the Christian notions absorbed by Rosmer into his 
secular vision, notably those of guilt and atonement. 
6.5.2 A holde justits selv 
Rosmer makes a parallel approach to Rebekka, not as somebody who 
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has suffered at her hands and is now seeking restitution, but as an equal. He 
tells her that he now submits to their liberated view of life, and they must 
now be wholly self-reliant morally. It is significant that Rosmer does not 
regress into the safety of his Ubarnetro," at this moment, but insists they 
must uholde justits selv", they must assert their own moral discipline. This is 
not a Christian term, neither is it related to justice. Marie Wells draws 
attention to the fact that this phrase is usually mistranslated: 
According to Norsk Riksmiilsordbok 'holde justits' means 
to 'keep order or discipline' and Rosmer's words 'vi far 
se at holde justits selv' are quoted as an illustration of 
that usage. To the best of my knowledge, no English 
translation is true to this meaning, preferring instead to 
emphasise the idea of judgement However, the more 
accurate translation would show more of the influence 
of Rosmer's background. [ ... ] The more accurate 
translation also reflects Rosmer's need to maintain 
moralorder.56 
It is in this phrase ua holde justits selv" that Rosmer's anagnorisis, hitherto 
partial and resisted, reaches its culmination. It expresses a need for nomos, 
for order, to stave off anomie, chaos, lawlessness, and dereliction while at the 
same time making a demand for freedom. It registers a recognition U of the 
banality of the pursuit of happiness for its own sake and the emptiness of a 
life lived in accordance with duty".57 It points to an area that falls outside the 
usual spectrum of responses to culpability, beyond what laws, institutions, 
damaged parties may expect of the agent, to what Bernard Williams calls 
Uwhat the agent demands of himself." - "Here we must turn back again 
from law and philosophy to tragedy, [ ... ] to the mistake at the crossroads".58 
Rebekka is convinced that by dying she can let Rosmer live: "Min 
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bortgang viI frelse det bedste i dig" (4.437). For Rebekka there are only two 
available versions of continued existence: one as a dehumanised sea-troll 
hampering Rosmer's progress, and the other consisting of "a slcebe pa et 
forkr0blet liv" lamenting her lost lykke "som min fortid har forspildt for 
mig" (4.437), again referring to a previous 'self occupying another moral 
space. Rebekka admits no prospect of salvation for herself, either in this 
world or the next, and though she asserts the necessity for atonement for sins 
committed by older versions of the self, this atonement does not define her 
moral horizon. 
Rebekka is slow to appreciate just how much progress Rosmer 
has made towards her. He declares that if she goes to the mill-race, he 
will go with her. For Rebekka it is enough that he accompany her 
across the footbridge and finally conquer his fear. Rosmer takes her 
hand and he performs a symbolic wedding ceremony, after which 
Rebekka declares her intention to perform the action willingly. There is 
good reason to read gladelig as "willingly" in the sense of freely chosen 
action as opposed to a sign of "joy" or any other cognate of happiness.59 
But for Rosmer this marriage was clearly intended to endure until 
death and he goes with Rebekka, insisting on the impossibility of 
knowing, truly knowing, whether this is the best course, or of ever 
really knowing whether they were not in fact being dragged to their 
death by the white horses. The only certainty there is, says Rosmer is 
that this is the only course. 
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The progress leading up to the final leap into death, performed 
gladelig, is rapid. It involves the total breakdown of identities of the two 
protagonists, not in the sense previously encountered of the 
disintegration of the moral self, but through a complete and deliberate 
merging of identities. The distinction between degj jeg, both as 
concerns the distribution of blame, and in the sense of independent 
agency, collapses. Who leads and who follows? Ibsen is at pains to 
make this willing leap a voluntary, willing action that truly belongs to 
them both, rather than the result of the will of the one subduing the 
other. "For nu er vi to et" (4.438). 
Theoharis C. Theoharis argues that Rebekka's death is a 
capitulation to oppression and that Rosmer's is inauthentic. Rebekka, 
he argues, however defeated, 
still has enough freedom to ask if Rosmer is dying 
under the authority of illusion and remorse instead of 
enacting his own self-transcendence. His indifference to 
the problem, his easy yielding to conventionally 
aggrandising notions of destiny, make this death 
unambiguously inauthentic.60 
To claim that there is anything "unambiguous" about Ibsen's tragic 
theatre is to chart perilous waters; to claim that the death of one of his 
protagonists is unambiguous is to ignore the subtlety of Ibsen's 
dramatic portraiture. Theoharis has a very specific agenda which leads 
him to his reductive closed reading of the play, but nevertheless, it is 
hard to see in what way Rosmer is "indifferent" to this question. It is at 
this point that he is at his most clear-sighted, that he begins to 
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appreciate what it means to see "helt til bunds". What he perceives here 
is the impossibility of truly knowing, and that is the only response 
proper to this tragic insight, which he had been resisting through his 
certainties, his rationality and his demands for proof. 
With a structural harmony that has been sustained throughout, 
the play returns to Madam Helseth at the end, standing at the window 
observing the leap to death. Her reading of the suicide besides being a 
function of the drama to relate the deaths is an example of what 
Durbach has defined as the "temptation to err": In his dramas of 
contemporary life, Ibsen often gives the last word to a character who 
remains outside the pull of the tragic field and who will give the tragic 
finale the most limited, reductive reading possible. Another example is 
Brack, whose unconscionable banality codas Hedda Gabler's suicide. In 
Durbach's view this is Ibsen throwing down the gauntlet to his 
a udiences and readers, defying them to take the restricted bourgeois 
view and miss the tragedy altogether.61 Madam Helseth's jUdgement, 
"Salig fruen tok dem" (4.439) silences her cries for help and could 
reduce Rosmersholm to a moralistic drama of retribution. But it posits 
another essential question: what is the difference between Beate's and 
Rebekka's sacrifice? Beate's suicide can be reduced to the felicific 
calculus. There is nothing heroic about allowing the self to be absorbed 
into an equation and cancelled out by that equation. Beate's was a 
suicide of effacement. Rebekka's suicide is a more positive action: it 
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acknowledges the impossibility of calculating happiness, and the 
impossibility of seeing the past as inactive and manageable. 
But in what does the tragedy inhere? First of all, if we consider 
those aspects of the play which renew the tradition, I think we must 
concur with Van Laan that Ibsen's achievement in writing a dual 
tragedy consists in his turning the tradition of high tragedy on its head 
by giving us a hero, the aristocrat Rosmer, who is invested with the 
stature demanded by many as prerequisite for a tragic hero, but who, 
at the same time, is almost disqualified from the tragic through his very 
aristocratic nature which proves an impediment to assertive action. But 
it is not only the formal requirement of a well-born hero with influence 
that Rosmer fulfills. It is important to remember that the Rosmer line 
dies with Rosmer, and Rebekka's lineage is not perpetuated. Thus there 
is a clear sense of an order dying with them. Furthermore, this move of 
Ibsen's is compounded when he pairs Rebekka off with Rosmer, an 
unlikely tragic figure of humble background, dubious origin, and even 
more dubious morals, and places a burden of action on her. Van Laan's 
analysis opens up much richer vistas on the play than the Brendelian 
readings of Chamberlain et a1. discussed above. 
But more central to the core of the tragedy is its treatment of the 
lykke problem. As Edvard Beyer points out, this is the first tragedy (and 
arguably the only tragedy) Ibsen wrote that takes lykke as its central 
theme, not simply as a tragic co-ordinate. Both characters feel that they 
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can master experience through mastering lykke through an assertive 
Utilitarianism. The reasons for the collapse of their life-plan based on 
the felicific calculus does point to inherent flaws in Utilitarianism itself, 
but the ultimate reason for their failure is that they try to order 
experience without admitting the power of forces which lie beyond 
themselves. These forces can subdue, overwhelm and ultimately 
destroy, and include the other side of lykke - contingency, what Martha 
Nussbaum calls uthe internal ungoverned tuche of the passions," 
whether acted upon or sublimated.62 Happiness, seen only as success 
and satisfaction, is doomed and too thin to account for what is 
important in life. 
Both Rosmer's abstracted happiness and Rebekka's goal-directed 
happiness fail to admit of two important areas of moral luck, 
'situational' moral luck, that is what one has to confront in life, and 
'executive luck', how one's projects tum out. It is in the space between 
situational and executive luck that the gap between the sort of person 
we are and the sort of person we want to be is revealed, and the 
elusiveness of happiness is thrown into relief.63 And it is in this space 
too that tragic man gets the measure of himself as one who uoscillates 
between being the equal of the gods and the equal of nothing."64 
The tragic power of this work resides in its representation of 
what is indomitable and unknowable in human experience: Triumph 
modulates into suffering; Eros into agape; innocence into guilt; 
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happiness into misery; victory into defeat; life into death. It is Ibsen's 
achievement that this scale of action overcomes the limits of naturalism 
and leaves the tragic experience intact 
In Rosmersholm, the white horses are introduced as a 
counterweight to the over arching desire for a rational ordering of 
experience. This superstition, though muted in the play, shows a 
residual belief in the supernatural, and a recourse to it as an aide to 
organising experience. In Bygmester Solness, which we now turn to, the 
supernatural and notions of contingency resurface only to dominate the 
thoughts of the play's hero to an extent comparable to the hold of the 
gottliche Gegensatz of the early plays. 
2·ll 
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The smell of luck; it hangs on him like a coat-
Arthur Miller, The Man Who Had All the Luck 
Chapter VII 
Bygmester Solness: Lykke as Compensatory Fictionl 
7.1.1 Introduction 
Barry Jacobs writes of Ibsen's tragedy of 1892, "The Master Builder is one 
of the most profound statements about lykke in modern drama".2 Indeed, in no 
other play by Ibsen does the word lykke and its cognates resonate more fully 
than in this one. However, Bygmester Solness is less a continuation of the 
conscious quest for happiness dramatised in Rosmersholm than a new 
departure within the nutidsdramaer, which finds more parallels in the early 
plays than it does with Et Dukkehjem, Gengangere and Rosmersholm. 
In Bygmester Solness there is a return to the presentation of the 
compulsive hero, temporarily suspended in these three plays: Nora's quest for 
truth arises through the action; Fru Alving's quest develops in parallel with 
the events of her life; Johannes Rosmer and Rebekka West similarly do not 
bear tragic features independently of the narratives of their lives. These 
characters are forced to confront very bad situationalluck.3 In this sense they 
are atypical within Ibsen, for there is a clear family resemblance between 
Catilina, Fru Inger, Hj0rdis, Skule, Julian and Brand, Solness and Borkman, 
who have in common the necessary identity we discussed in Chapter m. 
Here we seem to have come full-circle. In Chapter W, we noted how 
Ibsen conflated notions of contingency with a philosophical naturalism, 
clearing the way for a secular modern tragedy. The emphasis in all three plays 
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was on happiness-Iykke rather than contingency-Iykke. Part of this involved the 
embrace of the ordinary, which in turn relocated the tragic in ordinary 
characters, demanding the extraordinary from the ordinary. Although in 
Bygmester Solness both setting and hero are still unambiguously bourgeois, the 
tragic experience reaches beyond realism for its expression and returns to 
concepts of contingency, so absent from the previous three plays discussed. 
These concepts are manifested as extra-human forces, mythological 
elements and an encounter with God himself. On a dramatic level it would 
appear at first sight that Ibsen's secularisation of tragedy has lost its strenuous 
hold on the material to such an extent that, to quote Gerd, there "myldrer 
baade Trold og Draug"(3.261). 
But it is not enough simply to point out this apparently retrogressive 
act on Ibsen's part, of fastening the tragic onto supernatural agencies, or to 
argue as Bruce Bigley does that Et Dukkehjem and Gengangere were ilan 
aberration, welcome or not, in the development from Catilina to Niir vi d8de 
vdgner".4 The question is, why does Ibsen allow the trolls and devils to return 
after a thirty-five year exile? Why does God return after Nora, Fru Alving and 
Rosmer have all dispensed with Him? Is Ibsen inexplicably resacralising his 
tragic art after having so successfully secularised it? Having taught us to read 
the tragic in the ordinary, is he now telling us that we have to unlearn that 
kind of reading and look to previous paradigms once more? 
This chapter will offer a close reading of Bygmester Solness which will 
address these issues and explain why this is not a reversion or a regression but 
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a specifically modern kind of tragedy, the kind defined by Kierkegaard, 
whom we shall turn to presently. While there is a definite return to a pre-
occupation with contingency and the supernatural, they are doing very 
different dramatic work in this play from the early plays. 
Bygmester Solness does not derive its force from its re-presentation of 
human exposure to the kind of fortune that was decisive for Fru Inger, for 
example. The sort of incident luck that pushes the action of an Aristotelian 
tragedy through the stages of peripeteia and anagnorisis is absent in this drama, 
which is composed almost entirely of long, introspective exchanges between 
varying configurations of the dramatis personae.5 Solness's recognition emerges 
as more readily illuminable by the Kierkegaardian measure. 
S0ren Kierkegaard had identified the difference in the status of luck in 
Greek and modern drama as being definitive. Whereas in Greek tragedy, 
recognition is: 
the epic remnant based on a fate in which the dramatic 
action vanishes, and in which it has its dark, mysterious 
source [ ... ] Modern drama has abandoned destiny, has 
dramatically emancipated itself, [ ... ] absorbs destiny in 
its dramatic consciousness. Hiddenness and disclosure, 
then, are the hero's free act, for which he is responsible. 6 
In Aristotle's Poetics, peripeteia and anagnorisis "develop out of the very 
structure of the plof', the life-blood of tragedy: the inevitable and the 
unalterable happened to the hero? Where Aristotle talks of necessity, 
Kierkegaard talks of freedom and responsibility. Whereas Aristotle rests the 
burden of the easing of dramatic tension on the plot, in Kierkegaard's 
formulation this will not be brought about by the motion of any "tightly 
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wound spring" that will "uncoil of itself'.s Rather, the burden of easing 
dramatic tension shifts from the plot to the free acts of the hero. Because of 
this, "recognition" becomes the more active "disclosure" and the hero's 
movement from concealment to revelation becomes an ethical directive. For 
Kierkegaard, tragedy was the ethical dramatic medium par excellence. 
This chapter will argue for the applicability of Kierkegaard's 
description to Bygmester Solness. Offering a reading of the play in the light of 
this view of modern drama's relationship to fate and Kierkegaard's The 
Sickness unto Death (1849), it will consider the dual role of lykke in this work. It 
will examine how Solness uses this notion as his main strategy of concealment, 
how he develops it into a life narrative which is ultimately a fiction to 
compensate for his avoidance of revelation: a compensatory fiction. It will also 
consider how Ibsen himself exploits the notion in order to ask some very far-
reaching questions about common morality, in particular the tensions that the 
demands of the hermetic nature of the life of the artist produce within it. 
7.1.2 Despair 
In Bygmester Solness the metaphysical activity centres around the 
paradox of the artist's calling, which, although essentially creative, demands 
at best the exclusion of those around him, at worst their destruction, if not 
outright extinction. This question of the human cost of an individual's calling 
had been explored in Brand, and indeed, the stage of Bygmester Sol ness, like 
that of Brand, is populated by the dead and the infirm. Brand had formulated 
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his struggle between the competing demands of the human and the divine in 
terms of absolutes: intet eller alt. In Bygmester Solness there is a return to 
religious speculation, but Ibsen's presentation of the precise nature of 
Solness's struggle signifies a necessary departure from Brand's doctrine. 
That the individual strive after the ideal of full realisation of his 
potential, that he be in the words of Peer Gynt, himself, responding to his 
livskald, not in isolation but in full consciousness of his responsibility to those 
around him, constitutes the Uhighest moral norm postulated by Ibsen's 
drama"9. However, this imperative loses all practical application when the 
hero has actively rejected the ideal, and indeed any notion of the absolute. 
Solness has rebelled against God; he describes how at Lysanger, ten 
years earlier, he had overcome his vertigo to wreathe the steeple of the last 
church he built and had made a declaration of independence from the 
Almighty, announcing a new phase in his building work: 
SOLNESS. [ ... ] Her nu her, du mcegtige! 
Herefterdags viI jeg vcere fri bygmester, jeg ogsa. Pa mit 
omrade. Ligesom du pa dit Jeg viI aldrig mere bygge 
kirker for dig. Bare hjem for mennesker. (3.117) 
The new direction in his creativity represents an exchange of his own 
identity as one U grounded transparently in the power that established it"lO for 
one grounded firmly in his social environment 
It is useful to read this trading of identities in the light of Kierkegaard's 
paradigm of the self, as set out in The Sickness unto Death. In this work, the end 
of human life is identified as eternal life, which can only be gained by direct 
accountability to God. Selfhood is acquired through an acceptance of this 
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ideal: "The more conception of God, the more self; the more self, the more 
conception of God"l1. But what does this selfhood consist in? Kierkegaard 
defines the human being as: 
a synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of the temporal 
and the eternal, of freedom and necessity. [ ... ] A 
synthesis is a relation between two terms. Looked at in 
this way, a human being is not yet a self.12 
The Kierkegaardian self is not to be confused with the relation between 
soul and body; "for then the self would be merely a dependent factor, 
mirroring the interplay of the other two with each other and with the 
environment".13 The human being is "not yet a self' in the strict sense in that 
it cannot "by itself arrive at or remain in total equilibrium and rest." This is 
only possible when the self relates to itself, that is, ilto the power that 
established the whole relation" - God. When a person rebels against the ideal, 
against God, this sin puts him in despair; it is a refusal of the self, for selfhood, 
as we have seen, consists in "standing before God with a conception of God". 
Despair is sickness in that it is an imbalance in the relation described above 
and a choice against health. 
Solness is quite clearly in despair, both in the affective and the 
Kierkegaardian sense. The irony is that his despair is rooted in the very 
victory of his will to autonomy. Having rebelled against the ideal, he can only 
define himself in terms of the temporal, in which he can find no real meaning. 
That he finds his social identity/reputation inadequate, and is longing for the 
affirmation of an identity beyond its stifling confines, is something that is 
stressed when he realises that Hilde (his liberating Valkyrie from another 
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world who offers him an alternative identity of greatness) subscribes to the 
common perception of him as a happy man. He feels almost betrayed. That he 
also mistrusts and finds wanting the discourse of his society is further 
underscored by his constant qualification of statements made by himself and 
others with phrases such as 'That's what people mean', 'That's what people 
say' and ' ... so they say'. This is why he finds Hilde's discourse of kingdoms, 
castles, dreams and trolls so easy to slip into and so liberating. 
Yet, having denied the transcendent source of his artistic calling, he 
impotently clings to his immediate identity as Bygmester, a position he will 
under no circumstances yield. He declares early in Act I, "Men jeg tr~der 
aldrig tilbage! Viger aldrig for nogen! Aldrig frivilligt. Aldrig i denne verden 
gj0r jeg det!" (1.38), and defends his suppression of Ragnar by insisting "Jeg er 
nu engang slig, som jeg er. Og jeg kan da ikke skabe mig om heller!"(1.39).14 
Solness's choice of words is significant here. Instead of saying "I cannot 
change", he employs the language of creation, the power of which he 
attributes to himself in what amounts to a denial of the dialectic structure of 
the self. But finding his temporal self wanting, he resorts to tactics of 
avoidance and subterfuge to compensate for his gnawing sense of 
incom pleteness. 
Solness is seeking sanctuary from the spiritual paralysis which obtains 
from his break with the ideal (a fact that he does not confess until the final 
act), and as the title of this chapter suggests, he is doing so in the concept of 
lykke, which, paradoxically, provides the main structure for his subterfuge, 
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while at the same time exposing it for what it is. Kierkegaard identified the 
excessive reliance on a lykke narrative as characteristic of the man in despair; 
one who has no infinite consciousness of the self, whose "dialectic is: the 
pleasant and the unpleasant; its concepts: good fortune, misfortune, fate" .15 
This identification is articulated by Deianeira in Sophocles's The Women 
ofThracis: "Good fortune and happiness, they must go together".16 
We are dealing, then, not with two separate concepts - luck and 
happiness, but with a close, yet, as we shall see, unstable syzygy of the two. In 
this play Ibsen takes lykke beyond its customary signification and develops a 
complex anaphoric nexus of meanings around it, and involves it in a dramatic 
tension which it cannot ultimately sustain. 
7.2 Lykke 
The concept of lykke is introduced early in Act I by Solness himself, in 
conversation with Dr. Herdal: 
SOLNESS. Sa rna De vel sagtens bilde Dem ind at 
jeg er en sv~rt lykkelig mand da? 
DOKTOR HERDAL. Skulde det bare v~re en 
ind bildning? 
SOLNESS (ler). Nej, nej, - forstar sig! Gud bevar's 
vel! T~nk det, - at v~re bygmester Solness! Halvard 
Solness! Jo, jeg takker, jeg! 
DOKTOR HERDAL. Ja, jeg rna virkelig sige, at for 
mig star det, som om De har havt lykken med Dem i en 
ganske utrolig grad. (1.50) 
Here a preliminary, working definition of lykke is given, but it is one 
that Solness is to refine to such an extent that it fast becomes unworkable. That 
Solness is a happy man is in HerdaI's view obvious, and he defines this 
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happiness in terms of luck, as though luck were conclusive evidence of 
happiness. He thus establishes a luck-happiness equation, the logic of which 
Solness implicitly accepts. A sketch is drawn of a poor country boy whose 
meteoric rise to the pinnacle of his profession was facilitated by a monumental 
stroke of luck, and as the conversation develops, several points about luck are 
brought into relief. 
Firstly, with the identification of the fire at the old house (Solness and 
Aline's first home and Aline's cherished childhood home) as the precipitating 
factor of Solness's professional success, the point is made that luck is a scarce 
resource: one man's good fortune is another's ruin, in this case Aline's 
devastation at the loss of her home. uHun har ikke forvundet det den dag 
idag. Ikke i alle disse tolv-tretten ar" (1.51). 
The second point concerns its unstable and fickle nature. Solness 
confides that he is in a state of fear, and that he is so, precisely because luck 
has played such a decisive role in the history of his career. He is haunted by 
the spectre of a radical reversal of fortune: uOmslaget kommer" (1.51 twice; 
1.66; 2.94). While he sees himself as standing at the top of his field, he also sees 
that he stands on slippery ground, for it was nothing but sheer luck that raised 
him to these heights, and it is luck that will likewise, with almost gravitational 
certainty, topple him. It is the younger generation (personified by his 
apprentice Ragnar Brovik) that will engineer his downfall. Youth will come 
knocking on the door and usa er det slut med bygmester Solness" (1.52). 
Solness, like Deianeira, identifies the dependency of happiness on luck, and 
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also acknowledges that "if we are not blind, we cannot but fear today's success 
may be tomorrow's fall" .17 
However, the kind of oms lag Solness fears could never constitute 
peripeteia in the manner described by Aristotle. Solness is confusing luck with 
the law of nature, according to which the old are inexorably replaced by the 
young. Here he is articulating a fear of both his own mortality and of 
retribution - he had ruined Old Brovik and naturally fears displacement by his 
son Ragnar. 
This is further evidence of Solness clinging to reputation (what 
Kierkegaard calls "keeping hold of the temporal") - for even after Hilde 
arrives and her youth is enlisted on his side, "youth against youth", he 
continues to do everything in his power to thwart Ragnar. His treatment of the 
Broviks is consistent with the behaviour of the man in despair, whom 
Kierkegaard describes as "a king without a country" whose subjects live in 
conditions "where rebellion is legitimate at every moment" .18 
The lykke theme is picked up again in Act IT, but here the focus is clearly 
on a malevolent providence. Solness attempts to persuade Aline that the new 
house he has built for them will compensate for the dreadful emptiness that 
fills their present one. But Aline's grief is too intense for her even to simulate 
belief in this panacea: "FRU SOLNESS (udbrydende i klage). Du kan bygge sa 
meget, du i verden viI, Halvard, - for mig far du aid rig bygget noget rigtigt 
hjem op igen!" (2.70). Incredible though it may seem to Solness, Aline blames 
him neither for the fire nor for her subsequent misery, nor do her words 
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express any resentment concerning the unequal distribution of lykke between 
them. She puts the episode down to a rotten stroke of luck: 
FRU SOLNESS. For med det gamle huset, - med 
det fik det nu endda VCEre som det VCEre vilde. Herregud, 
- nar nu engang ulykken var ude, sa -
SOLNESS. Ja, det har du ret i. Ulykken ra'r en jo 
ikke for, - siges der. (2.71) 
Rather, Aline is blaming herself for failing to stand firm in grief, and even 
asks Solness to try to find it in himself to forgive her. Solness and Aline seem 
to agree on the ineluctability of ulykke, but Aline's relationship with luck is 
much more passive than her husband's. She retreats into the quasi-religious 
discourse of stoical, popular Pietism, insisting that such things as losing one's 
home, health and children are sent to try us, and that she has failed the test. 
That she sees ulykke in religious terms, and its outcomes as a product of 
divine agency is made abundantly clear in a later conversation with Hilde in 
which she attributes the death of the twins to the operations of "en h0jere 
tilskikkelse" - a higher dispensation, and adds, furthermore, that it is one's 
duty to "beje sig under. Og takke til" (3.102). Solness, on the other hand, who 
has so far avoided any overt identification of the locus of luck, sees no such 
need for passive submission, and rails against the apparent injustice of it: 
"(knytter hCEndeme i stille raseri.) A, at sligt noget kan fa lov til at ga for sig 
her i verden!" (2.80). 
At this point, he is detailing the history of the empty nurseries to Hilde, 
and this has led him naturally back to the subject of the fire. Ulykke, just as 
lykke in Act I is presented as a harbinger of both provision and deprivation: 
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HILDE. Var det en svcer ulykke for Dem? 
SOLNESS. Li'som en tar det til. Som bygmester 
kom jeg i vejret pa den branden. (2.79) 
He goes on to explain how after the fire he was able to divide the land 
on which Aline's childhood home had stood into plots, which gave him the 
necessary scope to build exactly what and how he pleased: homes for humans 
instead of the houses of God he had previously restricted himself to. 
Whereas Herdal formulates a luck-happiness equation, Hilde conceives 
of happiness as consisting in autonomy (as indeed had Solness when he broke 
with God) and she never admits luck into the equation. On her view, the 
autonomous individual is the locus of his own happiness, for which he is 
responsible. Because Solness achieved artistic freedom, she concludes, failing 
to identify his despair-in-autonomy, that he "rna visst vcere en svcert lykkelig 
mand" (2.81). Solness is clearly very disheartened to hear this, and the 
familiar Ibsenian device of double repetition leaves no room to doubt that he 
is anything but happy: 
SOLNESS (form0rket). Lykkelig? Sier De ogsa det? 
Ligesom alle de andre. 
HILDE. Ja, for det synes jeg da De rna. Nar De 
bare kunde la'vcere at t:enke pa de to sma barnene, sa -
SOLNESS (langsomt). De to sma bamene, - de er 
ikke sa greje at komme ifra, de, Hilde. 
HILDE (lidt usikker). Star de endnu sa svcert 
ivejen. Sa lange, lange tider bagefter? 
SOLNESS (ser fast pa hende, uten at svare). 
Lykkelig mand, sa' De-
HILDE. Ja, men er De da ikke det, for resten? 
(2.81) 
At this point, the notion of lykke is taken beyond the enabling/ disabling 
duality so far presented, and the highly personal cost of being the recipient of 
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good fortune is stressed. Solness agrees with Hilde that it is a "sv~r lykke" to 
build homes, to provide the setting for scenes of domestic bliss where people 
can live in "tryg og glad fornemmelse af at det er en sv~rt lykkelig ting, det, 
at v~re til i verden. Og mest det, a h0re hverandre til" (2.82). However, 
For at komme til at bygge hjem for andre, matte 
jeg gi' afkald, - for alle tider gi' afkald pa at fa et hjem 
selv. Jeg mener et hjem for barneflokken. Og for far og 
for mor ogsa. [ ... ] Det var prisen for den lykken, som 
folk gar og snakker om. Den lykken, - hm, - den lykken, 
den var ikke billigere at fa, den, Hilde. (2.82) 
According to this narrative, Solness had identified domestic 
architecture as the locus of lykke, but, in order to seize it, he had to sacrifice his 
own domestic happiness. This is the statement of a familiar problem in Ibsen's 
plays. In responding to his calling, the individual inevitably compromises his 
chances of personal happiness. But the question which needs to be addressed 
is how comparable is Solness's narrative with Brand's? Brand too sacrificed 
such a home but, as we shall see, Ibsen is asking very different questions of 
Solness. 
Solness, moreover, does not hold out any hope for future improvement 
- "Aldrig i verden" (2.82). These lines underscore the protean, paradoxical 
nature of happiness, once Solness extends it beyond the significance it holds 
for "solide folk" (1.35). Happiness, in terms of success and personal/ artistic 
autonomy can only be bought with personal happiness, the net result of which 
is unhappiness, and, it seems, an attendant loss of faith. 
This mode of despair is an integral characteristic of Kierkegaardian 
despair. It is what Kierkegaard called the "sin of despairing over sin", where 
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sin consists in forsaking God. Despairing over sin amounts to a denial of the 
possibility of redemption (and ultimately a denial of the Christian faith itself) -
which Kierkegaard sees as "an attempt to keep sinking even deeper". In the 
same passage, Kierkegaard goes on to detail Macbeth's psychological state 
after the murder, a description which could equally apply to Solness: 
Through [ ... ] despairing over the sin, he has lost all 
relation to grace- and also to himself. His selfish self 
crumbles in ambition [ ... ] he is no closer to enjoying his 
own self in his ambition than he is to grasping grace.19 
What this passage highlights is the impossibility of attaining selfhood 
outside the dialectical structure outlined earlier. Having abandoned the 
eternal pole, Solness has stranded himself in immediacy, and, without a 
conception of God, has no hope of emerging from it According to the 
Kierkegaardian paradigm, an incomplete self, however successful In the 
temporal realm, remains incomplete and thus cannot be enjoyed. 
Solness, in this last disquisition on lykke has collapsed the ancient and 
enduring identification of luck and happiness, positing the former as 
incompatible with the latter and the latter as self-annihilating. Thus, by the 
end of Act II, lykke has been stripped of its customary content and is reduced 
to a sign for spiritual malaise, the nosology of which will be revealed in 
subsequent confessions. 
7.3 Kunstnerplads 
As we have seen, Solness constantly refers to the cost of his position as 
an artist, which is paid in the currency of other people's happiness: "ikke med 
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penge. Med men menneskelykke. Og ikke med min egen lykke alene. Men 
med andres ogsa" (2.83) - and with the peace of his soul. He is paying off a 
debt that cannot be cancelled. It is the moribund Aline who in his view has 
suffered the most, and it is towards her that he directs his feelings of guilt 
"For min lykkes skyld [ ... J og nu er hun ded - for min skyld" (3.106). This is a 
development of the Solness-Herdal conversation in Act I, where Solness 
confesses to the nonplussed doctor that he is happy for Aline to harbour 
suspicions of his infidelity: "[ ... J Fordi jeg synes der ligger ligesom - ligesom 
en slags velg~uende selvpinsel for mig i det at la' Aline fa g0re mig uret" 
(1.48). 
Ibsen IS extending Solness's material metaphor by exploiting the 
polysemy of the word skyld 'guilt', 'debt', 'sake'. Nietzsche had stressed "[ ... ] 
the basic moral term Schuld (guilt) has its origin in the very material term 
Schulden (to be indebted)" .20 Guilt, therefore, is the outcome of indebtedness, 
which, as we saw in the Herdal-Solness conversation, is necessary for the 
procurement of happiness. The notion of guilt now enters the lykke equation, 
and in so doing, immediately invites the question of how happiness and guilt 
can possibly harmonise where happiness and luck failed, and, in what sort of 
moral relationship do luck and guilt stand? 
SOLNESS. [ ... J Jeg har aldrig gjort dig noget ondt 
Ikke med vidende og vilje ialfald. Og sa alligevel - sa 
kendes det som om en knugende skyld la og tynged pa 
mIg. 
ALINE. En skyld imod mig? 
SOLNESS. Mest imod dig. (2.73) 
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As earlier stated, luck is definable as that which is beyond our control. 
And surely, at least where common morality has developed alongside 
Protestantism, moral judgements work on the premise that at least some 
degree of control resides with the agent21? A moral evaluation through which 
guilt attaches to someone for an action, and by extension, for an outcome, 
which is beyond their control, outrages our sense of justice. 
Kant, while recognising the vulnerability of human life to luck, sought 
to isolate and immunise moral values from the workings of contingency by 
vanishing notions of luck from the moral landscape altogether. He did so 
through his promotion of the will as ultimately the only proper object for 
moral assessment. We recall that 
The good will is [ ... ] good in itself. [ ... ] Even if it should 
happen that by a particularly unfortunate fate or by the 
niggardly provision of a stepmotherly nature, this will 
should be wholly lacking in power to accomplish its 
purpose [ ... ] it would still sparkle like a jewel in its own 
right. 22 
This doctrine of the purity of the will immunises both morality and 
moral agents from luck, in that the moral burden is located in intentions and 
not in results. 
In contrast to the Kantian position stands the Greek position. Both 
philosophy and, as mentioned in the introduction, tragedy were much 
preoccupied with the question of the vulnerability of the good life to luck. 
Tragedy produces examples of how morality is in no sense safe from the 
incursions of luck: the fortunes of Oedipus, for example, show how concerns 
about intention are overridden by the actualities of what is achieved. As 
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Bernard Williams states, the guilt that Oedipus incurs is a recognition that "in 
the story of one's life there is an authority exercised by what one has done, 
and not merely what one has intentionally done".23 
Contemporary philosophers, notably Williams and Nagel, have 
engaged with this issue. They argue against Kant that in our moral 
assessments of actions of both omission and commission, there IS an 
irreducible element of what is called moral luck. "Where a significant aspect 
of what someone does depends on factors beyond his control, yet we continue 
to treat him in that respect as an object of moral judgement, it can be called 
moral luck. Such luck can be good or bad."24 On this view, guilt attaches to the 
morally unlucky. 
Williams defines the fundamental difference between the Kantian 
moral assessment as working within a 'from there' perspective; (intention) and 
the Greek within a 'from here' (result) perspective. To illustrate how the latter 
usually obtains, Williams offers the example of the life of Gauguin, who, 
while recognising the validity of the claim of his wife and children on him, 
nevertheless abandoned them to pursue the life of the artist in Tahiti. He 
argues that Gauguin was only justified in doing this because his paintings are 
seen to have made a valuable contribution to mankind. Had, however, his 
project been unsuccessful, had his paintings been deemed talentless rubbish, 
then this fact, and not the deliberations that produced his decision to leave 
home would have unjustified him.25 
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There are obvious parallels between Gauguin's and Solness's moral 
situation. Both relegated the claims of immediate, human relationships in 
pursuit of their projects. Gauguin was a successful painter, and Solness's 
project of becoming the Master Builder has also succeeded. So what is it, in 
Solness's view that unjustifies him and declares him guilty? 
In order to arrive at any possible answer to what Solness calls this 
"store forfc:erdelige spersmal" (2.84) it is necessary to work through Solness's 
confession to Hilde towards the end of Act 11. The two basic positions on 
(moral) luck outlined here will provide useful tools for the understanding of 
Solness's state of mind, for, as the exchange with Aline quoted above suggests, 
he seems to be caught between the two. 
7.4 Denne her sprukne Skorstenspiben 
We can, at least pre-reflectively, sympathise with Hilde in her 
conclusion that Solness is going too far in assuming guilt for the fire, Aline's 
unhappiness and the death of his children. But his confession that he had 
identified a potentially fatal crack in the chimney and yet had done nothing 
about it, puts a different complexion on the matter: a moral one. However, it 
was later established that the fire did not break out in the chimney but in the 
wardrobe. Had the opposite been true, his negligence would have made him 
responsible for the fire and its consequences. So, in the event, Solness can 
count himself not only lucky, but morally lucky too. 
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But guilt cannot be thrown off so easily in Ibsen, especially not 
dialectically, and Ibsen would probably not have subscribed to the Greek view 
of moral luck: The protagonist sinking under an intolerable burden of guilt 
remains very much centre stage, clearly ulykkelig in his lykke. 
If we take a closer look at Solness's description of the crack in the 
chimney, something emerges which resembles what in modern parlance 
would be called a self-indulgent guilt-trip. Solness's guilt, clearly does not 
consist in his negligence: guilt is not always a matter of pure fact 
One central point that needs to be addressed is why Solness ruptures 
his lykke narrative and declares himself guilty, when the alternative, to remain 
inside it, would have offered him a legitimate escape that would have 
vanished his guilt, or at least have offered him a structure which could have 
reduced its claim on his conscience. The question is whether Solness is trying 
to execute a genuine moral U-turn from solipsism into Kantianism, or whether 
his assumption of guilt should be interpreted as a reflex prompted by his fear 
of the workings of luck. 
Solness gives Hilde a detailed account of the progress of the crack in 
the chimney, which, true to form, Ibsen manipulates on both a realistic and 
symbolic level. The crack appeared in the chimney, part of the structure of the 
hearth, popularly conceived of as the focal point of the family. In Greek 
tragedy, the hearth (estia) was symbolic of female sexuality and fertility and 
the perpetuation of the male line through it 26 Solness describes how he would 
go up into the 10ft to see if the crack was still there, and, as no one else knew 
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of the crack, his repeated visits to check on its progress can only be interpreted 
as his seeking confirmation of his professional ambition. Thus the crack 
represents the fabric of domesticity beginning to give under the pressure of 
private ambition, and so functions as a symbol of the meanings so far 
intervolved in the notion of lykke. If the hearth can be taken as being broadly 
representative of domestic lykke and narrowly representative of female 
physical and emotional potential, then Solness's career was built on Aline's 
cracked femininity. 
He admits that he had thought of repairing the crack, but a hand 
interposed and led him, instead, to drafting a cruel winter scenario in which 
Aline would return, freezing, and instead of the cosy warmth of the home-fire 
she expects, would be greeted by a conflagration. 
What Solness's extreme Kantian, 'from there' evaluation shows is that 
his will is at fault. This is, objectively true, but, just as Ibsen does not privilege 
the Greek view as a preferable, liveable alternative, he by no means leaves 
Kantian modes of moral living unquestioned. 
7.5 Pligt 
Aline, who more than any other of Ibsen's creations is a bleak caricature 
of wholesale, uncritical digestion of Kantianism, functions as a warning 
against its sterile conclusions. For Kant, the good will manifests itself by acting 
for the sake of duty:27 The impulse behind all her relationships is pligt, not one 
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which promotes human happiness and love. Her response to Hilde on being 
thanked for the clothes she has brought her is characteristic: 
HILDE (viI kaste sig om hendes hals). A ~reste, 
dejligste fru Solness! De er da rigtig altfor snil ogsa! 
Forf~rdelig snil-
FRU SOLNESS (afv~rgende, g0r sig 10s). A,langt 
ifra da. Det er jo bare min pligt, det. Og derfor g0r jeg 
det sa gerne. (2.74) 
Peter Winch uses the example of Aline Solness to make a point about 
Kantian formalism: 
How very differently we should have regarded her if she 
had said [to Hilde on her arrival]: 'Do come and see your 
room. I hope you will be comfortable there and enjoy 
your stay.' Certainly in the latter case the conception of 
the relation between host and guest and the duties 
involved would still enter into our understanding of the 
situation, but not in the form of something 'for the sake 
of which' the action is performed.28 
Her concept of duty is so perfunctory and so devoid of any specific 
content that she is unable to distinguish between different levels or qualities of 
duty. In Act III, her guiding principle, duty for duty's sake, throws her into 
confusion. She fears that Solness will climb the steeple and, because of his 
vertigo, fall. Even so, she leaves him in order to attend to some visiting ladies 
on the grounds that this is her duty, and asks Hilde to stay and try to dissuade 
him from going up: 
HILDE. Var det ikke rettest at De selv gjorde det? 
FRU SOLNESS. Jo, herregud, - det var jo min pligt. 
Men nar en har pligter pa sa mange kanter, sa - . (3.115) 
What Ibsen, through Aline reveals about the Kantian principle of duty is that 
it is unworkable in that it has no identifiable end. Here we are presented with 
266 
a dramatisation of several philosophers' main objection to Kantianism, namely 
that it is not productive of human happiness.29 Indeed, Aline never once uses 
the word lykke in its positive form.30 
Solness's uncharacteristic leap into Kantianism can be seen as a 
combination of factors: firstly, feeling as vulnerable to luck as he does, he is 
desperately searching for some kind of immutable standard, which the 
doctrine of the autonomous, pure will provides; secondly, it shows how 
difficult it is for him to abandon completely the prevailing moral norms and 
with them the tradition they express. Ibsen had identified this difficulty as a 
basic conflict within the individual. 
De forskellige andsfunktioner udvikler sig nemlig 
jevnsides og ikke ligeligt i et og samme individ. 
Tilegnelsesdriften jager fremad fra vinding til vinding. 
Moralbevidstheten, 'samvittigheden', er derimod meget 
konservativ. De har sine redder i traditionerne og i det 
fortidige overhodet. (HU XVill.128) 31 
7.6 Hj~lperne og Tjenerne 
But Solness does not remain within the Kantian narrative for long. No 
ethical system in itself can bring him close to revelation. As Kierkegaard 
stresses, revelation is a free act for which the hero is responsible. Therefore, 
Solness has to make a choice to revelation, independently of imposing external 
ethical evaluations on his condition. 
Solness is no more able to eliminate luck from his narrative than he is 
able to see Kantianism through to its logical conclusion: he admits his guilt but 
does not acknowledge responsibility. The reason for this is that he does not 
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view the will in an antinomic sbucture of good and bad, but in terms of 
strength and weakness. 
His account of the interposing hand that led him to abandon his initial 
choice of repairing the crack is illustrative of Kierkegaard's account of the will, 
where he argues against the Socratic maxim that man sins only from 
Ignorance. Kierkegaard's view is that man can sin through a dialectical 
operation of the will, which, given time by the agent, works at obscuring 
knowledge so efficiently that it eventually deserts to the side of the will which 
"has underneath it all of man's lower nature": 
A very lengthy story begins [ ... ] if a person does not do 
what is right the very second he knows it is the right 
thing to do - then the knowledge comes off the boil. The 
will lets some time pass [ ... ] During all this the knowing 
becomes more and more obscured and the lower nature 
more and more victorious [ ... ] Gradually the will ceases 
to object to this happening; it practically winks at it. And 
then when the knowing has become duly obscured, the 
will and the knowing can better understand one another. 
Eventually they are in total agreement, since knowing 
has now deserted to the side of the will and allows it to 
be known that what the will wants is quite right. 32 
Solness willed the fire, and the fact that it broke out in the wardrobe 
and not in the chimney neither cancels his wish, nor, as he is only too well 
aware, does it diminish the incendiary power of his will. The subject of the 
potency of the will is one of his main preoccupations, and he has given 
previous examples of what has come to him simply through willing and 
wishing in silence and solitude: Kaja Fosli coming into his employ and 
perhaps Hilde's arrival too.33 
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Although fixated on the will, Solness's conception of it is highly 
unKantian in many important ways. Firstly, as we have seen, for him, the will 
is not a moral category, and is not to be judged in terms of good and bad. 
Secondly, and equally significantly, this will is judged purely in terms of what 
it can achieve: the potent will is the gift and preserve of "enkelte udkarne, 
udvalgte mennesker, som har fat nade og magt og evne til at enske noget, 
begiEre noget, ville noget - sa ihc:Erdigt og sa ub0nh0rligt - at de rna fa det 
tilslut" (2.88). He is convinced that had the same set of circumstances involved 
Knut Brovik instead of Halvard Solness, there would have been no fire. 
One of the main points about the autonomous will was its originary 
equality. Anyone, guided by a sense of duty could be said to be morally 
commendable and in possession of a good will. Thus the "stepmotherly 
nature" which Kant wrote of and the few chosen people amongst whom 
Solness numbers himself, are neither here nor there. 
What Solness is, in fact, arguing for is constitutive luck, the fact that he 
has certain innate capacities, namely his powerful will, denied to others. His 
insistence that the house would not have burnt down quite so conveniently for 
Knut Brovik exemplifies his position. But Kierkegaard is clear on this point 
"good fortune is not a specification of spirit", and seen in this way, Solness's 
suggestion that it is can be viewed as merely another tactic of concealment. 
However, this will is not sufficient in itseH. If anything really great is to 
be achieved, Solness is dependent on the ministrations of intermediary spirits 
and demons. 
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SOLNESS. [ ... ] (i stigende oprer). Det er det, som 
godtfolk kalder at ha' lykken med sig. Men jeg skal sige 
Dem, jeg, hvorledes den lykken kendes! Den kendes som 
et stort hudl0st sted her pa brystet Og sa gar hjeelperne 
og tjenerne og flar hudstykker af andre mennesker for at 
lukke mit sar! - Men saret heles ikke endda. Aid rig, -
aldrig! A, om De vidste hvor det kan suge og svie 
ibland t (2.89) 34 
Solness goes on to develop an entire folkloric corpus around the notion 
of lykke, of helpers and servants, good and bad demons (apparently 
indistinguishable from each other) and the troll within who determines the 
non-rational choices in life (413-4/465). In Peer Gynt the troll world stood for 
compromised humanity, where the normative motto "Mand, veer dig selv!" is 
reduced to "Trold, veer dig selv - nok!" (HU VI.2.100). Therefore, Solness's 
troll within can be seen as an image of his desertion of the ideal for the 
immediate and his choice against selfhood. 
The more Solness expands on the idea of the will, the further he moves 
away from Kantianism and from accepting responsibility, which he devolves 
onto these intermediary spirits, who, as he has explained, offer no standards 
by which good and bad can be distinguished. His companion narrative of the 
will offers him an escape from confronting his desertion of the ideal and gives 
him a self-description that distinguishes him from the solide folk around him. 
However, his expatiations on the strong will as being the locus of lykke expose 
the guilt he feels towards Aline as being displaced and must be seen in the 
wider context of his narrative of concealment 
It is clear that by now the original definition of lykke has been 
completely invalidated. Solness has effectively deconstructed his lykke 
270 
narrative: happiness and guilt, like happiness and luck are mutually exclusive, 
and the claim that luck inheres in the will is surely a contradiction in terms. If 
contingency can be subject to the control of the will (or of anything for that 
matter), then it ceases to be contingency. Even arguing for constitutive luck as 
Solness's doctrine of the elect does, does not solve this tension, for, if this were 
the case, he would have no need to fear his helpers and servants abandoning 
him to the mercy of inexorable retribution. Solness's particular brand of 
solipsism whose discourse is that of a fallacious external evaluative view 
(lykke) clearly affords him no adequate processes for dealing with his feelings 
of guilt and its attendant torment 
Solness's torment is the result of a divided conscience, but not, as he 
claims, a conscience tom between the conflicting duties enjoined on him by his 
calling and by those around him. This is revealed by the fact that he has come 
to doubt the very integrity of his art, and identifies no valid project in life. His 
kunstnerplads, which he sees as being paid for in the currency of Aline's 
happiness, is in fact paid for by his own loss of selfhood. 
Furthermore, the lykke construction placed on his personal and 
professional history, as we have seen, is fragile and collapsible, and obviously 
not one in which he can work out any kind of salvation, or repossess the peace 
of his soul. It is the narrative of "[oo.] the emergence of the self out of the 
opacity of immediacy into the clear and merciless transparency of the 
unhappy consciousness where nothing can save consciousness from despair 
[ ... J but a surrender to God".35 
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But by his excessive reliance on luck, both as an instrumental force and 
as the articulation of the aetiology and pathology of his torment, Solness 
denies himself any clear access to the buth of his guilt; his choice against 
health. And it is the very two factors that invalidated and exposed this lykke 
construction - (guilt and the will) that Solness most needs to come to terms 
with, but they are exposed by his self-mythologising discourse of the elect 
7.7 De er syg, bygmester 
Other identifiable tactics employed by Solness which enable him to 
avoid confronting the real locus of his guilt range, as we have seen, from plain 
intransigence and an insistence on the immutable essence of his self to a 
retreat behind the mask of madness. His constant challenges to those around 
him to declare him insane amount to a desperate plea for absolution, for 
whenever any reference is made to his illness/madness, some sort of 
discussion or disclosure of assumed guilt is never far off. It is Hilde who 
denies him the asylum of quasi-psychological discourse: 
HILDE (ser opmcerksomt pa ham). De er syg, 
bygmester, svcert syg, tror jeg ncesten. 
SOLNESS. Si' gal. For det mener De jo. 
HILDE. Nej, jeg tror ikke det skorter Dem videre 
pa forstanden. (2.89) 
She diagnoses his illness in terms of a "skranten samvittighed" - what 
Nietzsche termed the "indecent bite of conscience"36, which proves that a 
character is not equal to the deed, and she views this as a potential threat to 
her vision of his greatness. To counter this, she glorifies the robust samvittighed 
272 
of the Vikings that he mentions, and thus demonstrates the possibility of 
choosing an alternative, healthy identity. Hilde, in direct contrast to the 
Kantian notion of the inviolability of the rights of others, which determines all 
relationships as moral, insists that each person is responsible for seizing his 
own happiness, and questions the rights of others whose own happiness may 
be com promised in the process: 
o 
HILDE (i udbrud). A, jeg synes, det er rigtig sa 
tosset, sa tosset - altsammen! 
SOLNESS. Hvilket altsammen? 
HILDE. At en ikke b~r gribe efter sin egen lykke. 
Efter sit eget liv! Bare fordi det star nogen ivejen, som en 
kender! 
SOLNESS. En, som en ikke har ret til at ga forbi. 
HILDE. Gad vide om en ikke havde ret til det 
igrunden. (3.107) 
Hilde's vision of health could function as a description of Kierkegaard's 
sickness. She conceives of her self as her own self whose specifications are not 
the outcome of a relationship to God, and are not even, as in the case of 
Solness's identity as bygmester, the outcome of a socially constituted identity. 
However, this version of health can only provide Solness with, at most, 
temporary relief, as the overwhelming burden of guilt that he assumes on his 
wife's account is to a very great extent, simply displacement, and his morbid 
rhetoric on the subject merely a piece of self-deluding sophistry. 
Solness paints a highly sentimental portrait of Aline's radiance in 
motherhood, and insists that she had a calling for building human souls, a 
talent which he crushed. But the reality of this talent is one of the many 
unestablishable facts of the play. Firstly, the twins survived no longer than 
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three weeks - hardly long enough for any talent to declare itself; secondly, it, 
was Aline who was primarily responsible for their deaths, not he, as it was 
some misguided notion of duty that compelled her to breast-feed even when 
feverish which sent them to their early graves. Their empty nurseries function 
as a poignant symbol of blind slavishness to duty and its life-denying 
consequences. Moreover, Aline never mentions their loss, and certainly does 
not conceive of them as the instance of her most profound suffering, but 
instead laments the material losses from the fire, particularly the nine dolls 
that she carried under her heart well into womanhood. There are, then, 
compelling reasons for recording duty as the cause of her death, and not as 
Solness supposes the demands of his calling. Aline is no Agnes. 
This consideration very much reduces the stature of Solness's SIn 
against Aline, but it does not exonerate him. If we recall the duality of the 
symbol of the crack, some sin against her persists. It consists in the fact that 
any fantasies entertained by Solness during his repeated visits to the loft did 
not involve any consideration of Aline's happiness, but this hardly justifies the 
violence of his metaphor. 
No sin of corresponding magnitude is confessed until Act III, to which 
this discussion now turns. In the following section it will become clear that 
Ibsen, as suggested earlier, is taking the life/art dilemma in a direction 
different from that of Brand, and is questioning the very integrity of the 
artist's relationship to his project 
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7.8 Revelation 
It is not until the final act that Solness begins to display some kind of 
consciousness of the real root of his despair. In his final confession to Hilde he 
recounts how as a man of pious rural origins he had considered it the highest 
good (" det verdigste") to build churches to the greater glory of God, but God 
soon showed that He was not in fact pleased with him by depriving him of 
love and happiness (kjcerlighed og lykke) so that he could devote himself 
wholeheartedly, without the distraction of conflicting demands to Him. It was 
God (not Solness) who let the house bum and God, (not Solness) who took his 
sons away and God who put the troll in him and God who put both the fair 
and dark devils at his disposal. Compare this with "Hvem ropte pa hjtelpeme 
og tjenerne? Det gjorde jeg!" (2.89). 
At Lysanger he did do the impossible; conquered his vertigo to wreathe 
the last steeple he built and to declare his independence from God- the very 
moment that Hilde conceives of his apotheosis. Earlier, he had told Hilde that 
from the day he lost the twins, he only reluctantly built churches. This last 
confession in Act ill, is not, however, informed by any epiphanic self-
knowledge, for it, like his previous confessions rests on subterfuge. 
When the crack in the chimney opened up imaginary vistas of artistic 
success, his dream of dividing the site of Aline's home cannot have taken the 
form of building to the greater glory of God on those plots, but quite 
unequivocally to the greater glory of Solness. Therefore, he had stopped 
building humble churches with any sincerity and devotion limed et sa terligt 
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og varmt og inderligt sind" (3.116) long before the death of the twins. As 
Marie Wells emphasises, he is in bad faith.37 And thus the gradual process of 
devolvement of the responsibility for his guilt, through the compensatory 
fiction of lykke, with its helpers and servants, demons and trolls, reaches its 
culmination in the portrayal of a tyrannical God. 
After the ascent at Lysanger, he built nothing but homes for people, 
which he now perceives as an utterly meaningless squandering of his talent: 
"Ingenting bygget igrunden. Og ingenting ofret for at fa bygge noget heller. 
Ingenting, ingenting - altsammen" (3.118) - so much so that his will to build 
has almost been paralysed. These lines stand in stark contrast to his previous 
confession in which he saw his sacrifice as a sacrifice to his art, and not as 
now, the sacrifice of his art. He declares that building homes for people "er 
ikke fern 0re v~rd" (3.118) and this conclusion goes some way towards 
answering the question about the source of his guilt. It is not the success of 
Solness's project that is at issue as it is never questioned, but it does not offer 
him any justification, and moreover, leaves him consumed by guilt. The point 
is that his project itself with its definition rooted in Solness's defiance of God 
is at fault 
But the irony of this last confession is that through its very subterfuge, 
it has led him, however subliminally, back to the essence of his despair - his 
rebellion against Godj the ideal. Its circularity has betrayed both him and his 
desperate need for God. As Van Laan explains, Solness's fiction is 
created in response to a recognition - that is, to Solness' 
feeling of the utter nothingness of his existence. Solness' 
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narrative is a story that he tells himself in order to 
account for and make sense of that feeling in a manner 
that has a magnitude equal to it as well as to give 
himself, in the proposed second defiance of God, a 
possible means of overcoming that feeling".38 
Lykke thus functions not only as a compensatory fiction for a denied 
ideal, but has also a very clear dramatic function in that its exposure of what it 
was enlisted to obscure has led Solness back to a conception, albeit 
mendacious, of God, and has forced him to re-enter the dialectic of the self. It 
is his realisation that he must confront what he has been avoiding for the past 
ten years that more precisely defines the nature of the final action than does 
Hilde's project of claiming her kingdom and seeing its prince proud and free. 
This is not, however, an attempt to reduce Hilde's catalytic and enabling role, 
for it is clearly in response to her belief in him and her nympholeptic 
entreaties: "HILDE (lidenskabelig). Jeg vii det! Jeg viI det! (bedende). Bare en 
eneste gang til, bygmester! Ger det umulige om igen!" (3.119) and her 
Nietzschean casuistry that he is able to throw off the guilt he feels towards 
Aline and confront his denied ideal. For Solness, the ascent marks a reopening 
of his dialogue with God: "Jeg vii si' til ham: her mig, stormcegtige herre - du 
far nu demme om mig som du selv synes. Men herefter viI jeg bare bygge det 
dejligste i verden" (3.119). 
He has thus regained some degree of selfhood in that he is now 
1/ standing before God", albeit with a faulty conception, and although he has 
not directly submitted to Him, he does articulate a certain degree of awareness 
of his accountability to Him. His point is crucial in view of Kierkegaard's 
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dictum "The more conception of God, the more self'. He has, moreover, gone 
through the necessary stage of divesting both himself and his newly-defined 
artistic project of all traces of social identification - a basic requirement of 
selfhood. He dreams of a new life hand in hand with his princess Hilde (a 
social impossibility), and of a new building phase of castles in the air- with a 
firm foundation. These castles are det dejligste i verden because Solness 
perceives them as the only possible accommodation for menneskelykke -
human happiness: "Det eneste, som jeg tror der kan rummes menneskelykke 
i" (3.118). 
This is the first time he removes lykke from the worldly realm of 
subjective experience or from the domestic realm. Lykke is thus depersonalised 
and desocialised, indicating the potential for Solness's new moral position 
within the community of mankind and his commitment to nurturing its spirit 
The· castle in the air with a firm foundation, is however, a highly 
ambiguous image. On the one hand, it can be viewed from a Kierkegaardian 
perspective as the synthesis of the historical and the ideal, showing that 
through this project Solness is attempting to redress the imbalance within his 
self. On the other hand, it can be seen as a statement of the very impossibility 
of doing so - a castle in the air with a firm foundation ceases to be a castle in 
the air. This central contradiction communicated by the symbol of the castle is 
evocative of the paradox of the self set out by the Button Moulder in Peer Gynt: 
" At vcere sig selv, er: sig selv at d0de" (5.229). The image also invokes Christ's 
own words: "He that findeth his life shall lose it; and he that loseth his life for 
278 
my sake shall find it" (Matthew 10:39), inform the Kierkegaardian notion of 
true selfhood as being rooted in selflessness. 
Solness does, much to the consternation of the crowd, achieve del 
umulige (which throughout the play has assumed mantra-like significance for 
him, in the same way that del vidunderlige does for Nora). He overcomes his 
vertigo once more and makes the ascent to the top of the steeple of his new 
house and wreathes it, making real Hilde's dream. The religious undertones 
of the impossible: "Abba, Father, all things are possible unto thee" (Mark 
14:36) are thrown into relief by Hilde's ecstatic declaration on seeing Solness 
wreathe the steeple, "Nu er det fuldbragt." - "It is finished" Gohn 30:19). Her 
identification of Solness with Christ crucified means that for her, his 
subsequent plunge to death in no way constitutes either defeat or any 
reduction in his stature. He remains forever "Min bygmester!" (3.123). Hilde is 
Hedda triumphant. 
But the play does not end on an unequivocally triumphant note. Hilde's 
Solness-Christ identification is highly problematic: Christ assumed the 
collective guilt of mankind and died that man might live, whereas Hilde's 
vision of victory is grounded in Solness's throwing off of his private guilt in 
accordance with the doctrine of self-assertion, rather than any project of mass 
salvation. Furthermore, the question of Solness's guilt persiSts, and Solness 
carries his guilt with him to the top of the steeple; for it is only his guilt as 
personified by Aline that Hilde can relieve him of - only one part of his double 
defiance. Aline's fainting does parallel Solness's fall, but it must be 
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remembered that she has functioned merely as a symbol of his largely 
misplaced guilt 
Moreover, the irony of Ragnar handing the wreath (a potent symbol 
into which both notions of death and victory are interwoven) to Solness prior 
to his ascent violates a symmetry that dictates that Hilde should hand over the 
symbol of victory. Ibsen, by placing the wreath in Ragnar's hands 
momentarily turns it into a death-dealing symbol and Ragnar into the 
Nemesis that Solness so intensely feared. 
James McFarlane argues for a detachment on Ibsen's part during the 
last sequence.39 There is certainly a lack of the heroic, or what James Joyce 
termed "spiritual glamour" surrounding Solness's death.40 Moreover, there is 
a conspicuous absence of the redemptive possibilities as articulated by the 
voices at the end of Brand and Nlir vi dede vdgner; and the joining of estranged 
hands in John Gabriel Barkman. The harps that orchestrate Hilde's ecstasy 
constitute too subjective an experience to carry the same force as the above 
examples. 
The central issue is clearly not that Solness falls, but why he falls. To 
view his fall as merely the workings of a retributive agency (as the Ragnar 
sequence discussed above might be taken to imply) is to reduce considerably 
both play and protagonist in stature. Such an interpretation demands a 
reading of Solness as one who makes no spiritual progress during the course 
of the drama. And tracing the fortunes over three acts of a man who lives in 
fear of retribution and then receives it, holds little dramatic and less tragic 
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interest. So what spiritual progress has Solness made (for it cannot be claimed 
that his final ascent constitutes a drastic leap of faith)? The crucial, paradoxical 
point that Kierkegaard makes about despair is that it is in itself spiritual 
progress. Unlike somatic illness, despair is "an infinite merit", the only and 
necessary state through which men can return to God. Egil Tornqvist comes 
close to this idea in saying that Solness's illness "is a sign of his being truly 
alive, a sign, that is of his health" .41 
Many commentators hold with McFarlane that Ibsen is deliberately 
avoiding tragedy in that there is no cathartic finish to the action. In contrast, 
Theoharis C. Theoharis has argued eloquently for a double catharsis: 
Ibsen has constructed this final scene so that no one can 
doubt that Solness is Hilde's master builder. Whether 
that means he is her creator god or the all too human 
victim of her mischievous, unbridled, adolescent fancy is 
a question this play has required the audience to 
consider from the moment Hilde first appeared. To settle 
the question, Ibsen finishes the play with a classically 
rational and a classically irrational catharsis, testing the 
power of both to provide an adequate rationale for the 
change Hilde has wrought in Solness's life.42 
The "classically rational" catharsis is that provided by Ragnar, whose 
response Theoharis describes as representing the "solemn sagacity of the 
chorus member who proffers small understanding for great events." 
Theoharis sees Ragnar's reaction to Solness's fall as classic "pity and fear", 
whereas Hilde's ecstatic affirmation of Solness's affirmative action provides 
more than a counterweight to this solemnity. 
This is the first time Ibsen has used a dual ending of this kind. Prior to 
Bygmester Solness there are several instances of what Errol Durbach calls "the 
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temptation to err", that is allowing our response to the tragic action to be 
dictated by a chorus-type figure, always representing" small understanding of 
great events": Rosmersholm and Hedda Gabler are two notable examples. The 
audience has to separate the action from the commentary. However, nowhere 
else does Ibsen provide us with two voices in addition to the action as he does 
here. One way of understanding this development is to see Hilde as an 
extension of Solness and a messenger from the top of the steeple. 
Solness's fall was not thus the product of a vindictive agency, but his 
dizziness on the heights, which like the castles in the air is a statement of the 
impossibility of the impossible and the limitations of the human spirit. 
Kierkegaard's vertigo metaphor is illuminating in this context "[ ... J the 
dizziness of freedom which arises when the spirit would posit the synthesis 
and looks down onto its own possibility and then lays hold of the finite to 
steady itself' .43 
Solness, after a brief glimpse at the possibility of freedom, plunges to 
his death, the planks and poles of finitude (no longer able to accommodate his 
spirit) having failed to steady him. His tragedy is the human tragedy of the 
struggle between the immediate and the ideal, the harmonising of which 
obtains not in victory, but in victory-in-defeat. 
The Aristotelian rubric has clearly undergone several modifications in 
this play. What this chapter has attempted to demonstrate is how 
Kierkegaard's description of revelation is not only truer to late Ibsen than 
Aristotelian recognition, but also that it provides a clearer viewing lens 
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through which to approach these late heroes. We have seen in the case of 
Bygmester Solness, the pertinence of Kierkegaard's recasting of anagnarisis as an 
ethical imperative to the hero and his relocating of the burden of the release of 
dramatic tension from plot to protagonist. Furthermore, the opening up of the 
concept of revelation to give equal consideration to what it presupposes, 
namely concealment, enables us to strike at the very heart of the play. 
Aristotle had argued that narrative was not proper to tragedy. Ibsen 
shows that it can be, for here "'Ibsen has moved out of and perhaps beyond 
Aristotle's definition of tragedy as an imitation of a praxis with a plot as the 
soul. Bygmester Solness is the imitation of a stasis in which a poetic nexus of 
symbols is the soul".44 Bygmester Solness feeds off Solness's narrative - a 
narrative of concealment which Ibsen submits not only to stage tension but 
also to the stresses of his own unrelenting questioning, in the mode of a 
Ricoeurian "'hermeneutics of suspicion", in the sense that it embodies a false 
consciousness that needs to be revealed and to be overcome. As Van Laan 
points out, the new direction here is that Ibsen has created "'an action whose 
most crucial defining component exists only in the mental activity of its 
supposed agent."45 
In the next chapter, we look at John Gabriel Barkman, in which Ibsen 
extends this kind of anagnorisis which arises through a confrontation of lykke 
and a necessary identity. 
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Our idea of persons derives from two 
sources: one from the theater, the dramatis 
personae of the stage; the other has its 
origins in law. An actor dons masks, 
literally per sonae, that through which the 
sound comes. [ ... ] A person's roles and his 
place in the narrative devolve from the 
choices that place him in a structural 
system, related to others. [ ... ] The idea of a 
person is the idea of a unified center of 
choice and action, the unit of legal and 
theological responsibility. Having chosen, 
a person acts, and so is actionable, liable. It 
is in this idea of action that the legal and 
the theatrical sources of the concept of the 
person come together - Amelie Oksenberg 
Rorty. 
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ChapterVID 
John Gabriel Barkman: Emotions of Self-Assessment 
8.1 Introduction: Crime and Punishment 
As in Bygmester Solness, Ibsen gives us a hero who stands in an uncertain 
relationship to his calling, a play in which the tragic outcome is defined by the 
character's relationship to lykke. Borkman relies as much on contingency to 
explain experience as Solness does, but does not mobilise anything comparable 
to Solness's supernatural retinue. Human affairs are seen in human terms by 
this hero - human agency is precisely that, and the contingent is seen as a 
neutral, impersonal realm. 
This play adjusts its focus to allow the tragic to emerge through a dual 
notion of the person (see the Rorty quotation above, p. 287) in the coincidence 
of legal and tragic guilt, explored in a much more thorough way than in Et 
Dukkehjem. 
While the Latin root of the theatrical designation per sonae only dimly 
resonates in common usage, the legal aspect is still very much current. 
Moreover, the two concepts are often allied in tragedy, for choice, culpability 
and causation are crucial to both. Indeed, notions of responsibility, cause and 
guilt are all at stake in the Greek word aitios, and the verb aitiasthai means both 
to "find responsible" and to "prosecute". I would like to foreground the dual 
aspect of the concept for the purposes of the following consideration of Ibsen's 
penultimate work because in this work both notions of action and actionability 
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are central, and Borkman's stage anagnorisis is played out at the meeting point 
between tragic guilt and legal culpability. But, as we shall see, it is not so much 
a confrontation with guilt that clears the way to anagnorisis, but another tragic 
emotion, shame. 
Borkman's crime, in contrast to Solness's, is the outcome of concrete 
action, is specific and legally definable: embezzlement It has, moreover, been 
through the formalities of legal process and is not suspended like Sol ness' s in 
the realm of metaphysical speculation. John Gabriel Borkman has been tried, 
judged and convicted. He has served his sentence and is now technically a free 
man. But what Ibsen demonstrates by locating the occasion of Borkman's fall 
from U greet prosperitee ... out of heigh degree / Into myserie"l (to employ 
Chaucer's recasting of the tragic trajectory) in the forhistorie of the play is that 
this crime uimod lands lov og ret" (2.85) and the ensuing trial are, in and of 
themselves, dramatically uninteresting. Moreover, Borkman's gUilt, as far as he 
is concerned, is a mere formality: for him it is no more than the outcome of a 
trial whose validity and applicability to his vision he rejects. His fall is relegated 
to a fact about his past, and the trial is thus configured as an inadequate 
response to the crime he committed because it takes too reductive a view of it It 
therefore can have no saving effect, provide no resolution in the way that the 
trial for matricide provides closure in The Eumenides. 
There is a clear tension in the play between Borkman as a character in the 
sense Rorty gives, as someone whose uplace in the narrative" can be seen to 
udevolve from the choices that place him in a structural system, related to 
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others", and his forensic aspect. He is indeed a U unified centre of 
responsibility", but, as the plot itself implies, it is not as a formal forensic 
category that the notion of responsibility becomes meaningful. Borkman has 
done his time, yet in an important sense is clearly not a free man: he is 
physically incarcerated and socially isolated. 
In this play Ibsen develops notions of responsibility in a far less 
rhetorical manner than he does in Lille Eyolf for example, where for Allmers 
responsibility functions much in the same way as we saw lykke operating as a 
compensatory fiction for Solness. This is partly due to Borkman's own 
resistance to gUilt, which stands in marked contrast to both Solness's and 
Allmers's.2 In John Gabriel Borkman the notion of responsibility itself is central to 
the drama, and Borkman's changing relationship to it is propulsive of the tragic 
action. 
8.2 Act I 
8.2.1 Reparation: Erhart 
Something rarely commented on in the critical literature is this play's 
engagement with lykke. It turns just as much on this multivalent notion as 
Bygmester Solness does, but here its field of play is much wider than in the 
earlier work. Although the play is indisputably dominated by Borkman, 
(despite the fact that he is physically absent for much of the action), it does 
present 
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andre livsmater, som Foldal's naive illusjonsbaserte lille-
lykke, Fannys desillusjonerte utfoldelse, s0strenes 
erstatningslykke og antydningsvis Fridas liv for kunsten, 
ikke for mannen eller makten.3 
In fact, each character voices different aspects of lykke. It is a most centrifugal 
notion, and it catches in its wake concepts as diverse and important as sin, 
pride, guilt, love and above all, chance. 
As in Bygmester Solness the notion of lykke is introduced without delay, 
but not by the protagonist as in the earlier play: 
ELLA RENTHEIM. Jeg vilde lette vejen for Erhart 
til at bli' et lykkeligt menneske her i verden. 
FRU BORKMAN (blceser). Pyh, - folk i vore kAr har 
nok andet at g0re, end at t:enke pa lykke. (Xlli.l.47) 
Here the twin sisters Gunhild and Ella come together for the first time 
since Borkman's trial, and their differences are acute, on all levels, even over 
Erhart Borkman, son, and nephew and erstwhile foster-child respectively, their 
most cherished individual. They argue about what is in his best interests and 
both identify him as an instrument of reparation. Ella declares her intention to 
smooth Erhart's way in life, so that he can become lykkelig. 
However, the deceptive simplicity and implied altruism of this stated 
intention belies Ella's motives where her nephew is concerned. Ella is dying. 
Erhart's happiness in her scheme is really her own desire for a happy death, 
which depends on Erhart formally dissolving his legal and emotional bonds 
with his biological parents and the Borkman legacy by taking the Rentheim 
name. Thus what Ella really means to set in motion by adopting (the now adult) 
Erhart is a process of purgation and purification, whereby Erhart will 
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disassociate himself from everything and everyone that has caused her 
suffering in the past, as well as compensate for one of the most painful aspects 
of this suffering: her childlessness. Erhart functions less in and for himself than 
as a symbol of a version of her own potential happiness and her failure to 
extend herself through progeny. Erhart Borkman would have to rename and 
reinvent himself in order for his aunt to secure 'his' happiness. Hers is therefore 
a narrative of restoration, in the sense that she will be securing something that 
she has been deprived of unjustly.4 
Erhart's mother is equally obsessed with the question of the family 
name, but sees Erhart's mission as consisting in his obligation to eradicate the 
shame brought on the house of Borkman by his father's criminal actions. 
Through her, Ibsen makes a clear assertion of a tragic framework 
Jeg fatter ikke at noget sadant noget, - noget sa 
forfCErdeligt kan overga en enkelt familie! Og sa, tCEnk, -
vor familie! En sa fornem familie, som vorl TCEnke sig til, 
at det just skulde ram me den! [ ... J Skammen over oss to 
uskyldige! VanCEren! Den stygge, forfCErdelige vanCEre! Og 
sa rent ruinert til og med! (1.43) 
Gunhild rejects the claim of the pursuit of personallykke as a universally 
valid end: people charged with a higher purpose in life have no time for such 
pedestrian concerns. She has been training Erhart up to this calling, and there 
will be no reserve energy for happiness. With a derisory pyh she removes lykke 
from the valid-life equation as deftly as Pastor Manders does, on the grounds 
that it conflicts all too easily with dUty.5 
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So while Ella plans to salvage Erhart through her project of restoration 
from the Borkman narrative to enable him to begin a fresh chapter in the 
Rentheim narrative after her imminent death, Gunhild wants Erhart to invert 
the Borkman narrative of shame and deceit and turn it into a narrative of 
restitution, of righting an imbalance and demanding the suffering of the 
responsible party. But both projects are ultimately sterile as they are 
expressions of fear: fear of death and effacement in Ella's case, and fear of living 
in Gunhild's case, and they both operate through the same means, that is 
Erhart. Imposing this great mission on Erhart to purge the Borkman name of all 
the stigmata attaching to it may at first seem a positive ambition, but he is 
simply the instrument for her revenge on his father. So obsessed is she with 
revenge that there is ultimately little to distinguish Erhart's role in her life from 
the skamst6tte she vows to erect over Borkman's dead body in Act ill. Thus in 
both schemes, Erhart is circumscribed and is not "an end in himself' in the 
sense that Kant demands as the basis for ethical inter-personal relationships. 
8.3 Act II 
8.3.1 Lykke 
While Gunhild's position is established in Act I, Ella's does not become 
clear to the audience, nor truly to herself, until her confrontation with John 
Gabriel, Gunhild's sick wolf, who for eight years has been pacing the floor 
above her head, never breaking free from his self-imposed extended 
incarceration. Ella's purpose in confronting the man who abandoned her and 
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married her twin sister in her stead is dual: she both wants to settle accounts 
and to persuade Borkman to transfer his son to her. But John Gabriel's reaction 
on both counts is surprising. First, he rebuts her accusation that he ruined her 
chances of happiness by marrying Gunhild: 
BORKMAN. Der har du selv skylden, Ella [ ... ] Du 
kunde sa godt ble't lykkelig uden mig. 
ELLA RENTHEIM. Tror du det? 
BORKMAN. I fald du bare selv havde villet 
ELLA RENTHEIM (hanligt). - ar efter ar viste jeg 
lykken fra mig, mener du vel? (2.82) 
Borkman's implication is that just as he chose to marry Gunhild instead 
of Ella, Ella chose to be unhappy by rejecting Hinkel. In his view she has no one 
to blame but herself, her contrary, wilful self. For Borkman lykke is clearly in the 
realm of human control, and not prey to the whims of external capricious 
agencies. But even more astonishing is his suggestion that personal happiness is 
a solipsistic project which does not depend on successful association. Not only 
does this account isolate lykke from chance but also isolates the individual from 
chance. This notion is not only counter to common sense but also counter to the 
Aristotelian analysis, which insists on the centrality of others in the 
achievement of happiness: 
It seems clear that happiness needs the addition of 
external goods, as we said, for it is difficult if not 
impossible, to do fine deeds without any resources. Many 
can only be done by the help of friends, or wealth or 
political influence. There are also certain advantages, such 
as good ancestry or good children, or personal beauty, the 
lack of which mars our felicity; for a man is scarcely 
happy if he is very ugly to look at, or of low birth, or 
solitary, or childless; and presumably even less so if he has 
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children or friends who are quite worthless. (EN I, l099a 
32) 
Ella had refused to effect the smooth substitution of Hinkel for John 
Gabriel, the very smooth substitution she herself fell foul of. Borkman himself 
puts it in just these terms: "Men nar endelig sa rna vcere, sa kan dog en kvinde 
erstattes af en anden" (2.87). But Ella is acutely aware of the interdependence of 
lykke and not only external goods but also the emotions. She can only respond 
with weary sarcasm, for the imperative drive of emotions such as love, and 
their resistance to rational ordering have framed her life narrative, indeed, they 
have" determined her place in this narrative" as Rorty puts it 
Instead of submitting to Borkman's logic Ella directs the conversation 
round to the theme of guilt and debt, and sets out the terms of the injury she 
suffered at his hands. Borkman's desertion of her for her twin sister meant the 
end of Ella's emotional life, the end of a healthy, participatory life and the death 
of a female nature, which, in Ella's version of it, consisted in the happy and 
perfect coincidence of love and procreation. This play stands out among the 
nutidsdramaer in that here it is a female, not a male character who insists on the 
motherhood -as-destiny formula. 6 
Borkman persists in his gloss on events: "Du kunde sa godt ble't lykkelig 
med ham ogsa. Og da havde jeg vceret frelst" (2.82) - one of several instances of 
his tendency to deny the individuality of others while insisting on his own 
immutable essence. He explains how Hinkel, mistakenly convinced that his old 
friend Borkman was actively guiding Ella's consistent rejections of him, went 
295 
public with their correspondence containing incriminating evidence of 
Borkman's suspect business practices. This led to his arrest, trial and conviction. 
Borkman is convinced of Hinkel's catalytic role in his downfall. 
8.3.2 Helping Friends and Harming Enemies 
In the terms of classical tragedy, his misplaced trust in Hinkel, the 
confidential letters he sent him detailing his activities at the bank, could be seen 
as an "error of judgemenf' - hamartia, and the enormity of Hinkel's betrayal 
would have been a much bigger issue for classical audiences than it is for 
modern interpreters of Ibsen? In her study of Sophocles and Greek ethics, Mary 
Whitlock-Blundell explains how: 
Respect for friends could be ranked alongside reverence 
for gods, parents and laws [ ... ]. In other words, it was 
amongst the most powerful moral imperatives of Greek 
life. When Hesiod predicts the total moral degeneracy in 
which the iron age will culminate, he envisages the 
breakdown of the bonds of philia between parent and 
child, guest and host, friend and friend, brother and 
brother. [ ... ] The corresponding significance of philia in 
ethical thought can be seen by the attention devoted to it 
by philosophers and moralists.8 
Whitlock-Blundell explains that as well as being prized as a great good, 
friendship also demanded a conception of enmity, which in turn had its own 
ethic.9 This is the same framework Borkman uses in his definition of the most 
infamous crime: "Det er ikke mord. Ikke reveri eller natligt indbrud. Ikke falsk 
ed engang. For aU sligt noget, det eves jo mest imod folk som en hader, eller 
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som er en ligegyldige og ikke kommer en ved [ ... ]Det infameste er yens misbrug 
av yens tillid" (2.75). 
However, despite all the circumstances that conspire against Borkman 
and cut him down Ulige midt i afgerelsens dage" (2.75), he seems more 
concerned with acquitting himself in a rejection of his own finitude than with 
coming to an understanding of his situation, and the ramifications of his 
actions. Furthermore, the integrity of the position he takes on the question of 
friendship is made questionable, if not wholly undermined by his subsequent 
treatment of Foldal. Ibsen is hinting at tragedy here, introducing the old tropes, 
but forestalling it, because Borkman's mode here is resentment not suffering. 
His shameless ethical contortionism climaxes in an astonishing j' accuse: 
uSe, alt det er du skyld i, Ella!" (2.82) - a dismal failure to distinguish between 
efficient cause and moral blame. Female obstinacy, sentimentality, wilfulness; 
the sign of his undoing. 
Ella is content to have the tables turned on her in this manner; anything 
to prevent her project of passing on the Rentheim name to Erhart from getting 
derailed. Moving from the territory of guilt to debt (in the chapter on Bygmester 
Solness we saw how the word Schuld embeds both notions in it).10 Borkman 
acknowledges his indebtedness to Ella for having provided for his family ever 
since his conviction, and for allowing them to live in her house. Her charity is 
not in dispute, yet it seems to count for little. Then in a gesture consistent with 
his general revisionism, Borkman inverts the debtor/creditor, giver/receiver 
relationship as deftly as he had the sinning/ sinned against " ... jeg ved, hvad 
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du har ofret for mig og for din s0ster. Men du kunde ogsel gere det, Ella. Og du 
skal vel huske pel at der var mig som satte dig i stand til at kunne det" (2.83). 
Borkman here is presenting himself in the role of enabler, as he had 
spared Ella's money from the high-risk investment that foundered for 
everybody else. Nevertheless, demanding gratitude for not having outraged 
somebody's trust, for not having deprived them of their fortune is hardly 
commendable. Dramatically, however, it opens the way for Borkman to reveal 
the tenor of his feelings for Ella at the time. Whether this action was, as he 
claims, informed by his feelings for her, or whether it was calculated as a buffer 
for himself and his family in the event of catastrophe, is a point on which Ibsen 
is typically reticent. On the one hand, it is the only locus of equivocation in his 
project, but on the other, Borkman would have been aware that in the event of 
bankruptcy, all money and property in his name would have been turned over 
to the courts. 
What is even more remarkable is that he employs the language of 
deliverance and salvation from within a discourse of religious redemption. He 
says 1/ og da havde jeg v~ret frelst" instead of the more neutral reddet.l1 His 
salvation, however, would have been carried by the sacrifice not of self, not by 
any act of atonement, but by Ella sacrificing her emotional life in a cold act of 
transference, mirroring his own marriage to her twin sister Gunhild. Later it 
becomes clear that Borkman does not process experience against a matrix of 
redemption and retribution, because there is no place in the structure he 
produces for the premise for redemption and salvation - sin. Borkman attributes 
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his downfall to a chain of unhappy coincidences, either as an agentless, 
impersonal power, as we shall see below, or as the result of treachery on the 
part of a jealous friend and the obstinacy of an over-emotional woman. 
8.3.3 Ulykke 
When Borkman first appears on stage it is in his Napoleonic aspect, 
waiting for a delegation to come and entreat him to take the helm of a new 
bank: II Barkman staaende ved skrivebardet med den venslre hand st8ttet mod 
bordpladen og den h6jre indstukket pa brystet". But instead Foldal enters, the man 
who, with his young daughter Frida, is the only person with whom Borkman 
has any contact. Their relationship is mutually sustaining of their respective 
dreams and aspirations: Borkman's vision of restoration and vindication, of 
being restored to fame and Foldal's as a great tragic poet. This waiting, and the 
conviction that his expectations will be fulfilled define his life-activity, signalled 
by the triple rna: U ••• de rna, rna, rna komme ... Jeg tror det sa fast. Ved det sa 
uryggelig visst - at de kommer. - Havde jeg ikke havt den visshed - sa havde 
jeg for lcenge siden skudt mig en kugle gennem hodet" (2.73-4).12 
When Foldal makes indirect reference to the embezzlement scandal, 
Borkman reacts violently, referring to U -den ulykke, som bred ind over banken -
!" Foldal immediately tries to limit the damage: "(beroligende). Men jeg gi'r da 
ikke dig skylden for det! Gud bevare mig vel-!" (2.72). Borkman's first reference 
to the embezzlement is interesting: it was a crime for which he has been 
arrested, tried and convicted, so there is a clear question of established agency 
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here, in contrast to other catastrophes which frame the disasters of some of the 
other plays, for example, Solness's crack in the chimney (negligence/willing) 
and Eyolf s fall from the table (negligence). But in a movement counter to that 
of Solness's, Borkman depersonalises his agency through abstraction, even 
though the causal chain is incontestible. It is not an effect of his guilt like 
Solness's obsession with the fire, which is, significantly, also referred to as 
ulykke. Borkman here is mobilising the concept of lykke to a very definite end. 
More than a mere figure of speech, it goes someway to producing the fragile 
absolution that sustains his belief in his resurrection. 
Borkman's gloss on the embezzlement episode as ulykke not only 
vanishes the issue of his own agency, but also closes off his discourse to tragic 
enquiry and the kind of disturbing self-addressed analysis that Solness, 
however fraudulently and reluctantly, subjects himself to. Whereas Solness had 
resisted ulykke as an explanation for the fire, reading instead responsibility into 
the incident, Borkman rests his case on it 
Aristotle is very clear on the role of accident in tragedy. Ulykke or 
atuchema are not the sites of tragedy, for mischance either has an arbitrary or an 
external cause, like Aristotle's famous example of the falling statue13, in contrast 
with hamartia, which leads to suffering through error: 
To come to grief through hamartia is then, to fall through 
some sort of mistake in action that is causally intelligible, 
not simply fortuitous, done in some sense by oneself; and 
yet not the outgrowth of a settled defective dispositi.on of 
character. Further examination indicates that hamarha can 
include both blameworthy and non-blameworthy missing 
of the mark: the innocent ignorance of Oedipus, the 
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intentional but highly constrained act of Agamemnon, the 
passionate deviations of acratic persons inspired to act 
against settled character by eros or anger.14 
In the chapter on Bygmester Solness, I emphasised the distinction between 
incident luck which arises from external events beyond an agent's control and 
constitutive moral luck, which describes aspects of our character and 
temperament15 A distinction between two types of luck proper is made by A. 
Buriks, between tuche as factum and Tuche as agens, usually capitalised as a 
personification.16 The factum aspect covers states, conditions and events, rather 
like the category of incident luck. Borkman seems at first to be evoking the 
notion in the former sense, yet as he gets more involved in his narrative, the 
tuche he refers to, it transpires, was the betrayal of those closest to him: Hinkel 
and Ella. The nature of the crime was also deeply imbricated in luck as agens, 
not in the abstract sense of misfortune. Borkman reminds us of the risk factor 
involved in financial speculation. 
In this respect, Borkman is more truly modern than his counterparts in 
other plays. His image of the hot air balloon is an allegory of risk.17 Anthony 
Giddens explains that one of the "consequences of modernity" was the 
marriage of the concept of "trust" with the concept of "risk". The etymology of 
the word "risk" is the Spanish nautical term meaning Uto run into danger", Uto 
go against arock", and generally denotes unanticipated results obtaining as a 
consequence of one's actions, rather than the ineffable intentions of a deity. 
Giddens argues that risk "largely replaces what was previously thought of as 
fr I . "18 fortuna" and "becomes separated om cosmo ogles. 
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In a secular environment, low-probability high-
consequence risks tend to conjure up anew a sense of 
fortuna closer to the pre-modem outlook than that 
cultivated by minor superstitions. A sense of ''{ate' 
whether positively or negatively tinged - a vague and 
generalised sense of trust in distant events over which one 
has no control - relieves the individual of the burden of 
engagement with an existential situation which might otherwise 
be chronically disturbing. Fate, a feeling that things will take 
their own course anyway, thus reappears at the core of a 
world which is supposedly taking rational control of its 
affairs. Moreover, this surety exacts a price on the level of 
the unconscious since it essentially presumes the 
repression of anxiety. The sense of dread which is the 
antithesis of basic trust is likely to infuse unconscious 
sentiments about the uncertainties faced by humanity as a 
whole.19 
What Giddens is pointing to here is a state of affairs in which the 
individual relinquishes a direct engagement with significant elements of 
existence and autonomy, yet has not freed himself from a deep subliminal 
insecurity . 
That Foldal is attuned to the tenor of Borkman's moral reasoning is 
obvious from his reflex connivance in the effacement of his friend's 
responsibility in his unambiguous declaration of Borkman's innocence. Foldal, 
though himself a victim, exonerates Borkman through a defence of self, in the 
complex, tortured nexus of guilt and blame, thereby establishing the pattern for 
Borkman's subsequent treatment of Ella, as discussed above. 
However, Borkman's view of an acceptable risk diverges widely from 
Ella's. When he apprises her of the depth of the feelings he had for her, she is at 
a loss, having always believed that he had abandoned her for Gunhild out of 
straightforward erotic caprice. She was unaware that the substitution had been 
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prompted not by passion but by business concerns and that she had quite 
literally been sold. She cannot stomach the thought that she had been reduced 
to the status of an object of exchange, all the more when she learns that she was 
then" det dyreste i verden" to Borkman. 
Borkman, however, insists that where Ella sees choice, open free choice 
in the matter of whom he was to marry, there was none - just as for Ella the 
choice to take Hinkel was no choice at all. He had acted out of "h0yere 
hensyn", collapsing the preconditions of blame, morality and personal 
responsibility into the notion of "tvingende n0dvendighed", cura necessitatis. 
"Havde ikke noget valg. Matte sejre eller fa Ide. Den tvingende n0dvendighed 
var over mig, Ella" (2.85). These words accommodate a meta-tragic dimension 
in Borkman's self-conscious drama, which is structured around seminal tragic 
concepts such as necessity, while ostensibly functioning as a realistic, rational 
discourse of apology and examination of motive. 
But this narrative of self as victim of an unscrupulous, vengeful friend, is 
not tragic as it is simply the tale of a crime uncovered and punished, which is, 
as already noted, not the stuff of tragedy, something he points out with 
mordant irony to Foldal when they discuss Hinkel's betrayal: 
FOLDAL. Men oojt til vejrs kom han. 
BORKMAN. Og jeg i afgrunden. 
FOLDAL. A det er et frygteligt s0rgespill. 
BORKMAN. N~sten lige sa frygteligt som dit, 
synes jeg, nar jeg tc:Enker pa det. (2.76) 
Moreover, Borkman's insistence on locating his undoing in ulykke or 
atuchema precludes the tragic. His story only begins to insert itself in the tragic 
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field during his discussion with Ella, however much he tries to resist her and 
however determined he is to exonerate himself by inverting the sinning-sinned 
against relationship, because it is here that the central notion of sacrifice asserts 
itself. 
8.3.4 Forbryder 
Ella wrests him out of this pseudo-heroic discourse, re-inserting him 
squarely into the discourse of transgression. She denounces him as "forbryder", 
but not in the forensic sense, which as we have seen is not the core of the 
drama. For Ella the locus of his offence is not his violation of the law but his 
offence against love. She insists that had Borkman not traduced his love for her, 
she would have borne the scandal with equanimity. This assertion contrasts 
strongly with her sister's reaction to the affair - Gunhild is emotionally crippled 
by the "stygge forf~rdelige van~re" (1.43) - the shame brought on her. Her 
hunger for revenge defines her every waking moment But it is clear later that 
in Gunhild's case, there was no great love affair between her and Borkman to 
fall back on, only the picture of a man who brought disgrace on her house, 
propelled her into reduced circumstances and consigned her to the periphery of 
a society whose approbation she once enjoyed. 
Ella is so determined to shake Borkman out of his solipsism that she tries 
to shock with the charge of murder: 
Du har dr~bt k~rlighedslivet i mig [ ... ] Der tales i 
bibelen om en gadefuld synd, som der ingen tilgivelse er 
for. Jeg har aldrig fer kunnet begribe, hvad det var for 
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noget Nu begriber jeg det Den store nadeh~se synd, - det 
er den synd at myrde kcerlighedslivet i et menneske [ ... ] ... 
Du sveg den kvinde, du elsked! Mig, mig, mig! Det dyreste, 
du vidste i verden, det var du rede til at afhCEnde for 
vindings skyld. Del er dobbeltmordet, som du har gjort 
dig skyldig i! Mordet pa din egen sja?l og pa min! (2.86-7).20 
However, Borkman does not meet this accusation with the same 
vehemence with which it is made. Rather, he neutralises its force by over-
rationalising his position (in the manner Giddens suggests is emblematic of 
modern man) by resisting the validity of its terms. He concedes that from 
within her limited, female perspective Ella is right, and thereby posits a 
gendered, perspectivist morality, which, once asserted, he proceeds to outrage 
with his next point that one woman can easily substitute for another. He, 
however, as a man inhabits a much higher plane of experience and operates 
under the sign of necessity and lust for power, situated within a moral economy 
in which the substitution of one woman for another is stock-in-trade when the 
aim is to "vCEkke alle guldets slumrende ander" (2.87). Borkman then rehearses 
the claim that Ella was responsible both for his promotion to bank manager and 
his ignominious fall, - both determined by Hinkel's erotic ambitions and deep 
frustration at her refusal to reciprocate: 
For magtlysten var sa ubetvingelig i mig, ser du! Og sa 
slog jeg til. Miitte sla til. Og han hjalp mig op halvvejs 
imod de dragende hejder, hvor jeg vilde hen. Og jeg steg 
og steg. Ar for ar steg jeg - [ ... ] Og endda sa styrtet han 
mig i afgrunden igjen For din skyld, Ella. (2.88) 
In this speech Borkman's self-assessment is breathtakingly protean, 
slipping in and out of various discourses, never identifying himself with any 
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one for long enough to arrest his shifting perspective. On the one hand he 
seems to be reasserting the classical tragic progression of the irresistible rise of 
the great man, and the force of ineluctable necessity which brings him to his 
knees. But when the tragic fall does take place and Borkman is toppled, he does 
not see it as the result of his own hubris, or of his hamartia. It is brought about by 
a faithless, jealous friend: Hinkel as that implacable child of Night, Nemesis. In 
other words, external reasons. 
Alternatively, he shifts the blame onto the acratic woman who is 
incapable of regulating her emotions. Attracted by the grandeur constitutive of 
the tragic patterning, he seeks refuge in the concept of the tragic, but remains 
resistant to tragic guilt, luxuriating instead in the more satisfactory explanation 
of an ulykke which obtains from the lack of external goods. Whichever 
perspective obtains, Borkman as a victim of betrayal is exonerated. 
In Act II, at what is the beginning of a very tense sequence, Ella 
temporarily loses her footing to be drawn into this version of the tragic 
trajectory which erases individual responsibility. She asks Borkman whether he 
thinks that their entire relationship has not been under a curse. Borkman seems 
to suffer a crisis of confidence at this point, momentarily deprived of his 
rhetorical guile, he falters in his ability to offer ready judgements, something 
which opens up a space for Ella to reassert her own version of the truth. 
Extending Borkman's notion of gendered morality, she now delivers a highly 
gendered reading of personal happiness, defining it thus: 
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Al kvindelig menneskegl~de idetmindste. Fra den 
tid, da dit billede begyndte at slukne i mig, har jeg levet 
mit liv som under en solformerkelse. I aIle disse ar er det 
ble't mig mere og mere imod, - rent umuligt til slut, at 
elske nogen levende skabning. Ikke mennesker, ikke dyr 
eller planter. (2.88) 
This assault climaxes in the charge that uDu har bedraget mig for en 
mors gl~de og lykke i livet. Og for en mors sorger og tarer ogsa. Og det turde 
kanske v~re det dyreste tab for mig, du" (2.88-9). 
Ella's statement of female happiness is conventional; her portrait of 
motherhood verges on the sentimental. But her complaint against Borkman that 
he closed off all avenues to emotional fulfilment and experience is substantial. 
Motherhood for Ella means participation in nature and in process. Deprived of 
this opportunity, she is alienated from her fellow human beings, her biological 
function and the natural environment, leaving Erhart to absorb her pain, her 
sense of loss and her obsessive battle for her name to live on after her death.21 
But while Ibsen traces Ella's career with weighty poignancy he does not leave 
her to shoulder the burden of tragedy. Her heartbreak is just that, a heartbreak, 
and as such cannot extend beyond the sense of the tragic encapsulated in 
common usage into the realms of tragedy proper, however vexed a term this 
may be. The blame for Ella's emotional wasteland does lie squarely on 
Borkman's shoulders, but it is not this guilt alone that asserts the tragic measure 
of the play. For as previously mentioned, Ella's devastation is not tragic, 
especially since it is not mirrored by a commensurate sacrifice on the part of 
Borkman. Despite his claim that he loved her deeply, his choice to sacrifice her 
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reveals none of the contours of agony that shape Brand's decision to sacrifice 
Alf and Agnes. 
8.4 Actm 
8.4.1 Jeg matte det 
Act ill returns us to the gloom of Gunhild's drawing room. Borkman 
makes his first appearance for eight years, much to the consternation of both his 
wife and her maid. But it is not in a spirit of reparation and conciliation that 
Borkman returns. He proceeds to make several gestures at self-acquittal, almost 
parodying the oft-quoted Ibsenian adage "[a]t digte - det er at holde / 
dommedag over sig selv."22 He claims that he has repeatedly sat in judgement 
over himself, and each time he is forced into an acquittal, on the grounds that 
freeing the ore was incontrovertible, irresistible and imperative, and like 
Solness, he sees his relationship with his project as coterminous with his own 
identity, with his irreducible sense of selfhood: "Menneskene sk0nner ikke at 
jeg matte det, fordi jeg var mig selv, - fordi jeg var John Gabriel Borkman, - og 
ikke nogen anden" (3.97). His insistence that there is an absolving, 1/ sejrende 
bevidshed" (3.99) holds sway over the entire scene. 
In a breathtaking feat of ethical acrobatics, Borkman, like Solness, 
manages to recast his solipsism as a kind of utilitarianism, and like Solness he 
does so through a concept of lykke. But unlike Solness, Borkman never expects 
the term to apply to himself, or anyone individual close to him, and he never 
directs his self-examination in terms of happiness. In this respect, he could not 
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differ more from Halvard Solness who sees happiness as a condition for living 
"Jeg, jeg - som ikke kan leve livet gl~de10st!" (3.106). Borkman, in isolating lykke 
from the personal resembles Gunhild who earlier rejects lykke as a valid end for 
people with higher goals in life. 
So far then, Borkman has resorted to an impersonal notion of a cruel 
providence not only to eliminate his responsibility for the disaster at the bank 
and the number of lives it broke, but also to disburden himself of blame. But 
even then there is no felt compassion for his impoverished investors. Borkman's 
use of ulykke as the sign of his own downfall in fact communicates nothing 
more than the combination of circumstances which led to his fraud being 
uncovered, and his resentment at having been caught, and thus stands very 
close to the common usage of the term 'bad luck'. 
Here he provides the closest insight into what lykke for him consists in. 
His sense of selfhood, already asserted, prepares the ground for his defence and 
it coincides just as fully with the template of the 'necessary identity' we saw in 
the cases of Brand, Solness, and obtains in a negative form, in Hedda Gabler. 
But this alone cannot exonerate him without remainder. 
Borkman's II dommedag over sig selv" in the first part of Act III 
unfortunately is no more able to precipitate an anagnorisis than Solness's 
multiple 'confessions' to Herdal and Hilde in the same mode. Borkman's self-
evaluation is entrenched: "0g det domsresultat, jeg stadig kommer til, det er 
del, at den eneste jeg har forbrudt mig imod, - det er mig selv" (3.98). Gunhild 
challenges this solipsism by confronting him with his family and his investors, 
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and the extent of his sin against them. (Solness, at least, did not have to have 
this pointed out to him.) His family he gives but scant attention to by 
identifying their interests with his and subsuming their injury under his own 
(the only occasion, it must be stressed, that he makes such an identification). 
Using the same strategy he had employed earlier with Ella, Borkman re-
mobilises the tragic discourse, which automatically trumps the interests, rights 
and needs of Gunhild and their son, Erhart "Jeg havde magten! Og sa den 
ubetvingelige kaldelse indeni mig da!" (3.98). 
This raises the ethical dilemma, of the Gauguin problem, encountered in 
Bygmester Solness. What difference would a successful outcome have made? 
Would Borkman have been justified in 'borrowing' his investors' money if he 
had indeed succeeded in releasing the trapped millions? He is certainly of the 
view that he would, and makes a clear statement to this effect to Foldal in Act 
11.23 
His version of events is that he was the only person with the vision and 
capacity to respond to the pleas for release of the "bundne millioner", and his 
conceit is that no one else would have responded so wholeheartedly even if 
they had heard the plaintive cries of the imprisoned ore. This reinforces his idea 
of the unique value of the self, and his own selfhood. It is this "kort og godt" 
which acquits him. 
The only source of regret for Borkman is the fact of his post-release 
incarceration, the fact that he has allowed himself to idle away the last eight 
years in inert obscurity, instead of seizing the opportunity to re-enter the world 
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of men and try to overturn the tragic pattern: "5amme dag, jeg kom pa fri fod, 
skulde jeg gaet ud i virkeligheden, - ud i den jernharde, dr0mmel0se 
virkelighed! Jeg skulde begyndt nedenfra og svunget mig op til h0jderne pany-
h0jere, end nogensinde f0r, - "(3.98).24 But it is not too late: ILJa, nar hele verden 
hveeser i kor at jeg er en uoprejselig mand, sa kan der komme stunder over mig, 
da jeg selv er neer ved at tro det [ ... ] Men sa stiger min inderste, sejerende 
bevidsthed op igen! Og den frikender mig" (3.99). 
Van Laan argues that John Gabriel Barkman IS In many ways Ibsen's 
exemplary tragedy. His view that Ibsen was essentially a writer of tragedies in 
the Aristotelian mode has been discussed. But for Van Laan one of the most 
important modifications the Aristotelian tragic pattern undergoes in Ibsen is the 
use of the "retreat": 
In this version, the protagonist yearns to act boldly and 
aggressively but from lack of self-confidence, fear that the 
consequences will be disastrous, or some other cause also 
feels a counter-urge to retreat into the safety of ordinary 
existence. After yielding to this counter-urge, in some 
cases following upon an intial burst of action, the 
protagonist eventually realises that the retreat cannot be 
maintained because it proves to be a state of death-in-life 
and because the urge to act ultimately proves too strong to 
resist And so the protagonist finally acts decisively, with 
the almost immediate result being reversal and 
catastrophe. 25 
Van Laan argues that John Gabriel Barkman is the nutidsdrama which 
"contains Ibsen's most conspicUOUS use of the pattern". After thirteen years' 
absence from pursuing his calling, he is "stirred into reflection about his 
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retreat"26 - anagnorisis as mental process, and he realizes that his greatest sin is 
against himself and his total inertia in confronting the past and the future. 
Although Borkman has never seen the tragic trajectory as fixed and 
irreversible, he is supremely confident that an indomitable will can prevail and 
that the tragic patterning can be overturned by the very agency which 
instantiated it, his tragic identity. But hitherto he has done nothing to show that 
he is equal to his tragic identity. He has wasted many years in passivity, 
waiting fori delegation to appear and vindicate him, hiding behind a rhetoric L CL 
which shifts between self-aggrandisement and blame. It is Erhart's rejection of 
him that catalyses his recognition of this, and his acknowledgement of sin, the 
opening for his anagnorisis. 
Now the sin he acknowledges is not his sin against his investors who had 
entered into a relationship of trust with the bank he represented, nor is it the 
II greatest sin" which Ella accuses him of, but the sin against his own project But 
for him it is not merely an issue of reinserting himself in the world, albeit at the 
top. Gunhild accuses him of simply trying to repeat his previous life, but he 
dismisses the concept of repetition applying to life. Not in the sense that 
anything new will happen, but in the sense that the past is unique and 
unrepeatable, and is only transformed by the individual's relationship to it 
Extending the metaphor of resurrection and renewal, Borkman refers to the 
"genf0dte 0je" which has the power to transform past actions. 
Is this the eye of anagnorisis? Not quite, but it certainly represents an 
adjusted focus. It is followed by a flash, however momentary, of self-
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knowledge. Borkman complains that nobody has ever understood him. When 
challenged by Ella he modifies the charge to complain that nobody has 
understood him since the time when he thought he did not need understanding, a 
reference to the time when he and Ella were in love and he was at his most 
ambitious. Echoing his complaint to Foldal in Act II that "Det er forbandelsen, 
som vi enkelte, vi udvalgte mennesker har at bCEre pel. Massen og mCEngden, _ 
alle de gjennemsnitlige, de forstar oss ikke" (2.71). 
The terms of Borkman's discourse are revealing of a highly eclectic and 
predatory ego, one which has inserted itself into the discourse of the tragic to 
acquire stature and it also feeds off the Christian narrative of forgiveness and 
rehabilitation. But the essential elements of both narratives are lacking and this 
invalidates his project. From the tragic patterning, the anagnorisis is deferred, 
and from the Christian patterning of redemption and salvation, aspects of 
forgiveness and repentance have been overwhelmed in this attempt at sublation 
of two opposing systems. By refusing to acknowledge the price exacted both 
from himself and others in his rise and in his fall, Borkman denies himself 
restoration within a Christian ethics. He falls back on the notion of the curse, 
suggested to him by Ella in Act II, using it like lykke to vanish his own agent-
responsibility from the narrative and to underscore his belief that he has been 
impeded by flawed human beings. 
When Gunhild decries his self-love, he insists that his love is not a love 
of self but a love of power, which he twists into a spurious utilitarian model as 
"magten til at skabe menneskelykke vidt, vidt omkring mig" (3.100). The irony 
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of this is inescapable - not only does Borkman make repeated, derogatory 
reference to "masse og mcengden" in the rhetoric of the elect favoured by 
several Ibsen heroes, but he has of course achieved the opposite. This pseudo-
utilitarian aspect of his project was one that Solness also had recourse to. This is 
one of the defining characteristics of a certain type of Ibsen hero - the inability 
to live on an individual level and so employing the conceit of ameliorist 
concerns for mankind to compensate for the individual misery and destruction 
they cause. 
It is at this point in Act ill that Borkman breaks out of the danse macabre 
that Gunhild, not Frida, is playing for him, instructing him "Dr0m aid rig mere 
om liv! Forhold dig rolig, der du ligger!" (3.100) - in the grave. Gunhild's sick 
wolf has broken out of his cage and poses a threat to her peace of mind. In 
order for her to live out her narrative of restitution through Erhart, it is 
necessary to keep Borkman immobilised in her resentment, and for his life's 
narrative to end there. It becomes too difficult to carry out her project of 
annihilation if Borkman is at large again, more difficult for everything that he 
stood for to be hidden"i glemsel for menneskenes 0jne" (3.101). 
It may be objected that this anagnorisis comes too suddenly, and is as 
spurious as every other position Borkman has occupied. However, if the terms 
of Borkman's recognition are considered carefully, it will be clear that this is no 
mere posturing. 
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8.4.2 Emotions of Self-Assessment 
One of Borkman's defining characteristics is pride. Ibsen underscores the 
pride emerging through his speech with stage directions making this explicit 
(2.93; 3.99, for example). However, few have given the structure of Borkman's 
pride, and its reverse, shame and guilt, much thought, even though pride is a 
common designation of the tragic hero. These emotions are in Gabriele Taylor's 
view the cardinal emotions of "self-assessment" as they regulate the agent's 
view of himself. Taylor explains: 
[i]n experiencing any of these emotions the person 
concerned believes of herself that she has deviated from 
some norm and that in doing so she has altered her 
standing in the world. The self is the object of these 
emotions, and what is believed amounts to an assessment 
of the self. 27 
Pride falls under Hume's category of "indirect passions", that is passion 
involving reason. The classic example given of an agent's perceiving his altered 
standard in the world is Oedipus in the so-called Messenger scene when he 
realises his true identity. "0 Light! May I never look on you again, / Revealed 
as I am, sinful in my begetting, / Sinful in my marriage, sinful in shedding of 
blood".28 Oedipus's response to this shame is to pluck out his eyeballs with 
]ocasta's brooch pin - eyes that "should no longer see his shame, his guilt".29 
What this experience has done to Oedipus is to impose a change in his 
assessment of his self and his relationship to the world; a radical alteration. As 
Taylor goes on to say, "the drama is of course internal, the view of the event is 
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the agent's and the change takes place within him. He provides the stage as 
well as the dramatis personae."30 
The structure of pride can therefore be seen to provide the emotional 
matrix that enables anagnorisis to take place. For without this self-referential 
paradigm shift, there can be no insight, no recognition, no unconcealment. 
Pride, as a dispositional state insulates the agent from such insight. The English 
word "pride" does not share the transparent structure of the Greek and Latin 
words hypselos and superbus, which both indicate an elevated position within a 
structure - the proud man has inserted himself over and above all others in a 
hierarchy of some kind, be it ethical, social, intellectual or artistic. 
But there is a further aspect to pride underlined by John Rawls which is 
particularly relevant to this play. Rawls discusses pride in the light of notions of 
self-respect. He breaks the concept down into its constituent aspects: firstly, 
pride embraces the sense of the individual's sense of self-worth; secondly it 
covers his security in his conviction that his life plan is worth carrying out and a 
concomitant security in his actual ability to see his life plan through. Rawls 
argues that without it "All desire and activity becomes empty and vain, and we 
sink into apathy and cynicism."31 
The demand at work here coheres with the Aristotelian principle that an 
agent must have a rational life plan, and equally, needs to have his person and 
his deeds appreciated by others, and therefore others need to confirm the 
importance of what he does. Rawls insists that in order for this to be possible, it 
is essential "that there should be for each person at least one community of 
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shared interests to which he belongs and where he finds his endeavours 
confirmed by his associates."32 
Already from this preliminary investigation into the structure of pride, 
we have uncovered two fundamental insights into the mechanism of tragedy; 
firstly the principle of pride as a necessary condition for anagnorisis, and 
secondly, other-regard as a necessary condition for self-esteem. 
The notion of a "community of shared interests" is a fragile concept in 
Ibsen. Even in earlier plays like En Folkefiende when the emphasis is on 
functioning communities, the notion is questioned to breaking point. Ibsen's 
heroes are characteristically isolate, and their usual mode is to walk alone, so 
alone in fact that they lay themselves open to charges of solipsism. This 
explains that when they do form alliances they are at once so vulnerable to 
them and so energised by them, for example, Solness and Hilde, Rosmer and 
Rebekka. Their dialogue takes on an extra-social dimension and, dispensing 
with the realistic limits of the play, dwarfs them with a highly theatrical folie a 
deux in which identities merge, shift and double. 
But in John Gabriel Borkman the isolation and social disenfranchisement of 
the hero is so extreme as to be underscored in every way. The man has literally 
been locked away for fifteen years, the outcast exile in the classical tragic mode 
of the apolis. During these years he has been clinging to a dream of 
rehabilitation, or "resurrection" as he puts it, but refuses to acknowledge the 
transgression he committed, and instead focuses on the legal aspect of his 
experience as a question of bad luck. The burden of guilt is carried by others, by 
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his friend and his lover. Borkman himself as we have seen has removed himself 
totally from the ethical equation and inserted himself instead into a impersonal 
ca usal nexus. 
In view of his isolation, it is not surprising that the little social contact he 
does have, with Frida and her father Wilhelm Foldal, is dominated by 
discussions of worth and self-worth. Borkman's relationship with Foldal is a 
bitter reflection of the isolate hero who has no-one to confirm the validity of his 
project. Frida is the first character to be presented on stage with Borkman. The 
young girl-ageing man dynamic is familiar from Bygmester Solness; but here 
Ibsen deliberately eschews the folie a deux as a force to carry the action. Borkman 
holds no special fascination for Frida and vice versa, and his relationship with 
her father is so cynically configured as to suggest a parody of this folie and 
simply reinforces Borkman's isolation. 
There is literally nothing in Borkman's world to reflect back a sense of 
self. This desolation is amplified in the stage directions, which at once 
aggrandise and mock. Surrounded by Empire-style furniture stands Borkman 
with a "farnemt udseende, fint skiiret profil, hvasse eine og griihvidt, kruset htlr og 
skiEg" (2. 67) and "sa sig om i al tomheden" (2.70). To reinforce this existential 
emptiness, Ibsen has him looking into a hand mirror - a glass reflecting back his 
own image. This is a departure. Other Ibsen characters in moments of 
heightened agitation typically drum their fingers on windowpanes, the 
perspectives they afford reinforcing their feelings of entrapment, and 
frustration. Borkman, by contrast, is self-regarding, looking inwards, not out. 
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Because he can find no satisfactory confirmation of his project in his 
environment, he looks to history for analogies of his situation. What stares back 
at him from the mirror is a "Napoleon, der blev skudt til krebling i sit ferste 
feltslag" (2.74). 
The reference to Napoleon is an instance of Borkman's rhetorical 
experimentation. Groping desperately for a structure which will sustain the 
measure of the name John Gabriel Borkman, he has recourse to historical and 
mythical templates (Napoleon, and waiting a la Prometheus for a delegation to 
come and wrest him from obscurity and ignominy and beg him to resume the 
reins of the bank) and above all his repeated use of Biblical language, the 
rhetoric of resurrection, of "the kingdom, the power and the glory." At one 
point he even tries to co-opt Erhart into his vision of resurrection to a new life 
through hard work. But his confidence is plagued by self-doubt and his 
agitation rises against the relentless tempus fugit of the play. 
His overture to Erhart comes in Act ill. It is quite a reversal from his 
earlier position when he explains to Ella that it makes no difference to him if 
Erhart traded the Borkman name for the Rentheim name, as he is man enough 
to bear his name alone. But what has come between this solipsism and this 
em pty overture is his anagnorisis. 
As we have seen, Borkman's anagnorlsls IS facilitated through the 
structure of pride, which, as we have seen is not sustainable if it is not 
discernible to others. When this rupture occurs, shame, its counter-emotion 
takes root. 33 Shame is distinct from guilt. Guilt is occasioned by the knowledge 
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that the agent has transgressed, has violated some code, the validity of which he 
accepts (a moral code for example) or one that is imposed on him (a legal one). 
Shame, on the other hand is not so localised; "it is the emotion evoked by 
shocks to our self-respect",34 in other words when we are reduced in our own 
eyes or the eyes of others (Borkman's "genfoo te eje") in extreme cases this can 
lead to an annihilation of our sense of identity.35 It arises as Douglas Cairns puts 
it "out of a tension between the ego and the ego-ideal - not the ego and the 
super-ego as in guilt"36 Borkman makes a clear acknowledgement of loss of 
integrity and the desertion of his project His commitment to the "bundne 
millioner" has degenerated into empty posturing, occasioning shame. 
Borkman's anagnorisis takes this form. It is not a question of recognising 
his crime on a forensic level, but the crime against his identity as well as 
acknowledging his offence against Ella. The pride-shame nexus is central to the 
ancient Greek notion of aidos, which loosely translates as shame. Aidos in 
classical tragedy is intimately connected with honour: "the notion of honour is 
never far away from the evaluation that is constitutive of aidos".37 In the chapter 
on Brand we considered the example of Ajax who took his own life as a result of 
the damage done to his ideal self as constituted by the honour code. It is the 
same mechanism that is at work here: it is a deep sense of loss of stature that 
precipitates Borkman's an agnorisis, free of the obfuscations raised by the 
misdirected guilt that devours Solness.38 This prompts Borkman's belatedly 
reaching out to his son in an attempt to salvage some of the 'other-regard' so 
necessary for validation of his project. And when this fails, Borkman 'puts on 
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the harness of necessity' and goes out to meet his death on the snowy prospect 
His exit at the end of Act ill is preceded by a long silence on his part, and his 
announcement of his departure is evocative of Oeopatra's speech before she 
takes the poison. Compare: 
BORKMAN (sam vagnende til beslutning). Sa ud i 
uvejret alene da! Min hat! Min kappe! (Han gar skyndsomt 
mod dRJren). (3.111). 
CLEOPATRA. Give me my robe, put on my crown; 
I have immortal longings in me. (Act V S IT, 11. 282). 
Act III defines the terms of Borkman's decision to walk out to his death. This 
act, as well as containing his recognition of his desertion of his project, also 
contains a protracted debate on lykke. 
8.4.3 Lykke: Erhart 
Borkman, unlike Solness, never participates in this debate from a 
personal point of view. In the discussion involving Ella, Gunhild, Borkman, Fru 
Wilton and Erhart himself, Erhart asserts his right to live for happiness, on a 
very personal level. His encomium on lykke provides an interesting 
counterweight to that of his aunt's. Rejecting the burden of 
restoration/ restitution imposed on him by his mother and his aunt, he insists 
on breaking out of the tragic cycle and the death-in-life they represent, and at 
the same time he rejects his father's appeal to join him in a new life. He 
acknowledges Ella with gratitude for having enabled him to grow up with" al 
den sorgl0se lykkef01else, som jeg tror der kan vcere over noget barns Iiv" 
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(3.103) - (perhaps one of only a handful of Ibsen children thus blessed). He 
presents very rational objections to the careers mapped out for him, refusing to 
become Ella's son, but rejecting his mother at the same time, accusing her of 
having crippled his will by annexing it for her own purposes: 
Du, du har vreret min vilje! Jeg selv har aldrig fat lov til at 
ha'nogen! Men nu kan jeg ikke bcere dette ag lrenger! Jeg er 
ung! Husk vel pa det, mor! (med en hejligt, hensynsfuldt blik 
til Barkman.) Jeg kan ikke vie mit liv til soning for nogen 
anden. (3.104) 
He rejects the validity of any kind of livskald so central to the identities of 
most of Ibsen's creations, especially one imposed vicariously on him. He 
identifies lykke as the birthright of the young, but fails to provide any substance 
to it It certainly does not involve work - it is its antithesis as he makes clear to 
his father: IIJa men jeg vii ikke arbejde nul For jeg er ung! [00'] Jeg vii ikke 
arbejde! Bare leve, leve, levee [00'] For lykken" (3.106). And Iykke in Erhart's 
version of it consists in his love affair with Fanny. But the love he shares with 
Fanny does not have any of the romantic poetic reach of Foldal's dream of II den 
sande kvinde"; neither is there any sense of depth to it: Fanny already has one 
husband who is dead to her, and has decided to take Frida along on the trip 
south to cater for Erhart's needs once he grows tired of her. 
This version of lykke seems to be more a reflection of Erhart's need to 
escape the IIstueluft" than a positive value in itself. Not only does it lack on the 
one hand the carefree poetry of the Ejnar-Agnes alliance, but it also implies an 
appalling commensurability - the kind asserted by Borkman earlier in the play 
when he insists that one woman can easily replace the other. This is what the 
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character of Ella exists to negate. The entire story of Ella's suffering has arisen 
from the inescapable fact that when true love occurs, the beloved is 
irreplaceable. To argue the opposite is to diminish the integrity and 
individuality of persons. 
It is therefore impossible for the Erhart-Fanny-Frida triad to remain in 
the tragedy, and thus they exit and set off on their journey south, stepping out 
of the tragedy as determinedly as the Regine-Manders-Engstrand constellation 
does in Gengangere. 
8.5ActN 
8.5.1 Utenfor muren 
Their decision to leave to travel south coincides with Borkman's decision 
to walk out into the icy cold. Erhart's very simplistic version of happiness 
cannot speak to his father, for it does not provide any kind of possibility for the 
assertion of a great project. Borkman exits to make a final pilgrimage to his 
former vision of the great kingdom. He encounters Foldal, who has just been 
run over by the sled spiriting his daughter off to an uncertain future with Fanny 
and Erhart. Despite this knock, Foldal is still sustained by his versions of "liBe 
lykke", whether they reside in the romantic abstraction of the Ewig weibliche: 
"Det er sa lykkeligt og sa velsignet at tcenke pa at ude, rundt om os, langt borte, 
- der findes dog den sande kvinde" (2.78), or in his optimism for his daughter's 
future. 
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The encounter with Foldal gives Borkman a second chance to display his 
emerging humanity. He indirectly concedes his wrong to Foldal in his 
statement that this was not the first time he had been run down, and even 
affectionately calls him "gamle ven" (4.120). 
As he progresses upwards with the dying Ella who struggles to keep up 
with him, it becomes clear that he cannot resolve the tension between the 
humanity that she represents and the inhumanity of the tragic identity. The 
landscape here is of great significance. Not only does it serve as a 
counterweight to the "fengselsluff' of the Rentheim estate but it grants 
Borkman a space of play in which to assert the tragic, which the house would 
have denied him. 
This in no way suggests that the tragic cannot be played out in the 
bourgeois home - Rosenvold is the locus classicus of such potential. But Borkman 
had not been engaged in this world for many years, and thus an exit from this 
stasis was the only way open to him. Had he stayed in Gunhild's parlour, the 
best that he could have done would have been a recantation a la Bernick. The 
landscape that the bourgeois world gives out onto at the end of this play is 
what Fritz Paul terms the "heroic landscape".39 Borkman is now "utenfor 
muren" - outside the house and the city, the polis. Resisting Ella's "lokketoner" 
to return to the secure warmth of the house, he celebrates his rejection of his 
past years of self-imposed isolation, and goes into exile in the manner of 
classical heroes. He formulates this assertion of freedom in a mode anticipating 
the high Expressionism of the later Strindberg, claiming if he returns, "loft og 
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vcegge vilde skrumpe sig sammen. Knuge mig. Klemme mig flad som en flue" 
(4.121). 
By allowing Ella to walk with him, he is conceding her importance and 
establishing the terms of his tragedy, and the reality of the choice he made all 
those years ago. This belated, unspoken acknowledgement permits a closure, 
which, without being a resolution of conflicting values (if anything this play is 
as sharp a portrait of tragic incommensurability as anything Ibsen wrote since 
Brand) shows a hero who has broken out of the solipsistic cycle and yet at the 
same time reasserts his tragic identity and his commitment to his project. 
For the first time Ella brings her charge of murder against Borkman 
without it falling on deaf ears. He is aware of the scale of the sacrifice exacted 
for what Daniel Haakonsen describes as his "chimerical world" .40 He paints a 
picture of his dream of establishing a worldwide sense of community, and to 
bring warmth to countless homes. This is what he was on the brink of achieving 
"den gang jeg, - den gang jeg d0de" (4.123). 
Ella is clearly moved by this confession. For in it is an acknowledgement 
of his finitude and vulnerability. In this final act she calls him John, the plain 
element in his name, not the John Gabriel Borkman of his over-reaching ego or 
his former reputation. Here she is reaching out to the man, the human being she 
once loved.41 
She insists, however, that where he sees warmth and community, she 
feels an icy blast. This provides the key to the irreconcilable conflict "Det pust 
virker som livsluft pa mig", explains Borkman, and describes the night of his 
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failure. His ode to capital takes his discourse to previously unsealed heights, far 
beyond the posturing of earlier acts, and persuades us of his commitment to his 
vision: "Jeg elsker eder, der I ligger skindede i dybet og i merket! Jeg elsker 
eder, I livkrcevende verdier - med alt eders lysende felge af magt og ~re. Jeg 
elsker, elsker, elsker eder!" (4.124).42 This is followed by his acknowledgement 
that he sold the human heart that loved him for "rigets - og magtens - og ~rens 
skyld". Borkman agrees with Ella when she declares that this particular trade-in 
is one with no returns: "Du vinder aldrig den pris, du kr~vet for mordet Du far 
aldrig holde noget sejersindtog i dit kolde, merke rige! (4.124)." This is an 
assault on the vain hope Borkman had been nurturing during all those years of 
isolation: his vision of vindication through his own version of "oppstandelsens 
dag". However, when Borkman walks out "utenfor muren" into the coldness of 
the night, he leaves this dream behind. There is no mention of it in Act N. 
When the crisis occurs, and Borkman suffers a heart attack brought on 
not by the icy hand that Ella feels but by an iron hand, he is positioned and 
ultimately destroyed by competing values. The ice hand as the avenging angel 
of human love and instinct betrayed; the iron hand that of a vision betrayed. 
Ella sees Borkman's death as a merciful release from the grip of both. At first 
she decides to rush off back to the house to find help, and unwittingly repeats 
the words Gunhild had uttered in the previous act when her sick wolf threatens 
to make a break for freedom: "Bliv rolig liggende der du ligger" (4.125) / 
"Forhold dig rolig, der du ligger!" (3.100). 
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When Gunhild enters, not as a response to any appeal or cry for help 
from Ella, but out of what can only be seen as residual concern and she realises 
that Borkman is dead, her first thought is that he took his own life. Ella 
reassures her that he did not die by his own hand but by an "isnende 
malmhand", thus fusing the two poles of the conflict the human and that of his 
calling.43 
Borkman's death is Ibsen's final statement of how the competing 
demands on his heroes: "veer human" when pitted against the relentless deontic 
"jeg rna" of their modality, can only synthesise in death and annihilation. For 
the first time, the death of the hero brings about a sense of catharsis: Though 
reduced to aging and dying "shadows" and having been stripped of all 
occasion for their own consuming passion - revenge on Borkman and 
possession of Erhart - Ella and Gunhild can now come together in a final 
assertion of love, and forgiveness, not entirely overwhelmed by the bleakness of 
the landscape. 
With this last play, which clears the way for the dramatic epilogue Niir vi 
dRJde vagner, Ibsen has shown how modern tragedy, just as Greek tragedy, can 
be "propelled by a small set of irreducible determinants of which three seem to 
be of special importance: compulsion, excess and identity. In concrete linguistic 
terms, tragedy tends to foreground must and too and the name". 44 We have seen 
how the majority of his tragedies is supported by heroes whose mode is jeg rna: 
necessity as opposed to ability, or rather, reaiisability, which inevitably involves 
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a transgressive excess in the struggle to realize and sustain tragic identity. 
Except this time this tragic constellation is nuanced with catharsis. 
With John Gabriel Borkman, "Ibsen has joined reality and symbolism with 
the spirit of tragedy."45 The tragic belongs fully to the realist realm but looks to 
symbolism for its expression. But this is the last such tragedy Ibsen wrote. In NAT vi 
dade vagner Ibsen shifts the experience of the tragedy into the symbolic and the 
allegorical, and the result is a new dramatic expression, remote from Aristotelian 
prescriptions. 
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I assumed that everyone was aware that 
Ibsen was carrying the Greeks into the 
nineteenth century - Arthur Miller 
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Conclusion 
Had Arthur Miller been correct in his assumption that "everyone was 
aware that Ibsen was carrying the Greeks into the nineteenth century", there 
would have been no reason to write this thesis.1 If the preceding analysis has 
been successful, it will have established three major points: a) that with Ibsen, a 
secularised world view can sustain a tragic vision, b) that this tragic vision is 
predicated as much on the recognition of the vulnerability of human happiness 
as Greek tragedy and c) that Ibsen's tragic practice reproduces many of the 
concerns of Aristotelian theory. 
Those who read in the history of tragedy a diachronic corruption of the 
Attic ur-form overlook the fact that far from being the scourge of modern world 
outlooks and aesthetics, the secularisation of the core of tragic action goes back 
to Aristotle. Even critics like Raymond Williams, who are in no doubt as to 
Ibsen's rightful place in the pantheon of tragic authors, identify the 
secularisation of tragedy as a much later chapter in the history of the genre.2 
Thomas Van Laan's work has yielded the clearest conclusions regarding 
the family resemblance between Aristotle and Ibsen, and he has convincingly 
demonstrated how Ibsen was essentially an Aristotelian dramaturge in whose 
hand the basic template underwent several modifications. 
My reading of lykke and its cognates as residing at the centre of the tragic 
agon and as the notion which best encapsulates Ibsen's 'tragic sense of life' has 
attempted to build on Van Laan's conclusion, and in doing so finds Ibsen even 
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closer to the spirit of the Greeks and their negotiations with eudaimonia than 
previously thought 
But I have not argued for a 'heritage' view of Ibsen's tragedy. While he 
was clearly writing within a tradition, whether extending it or subverting it, he 
was rarely content with imitation and re-presentation. The readings of the 
moral questions that these plays openly address, such as some of the crucial 
nodes in Kantian and Utilitarian ethics, show how Ibsen lived up to his own 
standards for the poet .... [ ... ] Digterens Opgave: at klarg0re for sig selv, og 
derigjennem for andre, de timelige og evige Sp0rgsmaal, som r0rer sig i den Tid 
og i det Samfund, han tilh0rer" (HU XV.394). Both the 'timelige' and the 'evige' 
participate in Ibsen's tragic vision, the one never obscuring the other. 
This thesis has interpreted its conclusions about Ibsen's development as 
a tragedian as falling into three phases: high tragedy; naturalist-realist tragedy 
and finally, a significant variation on high tragedy. This is by no means an 
original conclusion; Sverre Arrestad had explicitly mapped out the same three-
part structure in 1959.3 It is simply that it arrives at it through a different set of 
pre-occupations and therefore extrapolates different conclusions from the three 
phases. 
The first, historical phase reveals a young playwright who had already 
organised his tragic vocabulary into semantic groups based around notions of 
contingency and happiness, but who was still undecided as to how to read 
Heraclitus's enigmatic conclusion ethos anthropo(i) daimon: 'the character of a 
f '? man determines his fate' - or - 'fate determines the character 0 a man. 
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By the time Brand was written, it is clear that Ibsen was more concerned 
with ethos than daimon. In this play daimon is absorbed by ethos and produces 
the 'necessary identity' of the compulsive tragic hero who re-emerges in the late 
plays. 
In the middle phase, questions of fate, contingency and daimon have all 
been subsumed by a naturalist philosophy. However, Ibsen does not permit the 
heroic to be stifled under determinism. In Et Dukkehjem and Gengangere choice 
lies at the heart of the drama, and is just as crucial for the revelation of character 
as it is in the Poetics (1139a22-3). The fact that these choices are made against an 
implied deterministic scheme intensifies rather than diminishes their tragic 
significance. Rosmersholm shifts the focus onto the experience of searching for 
the happiness within a rationalist world view. It reveals the recalcitrance of 
human experience to rationalist templates, and the power of areas beyond our 
control, such as the tuche of the passions, which confounds the quest to 'se helt 
til bunds' and prevent us from being transparent to ourselves. These plays paint 
a paradoxical portrait of the human who is at once enlightened and at the same 
time vulnerable because of that very enlightenment. 
The final phase signals a renewed openness to the supernatural and 
forces of contingency. While Bygmester Solness and John Gabriel Borkman point to 
the many ways in which luck, neutral or moral, can be decisive in the story of a 
life (Solness's good luck, Borkman's bad luck), Ibsen is relentless in his 
insistence that these areas do not eliminate responsibility or be allowed to 
obscure insight This goes as much for incidental as constitutive luck. These 
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plays explore the ontological vulnerability of the happiness of any individual 
who resists living the unexamined life. 
The most important conclusion that this reading of Ibsen has revealed, 
however, is that the tragic experience is structured around the hero's 
relationship to lykke in some form, and it is through this deceptively mundane 
word that Ibsen enlarged his tragic world from a crude, schematic structure to a 
highly sophisticated representation of "timelige og evige sp0rsmaal". There is 
an inherent split at the heart of lykke, which makes the end of human life always 
divided against itself. This irredeemable division encapsulates the Ibsenian 
agon, and makes Ibsen, like Euripides, tragikotatos.4 
To return to Arthur Miller's comment quoted above, the view that Ibsen 
carried the Greeks into the nineteenth century is by no means the prevailing 
wisdom. As we saw in Chapter W, there is still a tendency to deny that he was 
a tragic playwright at all. A choice has to be made. We could bow to the purists 
and opt for an exclusive view of tragedy. Steiner's most recent inventory of 
'pure tragedy' only admits a handful of Greek plays, Marlowe's Faustus, King 
Lear, Timon of Athens, Racine and Wozzeck.5 But this stance obscures the fact that 
tragedy is as Martha Nussbaum so aptly puts it "a messy business," and it is 
therefore too reductive and too limiting.6 The term 'tragedy' is not a recondite 
term, and in view of its immense purchase on the literary and popular 
imagination, it cannot usefully be thus circumscribed. As long as the term is 
applied in a considered way, there is no reason why it should not be applied to 
a far wider range of authors. A more hospitable approach is needed for 
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definitions to be more useful. Gilbert Ryle's analogy of the car park makes the 
point A car park need not contain any particular model of car; it need not 
contain any car at all, "but one thing it must have, and that is room for cars, no 
matter whose, and no matter of which make."7 
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Endnotes 
1 Arthur Miller in an interview with Christopher Bigsby, quoted in Brenda Murphy, "The 
Tradition of Social Drama" in The Cambridge Companion to Arthur Miller, ed. Christopher Bigsby, 
Cambridge, 1997, p. 15. 
2 Raymond Williams, Modern Tragedy, London, 1966, p. 30: "What has mainly to be shown, if the 
historical development of the idea of tragedy is to be fully understood, is the very complicated 
process of secularisation. In one sense all drama after the Renaissance is secular [ ... ]." 
3 Sverre Arrestad, "Ibsen's Concept of Tragedy", PMLA LXXIV, 1959, p. 285. 
4 Aristotle described Euripides thus ("most tragic") in Poet XllI. 
5 George Steiner, "Tragedy Pure and Simple", in Tragedy and the Tragic: Greek Tragedy and 
Beyond, M. S. Silk ed., Oxford, 1996, p. 542. Steiner also accepts "moments" in Ibsen, Slrindberg 
and Beckett. 
6 Martha Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy, Cambridge, 1986, 
p.14. 
7 Gilbert Ryle, Dilemmas, Cambridge, 1954, p. 84. 
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